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ABSTRACT 
The foundations of multi-attribute uti l i ty theory are reviewed and 
compared w i t h the author 's p r a c t i c a l experience and other 
psychological studies of decision-making. The case is presented 
for a new approach to decision-making, moving away from the 
strictly numerical techniques. Instead of concentrating on the 
n o r m a t i v e or desc r ip t ive aspects of dec i s ion-making , the 
meta-problem of decision-making is studied, thereby giving the 
decision-maker more control over the decision-making process and 
ensuring a more truly p a r t i c i p a t i v e approach to design and 
decision-making. The problem of uncertainty is also tackled by 
considering it from both the stochastic and fuzzy standpoints. A 
revised approach to the assessment of uncertainty and its 
incorporation in the decision-making process is advocated. The 
theoretical framework behind these ideas is expressed using fuzzy 
set theory. Previous attempts to apply fuzzy set theory to 
mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision-making are reviewed and criticised for 
their failure to tackle the basic assumptions of mul t i -a t t r ibu te 
u t i l i t y t heo ry . A p r a c t i c a l methodology for using verbal 
descriptions is derived, and illustrated with a worked example. A 
pract ical description of how to apply the method is included, and 
the results of some applications are presented. 
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QUOTATIONS 
"One of the chief d i f f i c u l t i e s l ies in p rope r ly descr ib ing the 
assumptions which have to be made about the motives of the 
individual." 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern 
pg.8, "The Theory of Games 
and Economic Behaviour", 1947 
"I'm not fascinated, but I am very, very interested." 
Xander Jones (age 8) 
upon being shown a Jacob's 
Ladder 
"If we have a correct theory but merely prate about i t , pigeonhole 
i t and do not put i t into practice, then that theory, however good, 





by now i t is a platitude to state again the importance of decision analysis 
in our modem complex world. Multi-attribute decision-making is only one 
part of the f i e l d , but has received fa i r at tention and there have been a 
selection of ways in which this problem has been tackled. One of the 
reasons for such a variety of approaches is that multi-attribute problems 
are so common and occur in every field of endeavour, so that the various 
inves t iga to r s have brought d i f fe ren t beliefs and practices to choose a 
solution. 
The main thrust of the study of multi-attribute decision-making has come 
f r o m the disciplines of psychology and management sc ience. The 
psychologists seek to understand the underlying mechanism of the largely 
intuitive process of choosing between alternatives. Management scientists 
are in te res ted because 'good' and 'bad' decisions may have serious 
commercial consequences, so they require a reliable method of making 
decisions so as to enjoy a successful outcome. 
However, despite a f lu r ry of interest in the s ix t i e s , m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e 
decision-making is not so fashionable with psychologists now, with the early 
models having proved unsatisfactory. From the management science point 
of view, l i t t le seems to have changed lately. The recent books on decision 
analysis still religiously quote the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
which was published in 1947 ("the most unread best seller in the social 
sciences other than the Kinsey report", Edwards, 1971), and each book 
seems to be largely a reiteration of all those previous. , 
j 
t 
To explain this apparent stagnation of the topic, we may look at the history 
of the subject and the present cul tural environment. Decision analysis 
took off with opertional research, which arose around the time of World 
War I I . The Armed Forces wanted to know how best to deploy their 
resources so as to defeat the enemy. The best minds were involved in the 
study and once the War was over, operational research remained with its 
emphasis on measurement and model l ing . The goal of the o r i g i n a l 
operational research teams was relat ively value-free, although emotive 
beyond its context, i.e. destroy enecfjyNforces. This encouraged a sc ien t i f i c 
£ ^ , - C E ' F > \ 
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o b j e c t i v e at t i tude, wi th wholly appropriate tools and results. In the 
post-war period, the cultural environment encouraged this ' rat ional ' a t t i tude 
and so i t persisted and is obvious in the textbooks of the f i f t ies . The 
development of decision analysis reflected this at t i tude and emphasised the 
decision technique and the skills of the analyst, ignoring the decision-maker. 
However, the cultural environment changes again, moving away f r o m s t r i c t 
ob jec t iv i ty in the fields which involve human reasoning, and some parts of 
decis ion analysis are being tugged in th is d i r e c t i o n . I n s t e a d o f 
concentrating on the application of the decision technique, decision analysis, 
and multi-attribute decision-making in part icular , are looking more closely 
at the decision-maker himself. 
This is the attitude which this thesis adopts. Rather than concentrating on 
mathematical rigour in decision analysis, I shall take a looser approach to 
the problem of mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision-making, involving the user in a 
participative design role, with a corresponding de-emphasis of the analyst 
and his t radi t ional techniques. The burden of decision-making is returned 
to the decision-maker, but with tools and a structure to assist him. 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to multi-attribute decision-making, as i t 
is normally pursued. General human problem-solving is described b r i e f ly 
and multi-attr ibute decision-making is placed within context. The problems 
of assessing both objective and subjective criteria are examined and previous 
attempts to do this are reviewed and their drawbacks considered. 
Chapters 3 and 4 move on to consider the two techniques which are almost 
always used, i.e estimation of the probability of events and the assessment 
of the u t i l i t y of the consequences of events . The many faces of 
uncertainty are considered only briefly but its origins in lack of knowledge 
and lack of insight are presented. The axioms of u t i l i t y are discussed, 
together wi th their practical difficulties, and a reassessment of the role and 
treatment of probability in decision-making is proposed. 
Chapter b in t roduces the no t ion of fuzzy sets and discusses their 
appropriateness to handling this subject, bcwA. as it ia wi th vinjtinnnss, 
subjective opinions and lack of information. "Ihe choice and definition of 
adjectives, the use of pairs of s ta tements and the advantages and 
disadvantages of truth functional modification and its inverse are considered. 
- 3 -
Chapter 6 presents a review of other attempts to apply fuzzy set theory to 
mul t i - a t t r ibu te decision-making and concludes that they have fa i led to 
attack the root of the problem. 
In Chapter 7 we have an attempt to do just that. Rejecting many of the 
approximations of traditional multi-attribute utili ty theory in a fundamental 
postulate and introducing a more human-oriented, fuzzy attitude, a new 
approach to mul t i - a t t r i bu te dec i s ion-making is presented. This is 
i l lustrated by examples, and its philosophical and axiomatic foundations are 
discussed. 
Chapter 8 presents a recipe for the application of such an approach, within 
a participative framework and considers how this will affect the role of the 
analyst wi th his consequent loss of control. Some attempts to apply this 
fuzzy approach are described in Chapter 9. 
The thesis closes w i t h a summary of its broad conclusions and some 
suggestions for fur ther development of the ideas and the direct ion such 
work is likely to take in the future. 
- A -
CHAPTER 2 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING AND 
MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING 
Before proceeding to discuss m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e dec i s ion -mak ing , i t is 
appropriate now to set i t within the context of problem-solving in general. 
Human problem-solving behaviour has been described, notably, by Newell and 
Simon (1972). They s tudied the behaviour of individuals who were 
presented wi th problems in chess, c ryptar i thmet ic and theorem proving. 
They formulated a general model of such behaviour, depicted in Figure 2.1. 
The sort of problems Newell and Simon's subjects faced had some features 
in common. These were, f i r s t l y , that the problem-solver was the only 
person involved in the task and its outcome; no one else could be a f f ec t ed . 
Secondly, i f the f i r s t solution method failed, the subject could continue to 
apply trial methods until one succeeded or he gave up. The environment 
imposed few constraints upon the problem-solver - he was not restricted by 
time, money or the effects of his actions upon other people. 
However , in r ea l l i f e , the environment does impose constraints upon 
problem-solving behaviour. The environment may not be able to permit 
the expenditure of large amounts of t ime and e f f o r t upon the repeated 
implementation of trial solutions. The problem must be solved at the f i r s t 
a t tempt , and the luxury of failure is denied. The problem-solver must focus 
his attention upon selecting the method which wil l solve the problem at the 
f i r s t a t tempt. Not able to sequentially apply the suggested methods, the 
problem-solver wi l l be required to forecast f rom his own experience what 
the outcome of the various methods is likely to be. He is faced with a 
decision to make under uncertainty. 
In o rde r to f i n d ou t w h i c h p rob lem-so lv ing method to use, the 
decision-maker is faced with another problem - the meta-problem - which is 
how to select the best method. To do so he may seek some sort of 
decision technique to assist the problem-solving ac t i v i t y . This leads to a 
meta-meta-problem of how to select the best technique. This state of 
affairs is depicted in Figure 2.2. To solve the external problem in the 
environment, the problem-solver's output must be a selected, best method. 
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Figure 2.1. Newell & Simon's Problem Solver 
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a decision-technique, with a selected method as its output. But what sort 
of meta-meta-problem-solver is required to select the best techniques? 
in practice, the meta-meta-problem is given l i t t l e consideration. The 
decision-maker chooses the meta-problem-solver which is most conveniently 
to hand or best presented by its devotees and advocates. In some ways, 
this thesis is just such a me ta -me ta -p rob lem-so lve r . By means of 
argument and persuasion, i t w i l l t r y to compare and discuss some 
meta-problem-solving techniques, wi th the hope that the output w i l l be a 
"best technique". 
In many cases the decision technique will be determined, more or less, by 
the type of meta-problem to be solved. Dilemmas in scheduling and 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n have t h e i r own m e t h o d s of s o l u t i o n , b u t the 
meta-problem-solving method which we sha l l be concerned w i t h is 
mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision-making. This technique is used when the external 
problem in the environment requires the attainment of more than one 
o b j e c t i v e , and each problem-solving method only attains some of the 
objectives, to a greater or lesser degree. The interests of many groups of 
people may be involved and there may be only limited opportunity to apply 
the selected method. 
W i t h i n the context of human problem-solving ac t iv i ty , mul t i -a t t r ibu te 
decision-making must be seen as one method of producing an output f r o m 
the ci rc le on Newell and Simon's diagram (Figure 2.1) labelled "Select 
Method". The multi-attribute decision-making problem only exists when the 
problem which is to be solved is wi th in an environment which imposes 
constraints upon the problem-solver, so that repeated attempts at solving 
the problem are forbidden and only a small number, perhaps no more than 
one, method may be applied. 
MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING 
AND THE CYCLE OF ACTIVITY 
As p a r t of the general p rob l em-so lv ing a c t i v i t y , m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e 
decision-making will also involve steps which require the building up of an 
internal , mental representation of the external problem, acquiring further 
- 8 -
internal general knowledge and inventing or discovering more methods of 
solving the problem (See Figure 2.1). As the decision-maker examines the 
meta-problem of the selection of the method, he will build up his knowledge 
of the problem in a learning process. Thus, the decision-making problem is 
at two levels. F i r s t ly , there is the level of learning about the problem, 
and this proceeds via the second level which is the examination of the 
meta-problem of selecting a problem-solving method. The multi-attribute 
decision process w i l l be c y c l i c a l , since the process of l ea rn ing and 
perception af fec ts the selection of a method of solving the problem. If 
we attempt to delineate the activities involved in solving a mul t i - a t t r ibu te 
problem, they wi l l be joined cyclically, because of the feedback to earlier 
stages. 
Many such attempts to classify the stages of multi-attribute decision-making 
have been made and a few are contained in Appendix 1 to this chapter. 
The differences between classifications of the stages of activity are due to 
the level of generalisation intended and are biased towards each author's 
preferred approach. Any attempt to divide up the decision-making process 
into a series of stages w i l l be open to dispute, because of the cycl ica l 
nature of the ac t iv i ty and the overlapping stages. However, the value of 
such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s is in the i r usefulness as a t o o l to he lp the 
decision-maker to think more clearly about the decision-making process, 
since before the f inal selection, all stages should be comple t e . A 
suggested c l a s s i f i c a t i o n is depicted in Figure 2.3. The cycl ical and 
reiterative nature of the process is emphasised by the feedback loops in the 
diagram. 
Using this diagram as a framework, we shall consider each stage of the 
activity in turn. Although the stages w i l l be considered in the order in 
which they occur in the diagram, this does not necessarily mean that this is 
the only order in which to perform each action. 
Problem Recognition 
The f i r s t stage, problem recognition, is a preliminary to every decision 
problem. I t is a stage which is sometimes hastily done so t ha t the 
def in i t ion of the problem to be solved is only an impression of what the 
problem is, and some ideas for solving i t . For example, an overburdened 
l ibrary may decide that i t needs a computerised issue system to solve its 
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d i f fe ren t (expensive) issue systems without ever questioning if their problem 
i 
could not be solved by the elimination of repetitive and unproductive work 
e lsewhere . This stage needs to be treated with as open a mind as 
possible. Something like the 'system approach' is very useful at this stage 
for questioning the assumptions which underlie the problem statement, 
obtaining an overall understanding of the environment and clarifying the real 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . If this stage is not given proper attention, and the terms of 
reference in which the problem is couched are too res t r ic t ive , i t may turn 
out later that interesting and useful solutions are unnecessarily discarded. 
Perception of Environment 
The second stage refers to the environment of the problem. People will 
be affected by the outcome. In 3ome cases, this will be the decision-maker 
himself alone, but in the decisions of corporations and governments the 
number of people involved w i l l run into mill ions, whole nations. The 
target population can be divided into groups which wi l l be af fec ted in 
different ways, although certain individuals may be members of more than 
one group. The interests of the groups may be conflicting, and it is more 
of a moral decision whether the outcome should favour the underprivileged, 
the vociferous, the loyal or the party members. Pareto-optimality is one 
strategy for allocating benefits and a state of a f fa i r s is Pareto-optimal 
when "no individual can move to a more preferred position except by 
causing another to move to a less preferred position" (Seldon and Pennance, 
1976). This is just one social welfare function simony many possible, such 
as Kaldor's Compensation Principle or the Pigovian social welfare func t ion , 
which is also known as dollar democracy. 
Such a statement as Pareto-optimality provides one set of constraints on 
the solut ions of the p rob l em. Those which can be shown to violate 
Pareto-optimality would be immediately discarded. But the environment 
can provide other constraints such as the amount of money available, no 
foreign equipment to be bought, staff must not be reduced or no change in 
public image. These constraints can come in many forms and usually 
impose limits on the resources available or the changes which can be made. 
They are of ten stated as negative imperatives. Constraints are often 
mixed up with the objectives of the organisation and indeed they are very 
s imilur . As a means of distinguishing between them, Eilon (l'/72) suggests 
tluiL <N)ii!il.r;iint:i a iu the Don'In and Goals urn the Uou. I would suggest 
tha i cuii:;l rainl.:; an; impuuud by l l IC unvimnmLMil and (joalu or ohjiictivou arc 
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determined f rom wi th in the organisation. Thus, if one problem is to buy 
the most suitable car, and the ideal consists of high re l iab i l i ty combined in 
the same model wi th low cost, such a car does not exist and this is a 
constraint which cannot be violated within the present environment. The 
constraint of avoiding s ta f f reductions could be violated, if an alternative 
could be presented which was outstanding in every other way. So this 
constraint is really an objective of the organisation. 
These two stages are linked since they are both part of the learning process 
involving the environment and the problem which i t contains. The next 
stages will be concerned with the analysis of the problem and the search 
for the best solution. 
Suggestions of alternatives 
i The third stage can take many forms. For a system change, such as the 
library example above, the solutions would be possible alternative systems. 
For the prospective car buyer the alternatives are the cars available on the 
market. The businessman may find that the solutions to his problems are 
policy changes or strategies which he may adopt, affecting his future plans 
and behaviour. The alternatives may be tangible items, such as the 
m o t o r c a r s , or plans for the fu ture . There wi l l be some uncertainty 
associated wi th any al ternat ive, but some w i l l be more uncertain than 
others (particularly if the car is secondhand). 
i 
' This is the most creative stage of the problem-solving process. I t requires 
the imagination of the decision-maker to conjure up new and pertinent 
approaches to the problem. The environment's constraints may mean that 
t radi t ional methods of solving the problem may not be appropriate, and so 
new methods w i l l be needed. There have been suggestions of ways of 
improving this process, because the resulting decision will only be as good 
as the proposed alternatives, no matter how worthy the decision-making 
technique. Again, the systems approach is useful here in generating new 
perspectives upon the problem, but the decision-maker himself w i l l be the 
source of these ideas. As the analysis of the problem proceeds, new ideas 
may occur to the decision-maker, and so this is one stage to and f r o m 




Lis t ing objectives 
The four th stage of problem-solving is in determining the objectives of the 
organisation. In this discussion, organisation is taken as meaning any 
decision-making entity, whether large corporation or single individual. The 
organisation w i l l have objectives at many levels, some acting as banner 
statements of general policy, objectives within departments, the objectives 
of individuals and many more. For example, in the recent f i l m , Superman 
stated his objectives to be "To f igh t for t ru th , justice and the American 
way". These would be his banner objectives, but he has lesser objectives 
as wel l , such as to avoid lumps of deadly Kryptoni te and to court Lois 
Lane. He achieves these objectives by fighting the bad guys and upholding 
law and order, and in the execution of these self-imposed duties, he ful f i l l s 
many lesser, more immediate objectives as well. 
The statement of the higher order objectives will often be made as part of 
the definition of the problem, but this must be reduced to more day-to-day 
objectives. One way of doing this is to weight the higher order objectives, 
and in turn resolve each of these to lower order objectives which are 
weighted at this lower level. This tree ordering of the objectives is 
continued until the objectives are stated in terms of direct ly measurable 
quantities, such as CPU store or queuing time (Land, 1975). This means 
that there is a means of direct ly measuring every objective and so the 
separate alternatives can be assessed. However, this does have the effect 
of forcing objectives which refer to intangible quantities, such as prestige 
or t rust , to be measured using objective, tangible quantities. This problem 
has been recognised, and the assessment of both subjective and objective 
aspects has been incorporated in a single assessment technique (Mumford, 
Land & Hawgood, 1978). 
We must also distinguish careful ly between attributes and objectives. In 
some multi-criteria techniques the terms are used interchangeably, but we 
shall distinguish between them here. An objective is an aim or intention 
of the organisation, whereas an a t t r i b u t e is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
alternative solutions to the problem. A solution will fu l f i l l the objectives, 
to greater or lesser extent, and i t w i l l possess the attributes s imi la r ly . 
The assessment of how a solution will f u l f i l l the objectives may be done by 
expressing the objectives in terms of the attributes and weighting them as 
seen f i t , or by measuring or estimating the f u l f i l m e n t of the objectives 
directly. This dist inct ion is not o f ten made, and in many cases is not 
necessary. However, we must be aware of the fact that objectives are 
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of ten subjective or quali tat ive in nature, and the introduction of so-called 
objective measurements may be misleading or art i f icial . 
The Measurement of Alternatives 
In the discussion of the previous stage, we touched on ways that this can 
be done, i.e. by reducing the higher level objectives to direct ly quantifiable 
a t t r i b u t e s . When tangible and intangible aspects are being assessed 
toge ther , i t is sometimes suggested t h a t , as f a r as possible, the 
measurement of intangibles should be reduced to quantitative aspects. For 
example, some libnrarians wanted to measure the f r i e n d l i n e s s of the 
atmosphere of the l ibrary and they suggested using l_itres of Green Paint 
on the Walls' as an indicator of the presence of an o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e . 
However, this approach can run into difficulties, because no single objective 
attribute can be used to capture the essence of the subjective quality i t is 
at tempting to measure. If more than one objective measure is used for 
each objective, then difficulties can arise from two additional sources, apart 
f rom its inabi l i ty to capture the essence. Firstly, we may find that the 
same index is being used as part of the measure of two or more objectives. 
This leads to that index being counted twice, and hence being given greater 
weight than it should have. The second problem is that when two or more 
measures are being used to assess one objective, then there must be some 
means of combining these separate measurements to give a s ingle 
measurement . This can be done e i ther by the weighting of lesser 
objectives methods, mentioned earlier, or by an unvoiced, in tu i t ive method, 
as has been used. In the second case i t might be simpler to dispense with 
the objective measures and just rely on the subjective assessment at source. 
On a slightly d i f fe ren t tack, the substitution of objective measures for 
subjective objectives can lead to 'goal displacement'. The f u l f i l m e n t of the 
measurement becomes the objective. For example, an employment agency 
wishes to improve its performance as a body set up wi th the purpose of 
f inding people suitable employment. As a possible measure of success 
"Number of people interviewed each week" is adopted, since the more 
people who are being interviewed, the more people who w i l l f ind jobs. 
However, in order to increase the number of interviews, s taf f attend to 
their clients hastily and superf icial ly , so the final outcome may be fewer 
people placed in satisfactory jobs, but more people presented for interview, 
over and over again. 
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I t had been hoped that the eventual advances of science would yield 
objective measurements for subjective aspects too. 
It is more d i f f i c u l t to construct measures of effectiveness where 
qualitative objectives are involved than where only quanti tat ive 
ob jec t ives are concerned. This fact should not discourage 
efforts to transform qualitative objectives into quanti tat ive ones. 
The h i s to ry of science has repeatedly demonstrated that a 
p roper ty tha t appears in one era to requi re q u a l i t a t i v e 
treatement is converted into quantitative terms in another era. 
At one time such q u a l i t a t i v e p roper t i e s as "red" , "hard" , 
" intel l igent" and "communicative" were thought to be inherently 
qualitative. Today we know better. There is no logical or 
methodological reason (though there may be a practical one) why 
such concepts as "good wil l" , "morale" and "responsibility" cannot 
be reduced to quanti tat ive terms. (Churchman, Ackof f & 
Arnoff, 1957) 
While holding out hope for a quantitative, scientific future, such statements 
offer little consolation to the analyst faced wi th int ransigent^ quali tat ive 
criteria now, and aware of the dangers of overenthusiastic quantisation. 
In the twenty years since that passage was wr i t t en , we are no nearer 
o b j e c t i v e , ope ra t iona l measurements of "good w i l l " , "mora le" and 
"responsibility". This lack of progress may be a t t r ibuted to the inherent 
and undeniable subject ivi ty of such concepts. The nearest that we have 
come is the unsatisfactory method of awarding points out of ten, which is 
neither reproducible nor independent of the observer. 
It seems that we must accept that there are some aspects of l i f e and 
decision-making which cannot be measured precisely and objectively. To 
assess any alternative, these aspects must be measured in some way . 
Awarding marks out of ten is one method which may be adopted, allowing 
the subjective and objective aspects to be treated s imilar ly . Once they 
have been included in the calculations, the 'subjective numbers' are assumed 
to be accurate, within the error limits which it may be possible to include. 
H o w e v e r , these ' sub jec t ive numbers ' when compared to o b j e c t i v e 
measurements are meaningless and to treat them on a par is to accord 
them greater respectability than they deserve. The answers which emerge 
may appear to be acurate to several places of decimals, but unless such 
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answers can be shown to be stable over a range of values on the subjective 
attributes, within all the error limits, say, then they cannot be trusted. 
Objective and subjective aspects are fundamentally different. Until this is 
proved to be wrong, we must consider what is the best way in which to 
handle them j o i n t l y . This difference means that applying objective 
techniques to the estimation of subjective aspects can lead to error and 
misunderstanding, e.g. the substitution of inappropriate objective aspects, 
multiple use of objective aspects and goal displacement. See Appendix 2 
for an illustration. 
Sub jec t ive aspects are not precise and the prec is ion of numerical 
measurement is out of place. Objective and subjective aspects are both 
i m p o r t a n t , but decision-makers require some method of t reat ing them 
equally, and with the minimum amount of distortion. 
I would argue that the substitution of objective measurements for subjective 
criteria is a dangerous pract ice. The objective measurements, by their 
very nature, can never express the essence of the subjective objective and 
can lead to the over-emphasis of unimportant attributes and displacement 
from the true objective. 
Evaluation of Alternatives and Final Selection 
I have discussed the process of measurement along the various at tr ibutes or 
ob j ec t i ve s of the organisation, without saying anything on how these 
measurements are to be combined. In many cases, the mesurements w i l l 
be along different scales and hence impossible to combine without some sort 
of rationalisation. Cost-benefit analysis does this by converting al l the 
uni ts to £ and expressing the overall value of each alternative as a 
financial benefit or cost. Other methods use "uti l i ty" measurements which 
convert the quantities of each at t r ibute into "utiles", which measure the 
subjective value placed upon commodities. The subjective value of any 
commodity is supposed to be expressible in ut i les , which can be freely 
converted to any other commodity. 
Once the attributes of the proposed solutions have been measured, they 
require some sort of combination so as to give tin index of mer i t , upon 
which to huse the selection of the 'best' ultcrnntivo. Tho objoctives or 
attributes (wn nhnll refer to them both as 'enterin 1 whore there is no need 
- 16 -
to distinguish between them) assume dif ferent importances in the eyes of 
the decision-maker and so the relative weights of the c r i t e r i a must have 
some representation. This is often done by assigning a numerical weight to 
each c r i te r ion . We now have a list of c r i t e r ia , each of which has a 
numerical weight, and a set of solutions, each of which is separately scored 
for each of the attributes. 
There have been many ways suggestged of combining these figures. See 
Table 2.1. The simplest method is to take the product of weights and 
scores and add them up. This method begs assumptions on the interactions 
between the attributes, but is o f ten used. Another method, which begs 
similar assumptions, is to multiply the products, obtained as before. These 
will be considered in Chapter 4. This method is not so commonly used, 
presumably because i t can cause wider variation and one must be careful 
not to include weights or scores which equal zero. Dujmovic (1977) and 
Easton (1973) both suggest higher order averages. Some of these have 
been investigated and are depicted in Figures 2.4-2.5 and Tables 2.1-2.5. 
There are three decision rules (wi th variations) common in the literature 
which evaluate multi-criteria alternatives in non-additive ways: 
(1) conjunctive - each cr i ter ion has a standard fixed, and the 
alternative must pass on a number of these s tandards. 
The standards must be set at a minimal level or few 
alternatives wil l pass. 
(2) disjunctive - standards are set of each criterion, but they 
are set at a maximal level , and an alternative need only 
pass on one. 
(3) l ex icograph ic - see Dawes (1964). The attributes are 
ranked in order of importance, and the i n t r a - a t t r i b u t e 
values are placed on an ordinal scale. All the alternatives 
are compared on the top-ranking cr i te r ion , and the highest 
scoring is selected. If there is a tie, they are compared 
on the next criterion and the process is continued unt i l a l l 
but one of the alternatives have been eliminated. 
MacCrimmon (1973) also suggests Dominance and Eliminating by Aspect. 
An alternative is dominant over another if it is better than or equal to the 
17 
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Figure 2.5 Comparison of C o r r e l a t i o n 
C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r Each Rule-Pair 
Geometric Harmonic 
Mean Mean 




Sum from Best 
The l e n g t h of a l i n e d i r e c t e d outwards from any corner i n d i c a t e s the 
rank c o r r e l a t i o n between the r u l e represented by t h a t corner and the 
r u l e towards which the l i n e i s d i r e c t e d . The c i r c l e s i n d i c a t e the 
maximum c o r r e l a t i o n . The c e n t r a l r o s e t t e d i s p l a y s the average of 
the c o r r e l a t i o n s of each r u l e w i t h the other f i v e . 
Each diagram in Figure 2.4 represents a separate group. The weights 
which a particular group has assigned to the objectives are combined with 
the scores of each of the 8 decision stategies or alternatives to produce a 
figure of merit for each strategy. Using the six combination rules of 
Table 2.1 produces six differing figures of merit for each strategy, for each 
group. These are plotted in Figure 2.4, to display the similarities and 











m objectives ^ ^ = 100 - 10 $ S i $ t <0 
Name Rule Normalised Version 
Sum F = 
i-i 
^WiSi F* = 500 * F 
H id 
F i = SO? - 50 
F l = 50 F 
Distance from F = fl- 1"K V^S*-*' | r J = 'COO - 5 0 >JT»i\1' 
best y Z . l t - fx^.J £Z, 
p i = 50 F -r 600 
For each rule, when all S| = 0, F 1 = 500, and when all S, = 10, F 1 = 1000 
* When a wj = 0, this is not included in the calculations and the n t n root 
is taken, when n is the number of non-zero weights. This maintains F^ 
at 500 when the Sj approach 0. 
** Squaring negative scores loses the information on the scores being less 
than zero. To al low f o r t h i s , the squared nega t ive scores are 
subtracted. 
The let ters in the leftmost column are used to distinguish between the rules 





Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Objective 
1 12 4 0 6 15 0 4 16 0 14 
2 1 0 1 0 46 79 9 28 76 10 
3 0 39 7 0 0 13 19 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 22 8 0 0 0 0 0 
5 38 0 0 0 0 0 13 22 16 2 
6 0 0 26 0 4 0 26 0 0 10 
7 23 18 36 48 0 2 0 34 0 36 
8 12 16 30 11 12 0 10 0 7 12 
9 0 23 0 13 0 4 0 0 0 0 
10 14 0 0 0 15 2 19 0 1 16 
SCORES 
Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Objective 
1 0 -1 -5 0 -4 -6 0 -7 
2 0 -4 -6 -4 0 9 0 -9 
3 3 0 0 -5 0 0 -3 5 
4 -4 -2 0 -7 0 -5 9 0 
5 -3 -7 0 0 -2 0 0 1 
6 -4 -2 0 0 -6 -9 0 -4 
7 6 0 0 0 0 -5 -1 1 
8 -2 0 -4 9 3 4 0 0 
9 0 0 0 -2 9 7 0 0 
10 2 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 
Table 2.2 
Weights and Scores 
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Figures of Merit 
Each group of weights is combined with the scores for each of the eight 
s t r a t eg i e s , using each of the six combination rules in Table 1. The 
resulting 480 figures of merit are listed in Tables .3a to 3j below, together 
with the rank orderings. 
Table 2.3a Group 1 
Strategy 
Rule 

































































































Table 2.3b Group 2 
Strategy 
Rule 


































































































Table 2.3c Group 3 
Strategy 
Rule 





































Table 2.3d Group 4 
Strategy 
Rule 
































































































































































Table 2.3e Group 5 
Strategy 
Rule 

































































































Table 2.3f Group 6 
Strategy 
Rule 


































































































Table 2.3q Group 7 
Strategy 
Rule 





































Table 2.3h Group 8 
Stragegy 
Rule 































































































































































Table 2.3i Group 9 
Stragegy 
Rule 

































































































Table 2.3j Group 10 
Strategy 
Rule 


































































































The correlation coeff ic ients are calculated between the rank orderings of 
the strategies. Each group has the coefficients calculated separately for 
all pairs of rules. 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Rule Pair 
Sum GM .81 .45 .55 .81 
DW .76 .93 .86 .96 
DB .61 .88 .93 .88 
LS .96 .98 .92 1.00 
HM .98 .95 .88 1.00 
GM DW .31 .24 .64 .73 
DB .14 .24 .74 .50 
LS .74 .43 .77 .81 
HM .75 .31 .74 .81 
DW DB .90 .95 .79 .90 
LS .99 .95 .98 1.00 
HM .81 .95 .67 .96 
DB LS .73 .90 .99 .88 
HM .67 .93 .67 .88 
LS HM .99 .95 .98 1.00 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
.47 .78 .91 .86 .88 .85 
.95 .99 .49 .50 1.00 .88 
.98 .99 .60 .60 1.00 .90 
.98 1.00 .93 .93 1.00 .98 
1.00 .99 .77 1.00 1.00 .98 
.37 .77 .18 .76 .88 .56 
.41 .77 .52 1.00 .88 .71 
.41 .78 .91 1.00 .88 .90 
.47 .77 .68 .86 .88 .77 
.98 1.00 .20 .76 1.00 .96 
.98 .99 .84 .86 1.00 .93 
.95 1.00 .40 .90 1.00 .93 
1.00 .99 .79 1.00 1.00 .90 
.98 1.00 .92 .86 1.00 .97 
.98 .99 .84 .86 1.00 .93 
Table 2.4 
Rank Correlation Coefficients 
For each Rule Pair, the mean and standard deviation of the correlation 
coefficients are calculated from the ten values in Table 2.4. 
































Standard Deviation of 
Correlation Coefficients 
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other on all a t t r ibutes, and better than one at least once. In practice, 
such a clearcut decision seldom arises. Elimination by Aspects is similar 
to lexicography because i t eliminates alternatives by comparison attribute by 
a t t r ibute . The attributes are not arranged in order of descending 
i m p o r t a n c e , but in order of descending discriminat ion power. A l l 
alternatives are compared on a part icular cr i te r ion wi th a set standard. 
Those which f a i l to comply are el iminated. The remainder are tested on 
the second attribute, and some more eliminated, until eventually only one is 
l e f t . Because of its s imi lar i ty with lexicography, this technique willl not 
be considered separately. 
Einhorn (1970) considers these three models and tests them against liner 
models on how judges select applicants f o r graduate school . Each 
applicant is considered on three criteria and the judges were asked to rank 
order 20 hypothetical applicants according to their acceptabili ty on the 
graduate program. These results yield the judges' regression weights on 
each criterion, and given a further 20 hypothetical applicants it was possible 
to predict according to the d i f fe ren t models how a particular judge would 
rank this second group of 20 applicants. He found the three judges used 
d i f f e ren t models, one conjunctive, one disjunctive and one using a complex 
combination of models. 
Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) explore combination of models and take into 
account second orders of the decision criteria, as well as cross terms, e.g. 
X j 2 and X j X j . They tested 29 judges who were deciding whether patients 
were neurotic or psychotic according to their MMPI scores (Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory). The models used were: 
1) Linear 
i-1 
bj represents least-square regression weights. 
2) Quadratic J~ ^ % i + J J b ^ i *J 
- - f i 7,, 
3) Sign model 
"A sign model consists of a linear combination of 70 clinical signs 
where a sign is any scale score or combination of scores however 
simple or complex which can be specified precisely." (Goldberg, 
1965) 
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The sign model contained cross terms (called configural) and rationally 
chosen variables based on, e.g., sums and differences of the 11 scales, as 
found in the clinical literature. They found 
13 sign model 
3 quadratic 
12 linear 
1 sign and linear equally well 
They found 16 judges took account of configural terms. 
Smi th and Greenlaw (1967) use an essentially lexicographic process to 
simulate the psychological decision processes in selection of personnel. 
Each job applicant sits a battery of tests, providing J.9 test scores, as well 
as some personal information, e.g. age, previous experience. Psychologists 
were asked to 'verbalise* how they selected an applicant as being suitable or 
otherwise for the job. They wrote a computer program wi th about 300 IF 
statements to simulate the process, and print out diagnostic remarks along 
the way. They found a surprising degree of s i m i l a r i t y between the 
classif icat ion and comments produced by psychologists and the computer on 
assessment of test cases. 
Tversky (1969) describes the lexicographic semiorder which is appropriate 
when the "relevant dimension is noisy as a consequence of i m p e r f e c t 
discrimination on or unreliabil i ty of available information". For example, 
if choosing a job applicant f rom a pair for a job where intelligence was 
most i m p o r t a n t , i t would be correct to pick the brighter of the pair. 
However, if their IQ scores were suff ic ient ly close together, e.g. 3 points 
separate them, as to make l i t t l e d i f ference , the decision-maker would 
consider them as equal and decide on the next criterion, e.g. experience. 
The process of aggregation is crucial to the decision-making process, since 
it can affect the eventual choice of a solution to an unexpected degree. 
I t is important to be aware of the idiosyncracies of the various aggregation 
techniques, and when they are applicable. I feel that the t ru th is that 
people do not always use one rule or another, but combinations of some. 
A certain rule may be obeyed locally in some part of the decision space, 
und a completely different rule at some other port. Without being sure of 
what, O I K ! i« doinij, it could lend to error to uuiiume thnt what seems to be 
u locally nccurutu rule will remain nccurate over the entire spuce, globally. 
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Throughout this discussion, I have avoided any mention of probability. This 
will be dealt wi th in Chapter 3. We shall take i t that the scores and 
weights are single-valued, wi th no estimate of error or probability. The 
aggregation methods discussed are valid in each case. 
Implementation 
Once the f ina l selection has been made, the next stage is implementation. 
This stage has received very l i t t le attention in the literature and this could 
be for a variety of reasons. Once the decision has been made, the analyst 
or consultant feels that his job is done and so is gone before the job is 
f ina l ly f inished. Or the implementation process is not so successful as 
people would like to think. Or there have been so few applications of 
decision making techniques that successful applications are thinner on the 
ground than we would imagine. Implementation can be a traumatic and 
irksome business. I f a change is imposed upon an organisation without 
prior consultation of the people involved, then the implementation of the 
project w i l l almost certainly be fraught with diff icul ty . To evaluate such 
a change requires the assessment of the reaction of crucial interest groups, 
and the decision-maker may find that his estimates of their reaction can be 
sadly out. This is one reason for consulting them at the planning stage, 
apart from gaining their moral support and interest. 
For successful implementation of a system change, consultation is very 
i m p o r t a n t , i f no t v i t a l . These r e m a r k s only apply when the 
decision-making entity is a corporation of some kind. For an individual , 
the implementation of such decisions is not often reported. To be sure, I 
would guess that few people use such techniques to make important personal 
decisions such as the choice of a spouse, with perhaps the notable exception 
of Charles Darwin. Having decided he needed a w i f e , he surveyed his 
eligible cousins and selected that one who most accurately answered his 
needs. Apparently his choice was a good one. (Litchfield, 1915) 
TYPES OF PROBLEM 
The types of problem which have been studied according to the pattern of 
multi-criterial techniques may be divided into two classes. These are the 
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classes of 
1) repeated decisions 
2) one-off decisions 
Examples of the first class are the admission of students to college and the 
classification of patients as maladjusted or not. Examples of the second 
class are decisions such as to install a new organisational system, or 
allocate a large amount of money on one particular project. 
The class of repeated decisions may seem to contradict the ideas in the 
first section, but this is not so. Although the decision-maker makes the 
same sort of decision repeatedly, each individual case represents a separate 
problem, which can only be solved once. Because the decisions in the f i r s t 
class are repeated, they may be subject to statistical analysis. With the 
example of the psychotic patients, their mental health can be measured by 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, which consists of 16 scales. 
The judges sort patients into 'maladjusted' or 'adjusted' according to these 
scores. If linear regression is applied to the patients' test scores and the 
judges' decisions, a model can be obtained which ought to p red ic t the 
answers the judges would give. The predictive ability of these models is, 
in general, not very high, but we shall discuss possible reasons for this later 
on. With one-off decisions, no s ta t is t ical analysis can be performed. 
With the first class, the decision-maker does have the opportunity to learn 
if his decisions were good and to modify his future behaviour accordingly. 
With the second class, the only learning that can be done is prior to the 
decision, and if the decision is bad, then tough. 
The first class of decision, the repeated decision, has received a great deal 
o f a t t e n t i o n in the psychology l i t e r a t u r e , because i t enables the 
psychologists to test their theories on the aggregation of informat ion by 
human judges. Because of their repet i t ive nature, these decisions are 
learnt according to a set of rules, which are passed on. Thus, the stock 
broker has a set of rules for governing his behaviour in the market, and 
these are passed on to his apprentices. This sort of decision behaviour is 
governed by a series of pragmat ic rules and so to t ry to model the 
decisions using a linear regression model would seem to be the wrong 
approach. Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) used other decision rules apart 
from the linear model and they found that the berhaviour of some judges 
was better described by quadratic or sign models. If it is the case that 
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the repeated decisions are made according to a set of rules, which may be 
revealed by stat is t ical analysis, then we may suppose tha t the value 
judgements f rom one-off decisions are also rule-based, and do not depend 
upon mathematical aggregation, which is the modelling technique commonly 
used. Since such decisions are only implemented once, the fault in the 
aggregation method can only be observed when i t is too late to amend the 
procedure. 
REVIEW OF TECHNIQUES 
We shall move on to consider some multi-attribute techniques and discuss 
them in the light of the previous part of this section. Chief amongst 
these is cost-benefit analysis, which illustrates many of the earlier points. 
Cost benefit analysis is thus a par t icular k ind of economic 
appraisal. It assumes that the considerations in an appraisal can 
be reduced to economic values, which w i l l represent the way 
people themselves value d i f fe ren t goods. This may sometimes 
include 'shadow prices' for goods in which there is no market, 
such as Norman churches and fine landscapes. I t fur ther 
logically assumes that all these can be rendered in money terms, 
and so made co-measurable. It then follows that these values 
can be aggregated to f ind a single best solution, in terms of 
benefits versus costs. Money valuation and aggregation are 
crucial features of cost benefit analysis. 
The above succinct description of cost benefi t analysis comes from the 
Leitch report (1978, ch.A) on the assessment of trunk road schemes. The 
characterist ic feature of cost benefi t analysis is indeed its at tempt to 
reduce the effects of a policy decision to monetary values, in order to fo rm 
some figure of meri t which w i l l assist in the choice between altgernaUve 
policies. 
According to Turvey (1969) the purpose of cost benefit analysis is two-fold: 
In one i t consists simply of the work necessary to present a 
decision taker with the information which he requires in order to 
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take a decision. In the other sense it goes further and includes 
the task of taking the decision. 
I t is in this duplicity of roles, I feel, that many of the criticisms of cost 
benefit analysis are founded. 
There seem to be three ways generally of dealing with somewhat subjective 
benefits and costs. The f i r s t is to infer their value i n d i r e c t l y f r o m 
people's behaviour. For example, during the enquiry into a third London 
airport, the value of a noise-free home was deduced by seeing how house 
prices in quiet suburbs compared wi th those of similar properties near a 
large airport. The second method is to go and ask people di rect ly what 
they think by carrying out social surveys. The third method is to ignore 
their measurement completely and list such ex t r a b e n e f i t s and costs 
alongside the economic considerations. 
Cost benefi t analysis tends to emphasise the easily quantifiable aspects of 
any proposed scheme. Williams (1972) blames this on the " s c i e n t i f i c 
sub-culture wi th in our society", so that "quantifiable things tend to take 
precedence over non-quantifiable things, and hence undue weight tends to be 
given to the insignificant things that CBA is able to measure with precision, 
while the crucial unmeasurables get neglected." He regre t fu l ly concedes 
th is as a l ikel ihood, but cannot p rof fe r any resolution of the dilemma 
between things quantifiable and non-quantifiable. 
In his book, Easton (1973) suggests many aggregation rules, or amalgamation 
rules as he prefers to call them. Many of these have been investigated in 
the ea r l i e r section on aggregation. He also advocates rules such as 
dominance and simple binary choice , which do not have very wide 
discriminatory powers. 
The Hawgood, Land and Mumford (1978) technique, called BASYC (Benefit 
Assessment for SYstem Change) pays careful at tention to all the stages 
mentioned in the earlier discussion. The aggregation method it employs is 
the addition of the products of weights and scores. However , i t 
incorporates an additional feature not normally treated explicitly, that of 
uncertainty. The decision-making group is asked possible outcomes of the 
alternative strategies, assuming both favourable and unfavourable states of 
nature. They are uskod to ontiinatti the outcomes which would lie roughly 
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at the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution of outcomes. These 
forecasts are referred to as 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic', although in most 
cases they are probably not the quarti le values. The opt imist ic and 
pessimistic levels are treated separately throughout the analysis, so that 
each alternative has two figures of mer i t . The decision-maker now has 
extra informat ion on the stabil i ty of the proposals to unknown f u t u r e 
events, and can use his own attitude towards risk to trade off between high 
potential benefit and lack of s tabi l i ty . This additional feature is well 
understood and t r ea t ed in pract ice . My own real objection to this 
technique is in its lack of flexibility when it comes to the aggregation stage. 
The BASYC technique is also part icular ly careful in its treatement of 
separate interest groups. Each group is allowed to set its own goals and 
to weight them accordingly. Their benefits are calculated separately and 
there is no attempt to impose a weighting upon the groups.It is up to the 
decision-maker himself, as this is essentially a political decision. 
Another markedly similar technique is that of Morris H i l l (1968). He 
distinguishes between constraints and objectives as follows: 
Constraints are a particular type of requisite. The achievement 
of s p e c i f i e d levels of p a r t i c u l a r ob j ec t ives may serve as 
constraints on the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the a l t e r n a t i v e plans, 
irrespective of the weight of these objectives in the total array 
of objectives. Thus, the maintenance of air pollut ion below 
s p e c i f i e d levels may serve as a constraint on the choice of 
alternative transportation plan even though the reduction of air 
p o l l u t i o n , expressed as an open-ended object ive, may not be 
highly valued by the community. 
He has an interesting interpretation of weights: 
The weights applied to the incidence of o b j e c t i v e s can be 
interpreted as the community's desired distribution of benefits 
relating to particular objectives. 
He also realises the importance of uncertainty, but fa i ls to o f f e r any 
concrete suggestions for treating i t , other than "supplementary comparisons 
where outcomes are sensitive to a particular contingency". Each goal is 
given a value and every group is given a weight, either for each goal 
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individually or for all the goals together. Costs and benefit are treated 
separately, allowing some element of risk assessment, since costs and 
benefits may not cancel out in the manner that such techniques suppose. 
Rather unexpectedly, he sums the costs and benefits for each goal, across 
the groups. Compare this wi th the BASYC technique, which produces a 
much more sensible sum across goals for each group. In general, this is a 
f a i r l y sound technique, but doesn't seem to go as far as it. should. The 
aims behind it are to be applauded. 
Bell (1970) used linear programming to select Research and Development 
projects. His technique seems to have narrow usefulness and i t took four 
years to develop his f i r s t model. Geoff r ion et al used a method which 
involved eliciting weights and trade-offs from people on the various aspects 
of an academic department's administration. He used an iterative process 
which he c la ims is easy to use w i t h computer assis tance. The 
mathematics wi th this method, in contrast to the others mentioned so far, 
is non-trivial. 
Moore and Baker (1969) classify R&D selection techniques into 4 groups: 
1) Scoring Models compute an overall project score based on 
various ratings assigned to each project for each relevant 
decision cr i te r ion and are designed to operate w i t h the 
subjective input data which exists at the research stages of 
the project l i fe . 
2) E c o n o m i c M o d e l s base p r o j e c t r a n k i n g s on such 
economiccriteria as rate of return and present worth. 
3) Constrained Optimisation methods which seek to optimise 
some objective economic f u n c t i o n subjec t to s p e c i f i e d 
resource constraints. 
3) Risk Analysis based on a simulation analysis of input data in 
distribution fo rm and which provide output distr ibution of 
such factors as rate of return, market share, etc. They 
proceed to compare the four models, warning against the 
excessive data required by some. 
In another paper, Pessemier and Baker (1971) ident i fy three methods , 
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comparative, scoring and benefit contribution methods. They explain the 
three methods thus: 
1) Dollar Metr ic Each judge is given a pair of projects and 
asked to say which is preferred, and how much the price 
would have to change before he would reverse his choice. 
2) Successive Rating Give 100 points to the most preferred 
project and an appropriate number to all the others. 
3) Successive Comparisons Each project is compared against 
selected subsets of alternative projects. 
They find that in practice the three methods produce similar results, but 
prefer the Dollar Metric method. Note that this is a decision-making 
case, in which the separate attributes of the problem are never stated. 
Perhaps this is because the members of the decision-making group are 
already fami l ia r wi th the attributes involved, and there is no point in 
stating them over again. This also means that there is no aggregation 
method explicitly involved. Direct preferences between alternatives are 
used. 
Dean and Nishry (1965) use two models: the scoring model which is 
appropriate at the early stages, and the profitability model which uses more 
detailed information. The scoring model is no different to the many other 
models we have seen. A single estimate of the weights and scores are 
provided, and the sum of their products provides a rating value of each 
project. To determine the weights of the at tr ibutes, or ' factors ' as they 
call them, the following procedure is used: 
Board members were asked to rank order factors . The rank 
orders were converted into numerical values, assuming equal 
intervals between adjacent ranks. These values were averaged 
across the review board members, assuming approximately equal 
degrees of knowledge. 
Without some jus t i f i ca t ion , these 
The profitability model is based on 
involves no consideration of multiple 
assumptions would seem questionable, 
purely economic aspects, and since i t 
criteria need not concern us. 
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A v e r y n e a t and t h o u g h t f u l t e c h n i q u e is t h a t o f G o o d w i n ( 1 9 7 2 ) . He 
e m p h a s i s e s t h e n e e d to t a k e c a r e o v e r t h e a s s i g n a t i o n o f t h e w e i g h t s 
b e c a u s e o f t h e m i x t u r e o f o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s , l a c k o f 
k n o w l e d g e and h a p h a z a r d t h i n k i n g . H e t r i e d a n u m b e r o f a g g r e g a t i o n 
m e t h o d s , b u t in t h e end used a s i m p l e a d d i t i v e m e t h o d . To c o n v e r t the 
assessment o f sub jec t i ve a t t r i b u t e s i n t o n u m b e r s , he s u g g e s t e d a s c a l e , as 
s h o w n in F i g u r e 2 . 6 . To t a k e a c c o u n t o f e r r o r or u n c e r t a i n t y in t h e 
we igh ts and scores, he used a c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m w h i c h a l l o w e d t h e w e i g h t s 
to v a r y by + / - 1 0 % o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l v a l u e s and the scores by + / - .5 . In 
th is way , he o b t a i n e d a r a n g e o f v a l u e s f o r t h e f i g u r e o f m e r i t o f e a c h 
a l t e r n a t i v e . He considers some o f the cases when over lap o f the ranges of 
d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s , and considers how to choose t h e o p t i m a l a l t e r n a t i v e . 
I w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t t h i s l a s t s t a g e s h o u l d be l e f t to the dec i s i on -make r 
h i m s e l f , know ing his own f a i t h in the f igures he p r o v i d e d . 
T h e L i t c h f i e l d , H a n s e n and Beck (1972) m o d e l is ve ry thorough and t r i es to 
t a k e a c c o u n t o f u n c e r t a i n t y by r e t h i n k i n g t h e c l a s s i c a l a p p r o a c h t o 
m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The c lass ica l mode l consists of a set o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e s and a s e t o f p o s s i b l e s t a t e s o f n a t u r e . E a c h o f t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s has a p a y o f f va lue assoc iated w i t h each s ta te of n a t u r e . The 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s o f n a t u r e a re a s s u m e d to be k n o w n . 
T h e y r e p l a c e t he s t a t e s o f n a t u r e w i t h a set o f ob jec t i ves or goal3 w h i c h 
the dec i s ion -maker wishes to ach ieve . The p a y o f f m a t r i x is s u s t i t u t e d by 
a se t o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f e a c h o b j e c t i v e be ing rea l ised by each a l t e r n a t i v e . 
The p r o b a b i l i t y o f o c c u r r e n c e is r e p l a c e d by a m e a s u r e o f t h e r e l a t i v e 
w o r t h o f e a c h o b j e c t i v e . The i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d by th is techn ique is 
q u i t e cons iderab le : 
1 ) E a c h d e c i s i o n - m a k e r p r o d u c e s a p r o b a b i l i t y c u r v e f o r t he 
leve l o f a t t a i n m e n t o f each a t t r i b u t e f o r each a l t e r n a t i v e . 
2) A 5-po in t u t i l i t y curve is ob ta ined fo r each a t t r i b u t e . 
3) The a t t r i b u t e s are we igh ted by t a k i n g s u c c e s s i v e p a i r s a f t e r 
r ank ing and assigning f igures to g ive r e l a t i v e va lue . 
T h e a n a l y s i s p r o d u c e s g r a p h s o f p r o b a b i l i t y a g a i n s t u t i l i t y f o r e a c h 
a l t e r n a t i v e . T h e s e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s are not scaled to inc lude the 
r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e of the a t t r i b u t e s . T h i s is done u s i n g a M o n t e C a r l o 
m e t h o d to e s t i m a t e t o t a l u t i l i t y . Where a consensus o f u t i l i t y f unc t i ons is 
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1 Very Low 
0 Absolutely None 
Figure 2. 6 Goodwin's Scale for Converting the 
Assessment of Subjective Attributes 
to Numbers 
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i m p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g g roup , a number o f runs can be done 
using the 'best ' , 'worst* and e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s . The o u t p u t f r o m 
t h i s m e t h o d iB a se t o f c u m u l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y e s t i m a t e s on the u t i l i t y o f 
each a l t e r n a t i v e . To rank order these graphs t h e a u t h o r s d e m o n s t r a t e h o w 
t h e g r a p h s m a y be c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a m e a n and v a r i a n c e , and m a y be 
p l o t t e d on a m e a n - v a r i a n c e p l a n e , t o a l l o w t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s t o m a k e 
t h e i r o w n c h o i c e . F o r a s y m m e t r i c d i s t r i b u t i o n s t h e y s u g g e s t a 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n m e t h o d t o m a k e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s s y m m e t r i c a l and a l l o w 
t h e m to be p laced on the p lane . 
T h i s m e t h o d seems a d m i r a b l e i n i t s i n t e n t i o n s , b u t does r e q u i r e a la rge 
a m o u n t o f i n f o r m a t i o n . A l s o , I w o u l d q u e s t i o n i t s t r a n s p a r e n c y t o t h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s ; do t h e y rea l l y unders tand w h a t becomes o f the da ta they 
s u p p l y , and how s e n s i t i v e is t h e f i n a l a n s w e r t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y 
s u p p l y ? I t c o u l d h a p p e n t h a t by t h e t i m e t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s h a v e 
suppl ied a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n asked o f t h e m , t h e y c o u l d h a v e a l r e a d y m a d e 
t h e d e c i s i o n . To s t r u c t u r e t h i nk i ng is an i m p o r t a n t pa r t o f the use o f any 
t echn ique , and th i s m e t h o d ach ieves t h a t in good measure . 
T h i s s e c t i o n has c o n s i s t e d o f a r e v i e w o f s o m e o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
t e c h n i q u e s to h a v e a p p e a r e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e o v e r t h e p a s t f e w y e a r s . 
F o r m o r e p a p e r s o n t h e s u b j e c t , see t h e e x c e l l e n t r e v i e w a r t i c l e s by 
M a c C r i m m o n (1971), Du jmov iC (1977) and Baker and F r e e d l a n d ( 1 9 7 5 ) . We 
shal l r e t u r n to some o f the po in ts made i n th is r e v i e w l a te r in the w o r k . 
S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
T h i s c h a p t e r o p e n e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r o l e o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e 
dec i s i on -mak ing w i t h i n genera l human p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g . I t w a s p o i n t e d o u t 
t h a t t h e n e e d f o r m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e dec i s i on -mak ing ar ises f r o m the impos i t i on 
o f cons t ra in t s upon the p rob lem-so l ve r by the e n v i r o n m e n t . 
The c y c l e o f a c t i v i t y i n m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e dec i s i on -mak ing was cons idered , and 
how th i s cyc le a c c o m m o d a t e d t h e l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s . Some s t a g e s o f t h e 
c y c l e w e r e d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h , i . e . M e a s u r e m e n t o f the A l t e r n a t i v e s and 
Eva lua t i on o f the A l t e r n a t i v e s and F i n a l Se lec t i on . F r o m t h i s i t is a r g u e d 
t h a t p r e s e n t m e t h o d s o f assess ing s u b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a a r e inadequate and 
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m i s l e a d i n g , b o c a u s e o f t h e s p u r i o u s emphasis on o b j e c t i v i t y . The process 
o f aggrega t ing measu remen ts is o f t e n a r b i t r a r y and may b e a r no r e l a t i o n t o 
t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s i n t u t i v e a g g r e g a t i o n m e t h o d . Indeed, such i n t u i t i v e 
methods may not be s im i l a r to the m a t h e m a t i c a l agg rega t ion t e c h n i q u e s , b u t 
may be ru le -based . 
T h e c h a p t e r c l o s e d w i t h a r e v i e w o f t echn iques and t h e i r so lu t ions o f the 
m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e dec is ion p r o b l e m . 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
SOME C L A S S I F I C A T I O N S OF T H E 
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IDENTIFYING BEST ALTERNATIVE 
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Easton (1973) ; Basic Optimising Model 
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Moore & Thomas (1975) 
T h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has a se t o f ob j ec t i ves whose a t t a i n m e n t depends upon 
the dec is ion t h a t he takes . 
T h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r must s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and c r e a t i v e l y search fo r a range o f 
p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s f r o m w h i c h a s e t o f a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n ( o r 
s t r a teg ies ) can be d e t e r m i n e d fo r cons ide ra t i on in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t . 
T h e d e c i s i o n p r o b l e m s e x i s t i n an u n c e r t a i n e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d t h e 
dec i s i on -make r may have the op t ion o f c o l l e c t i n g f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n . 
A measure is needed of t h e v a l u e or p a y o f f o f e a c h p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e i n 
t e r m s o f the dec i s ion -maker ' s ob j ec t i ves . 
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Johnson & Huber (1977) 
U t i l i t y Assessment Process 
1 ) I d e n t i f y t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h u t i l i t y is t o be a s s e s s e d , i . e . 
" u t i l i t y to w h o m " , w h i c h i nd i v i dua l or o rgan i sa t i ona l u n i t . 
2 ) D e t e r m i n e t h e s c o p e o f t h e p r o b l e m a n d i d e n t i f y t h e o b j e c t i v e s , 
purposes or uses o f t h e o b j e c t s or e v e n t s w h o s e u t i l i t i e s a r e t o be 
assessed. 
3 ) I d e n t i f y the set o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t o be e v a l u a t e d . 
4 ) D e t e r m i n e t h e r e l e v a n t a t t r i b u t e s o r f a c t o r s on w h i c h e a c h o f t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s are t o be assessed. 
5 ) Deve lop o p e r a t i o n a l measures f o r each a t t r i b u t e or f a c t o r . 
6 ) C h o o s e an a p p r o p r i a t e t e c h n i q u e f o r assess i ng t h e u t i l i t y o f e a c h 
a t t r r i b u t e or f a c t o r , i . e . f o r c o n v e r t i n g t h e p h y s i c a l m e a s u r e i n t o a 
u t i l i t y or value measure . 
7 ) Assess t h e u t i l i t y or v a l u e o f e a c h a l t e r n a t i v e on each a t t r i b u t e or 
f a c t o r . 
8 ) Choose an assessment m o d e l . 
9 ) Eva lua te each a l t e r n a t i v e using t h i s m o d e l . 
10 ) Se lec t the " b e s t " a l t e r n a t i v e . 
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A P P E N D I X 2 
T h e f o l l o w i n g is a t r u e a c c o u n t o f an a t t e m p t t o p l a c e a n u m e r i c a l , 
q u a n t i t a t i v e m e a s u r e m e n t on the l i b r a r y o b j e c t i v e "Equa l ise Book P r o v i s i o n " . 
I t was w r i t t e n a f t e r a d iscussion o f how b e s t t o q u a n t i f y t h i s g o a l , b e f o r e 
t h e a u t h o r r e a l i s e d t h e p a r a d o x i nvo l ved in such a t t e m p t s . I t is i n tended 
as an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the p rob lems invo lved in such a t t e m p t s . 
E q u a l i s e B o o k P r o v i s i o n 
This is a ve ry laudab le goa l f o r any A r e a L i b r a r i a n , b u t i t is v e r y d i f f i c u l t 
t o k n o w w h e n t h e g o a l has b e e n a c h i e v e d . T h a t goa l imp l i es t h a t each 
ra tepaye r served by the l o c a l l i b r a r y should have e q u a l a c c e s s t o b o o k s , o r 
as n e a r e q u a l as p o s s i b l e . Thus people l i v i n g near D u f f i e l d l i b r a r y should 
rece i ve as good a s e l e c t i o n o f books as those l i v i n g n e a r D e r b y . C l e a r l y , 
t h i s is an i d e a l , because not eve ry l i b r a r y can o f f e r the spec ia l ised serv ices 
a v a i l a b l e i n s o m e l i b r a r i e s , b u t o n t h e . l e v e l o f g e n e r a l f i c t i o n a n d 
n o n - f i c t i o n r e a d i n g t h e user o f t h e s m a l l l i b r a r y o u g h t t o be as w e l l 
supp l ied w i t h a supply o f t i t l e s to su i t h is tas te as anywhere e lse. 
T h i s l e a d s us t o one o f t h e f i r s t r e q u i r e m e n t s o f th is goa l , t h a t the s tock 
should m a t c h the c a t c h m e n t a rea p o p u l a t i o n , i . e . t h a t e a c h l i b r a r y s h o u l d 
h a v e x b o o k s p e r c a p i t a i n i t s c a t c h m e n t a r e a . T h i s l e a d s us t o 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in the measur ing o f the l i b ra ry ' s c a t c h m e n t a r e a , w h i c h m a y be 
c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g . So we can t r y to m a t c h books to the a c t u a l number 
o f readers reg i s te red w i t h t he l i b r a r y . 
T h i s l e a d s t o t h e s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t , t h a t e x i s t i n g s tock be taken accoun t 
o f . Obv ious l y , a l i b ra r y w i t h an a g e i n g , d a t e d s t o c k is n o t p r o v i d i n g f o r 
i t s users as w e l l as a l i b r a r y w i t h f r e s h , new s tock ava i l ab l e , a l l else be ing 
e q u a l . I t wou ld be foo l i sh to e m b a r k upon a p o l i c y o f c o m p l e t e l y r e s t o r i n g 
a l l l i b r a r i e s i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n equa l i t y o f p r o v i s i o n , i gno r i ng the resources 
a l ready a t hand. 
S o m e i n d i c a t i o n o f the books ' p o p u l a r i t y is necessary , so th is leads us to t r y 
' issues p e r r e a d e r ' as a p o s s i b l e m e a s u r e . B y b r i n g i n g i ssues p e r 1000 
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r e a d e r s t o t h e s a m e l e v e l a t e a c h l i b r a r y , w e k n o w t h a t readers in bo th 
p laces are be ing p r o v i d e d w i t h an equ i t ab le supply o f books. 
A p r o b l e m w i t h t h i s m e a s u r e is how w e l l one can fo recas t i ts l i k e l y va lue 
i n t h e f u t u r e . T o p r e d i c t h o w a n n u a l i ssues a n d r e a d e r s h i p w i l l b e 
i n f l u e n c e d by c h a n g e s i n b o o k p u r c h a s e p o l i c y a r e separa te task3 f r a u g h t 
w i t h e r r o r , and compound ing t h e m to t he same measure w i l l p roduce a l a r g e 
e r r o r . T h i s is w h e r e o p t i m i s t i c and pess im is t i c e s t i m a t e s w i l l show t h e i r 
m e r i t . 
One p o i n t wh i ch must be stressed is t h a t the numbers ob ta ined as issues per 
1000 r e a d e r s a r e no g u i d e w h a t s o e v e r t o t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f f u n d s . A t 
p r e s e n t L o n g E a t o n r e c o r d s 270,000 issues annua l l y and has 12,000 readers , 
g i v ing a p p r o x i m a t e l y 22.5 issues p e r r e a d e r . A l f r e t o n has 8 ,218 r e a d e r s 
a n d 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 i s s u e s , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 per reader . To j u m p s t r a i g h t in and 
dec ide to a l l oca te money acco rd i ng l y , say £3,000 t o A l f r e t o n and £ 2 , 2 5 0 t o 
L o n g E a t o n , or i n v e r s e l y £ 3 , 0 0 0 to L o n g E a t o n and 2,250 to A l f r e t o n , is 
absurd . I t is only the s im i l a r s i ze o f t h e s e l i b r a r i e s w h i c h t e m p t s us t o 
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . Had we done the same c a l c u l a t i o n fo r De rby and D u f f i e l d , 
and found 20 i ssues / reader a t D e r b y and 30 i s s u e s / r e a d e r a t D u f f i e l d , no 
one w o u l d h a v e s u g g e s t e d g i v i n g Derby £2,000 and D u f f i e l d £3,000. Issues 
per reader i t s e l f bears no l inear r e l a t i o n s h i p t o m o n e y s p e n t , and i t w o u l d 
be reck less to a l l oca te money assuming such a r e l a t i onsh ip . 
O f course , th i s was no t the only measure cons ide red , many o t h e r s s u g g e s t e d 
t h e m s e l v e s . S o m e s o r t o f r a t i o c o m p a r i n g s o m e va lue a t e i t he r l i b r a r y 
was essen t ia l , a i m i n g f o r the r a t i o t o t e n d to u n i t y , i . e . t h a t t h e n u m b e r 
o b t a i n e d a t e a c h l i b r a r y is t h e s a m e . B e c a u s e o f s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s a t 
e i t h e r l i b r a r y , e . g . r e c o r d s , p h o t o c o p y i n g , b o o k s a l o n e s h o u l d n o t b e 
cons ide red , and for the sake o f s i m p l i c i t y , r e fe rence books i gno red . 
Some sor t o f f o r m u l a was also sought , bu t th i s cou ld no t be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d . 
A s a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , m e a s u r e s r e l a t i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , t o r e c e n t l y acqu i red 
b o o k s , s h e l f s t o c k , i s s u e s , e t c . t o t h e c a t c h m e n t a r e a p o p u l a t i o n w e r e 
c o n s i d e r e d . C a t c h m e n t a r e a p o p u l a t i o n is an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y concep t f o r 
t w o reasons: 
.1) c a t c h m e n t a r e a i t s e l f is h a r d t o d e f i n e , p a r t i c u l a r l y at the 
boundar ies , w h e r e l i b ra ry usage over laps and n o t h i n g is k n o w n 
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o f h o w i t m a y change as a r e s u l t o f a l i b r a r y po l i cy change , 
and 
2 ) t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e a r e a is a t r a n s i e n t t h i n g , c o n s t a n t l y 
c h a n g i n g and a t t e n d i n g w o r k , s c h o o l and shops in a n o t h e r 
l i b r a r y ' s c a t c h m e n t a r e a , and so p r e f e r r i n g to use i t . Fo r 
these reasons ' readersh ip ' as chosen i n s t e a d as m o r e t a n g i b l e 
and easier to measure . 
T h e s e a r c h f o r a f a i r m e a s u r e f o r th is goa l is made more d i f f i c u l t by the 
dual a ims o f such a measure to r e f l e c t the c a t c h m e n t a r e a as w e l l as t h e 
e x i s t i n g s t o c k . T h a t one proposed goes some way t owa rds doing b o t h , and 
has t h e a d d e d a d v a n t a g e o f b e i n g e a s y t o m e a s u r e a n d c a l c u l a t e . 
H o w e v e r , i t s tands to be c o r r e c t e d . 
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C H A P T E R 3 
P R O B A B I L I T Y A N D U N C E R T A I N T Y 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In t h i s c h a p t e r , w e s h a l l c o n s i d e r s o m e w a y s i n wh i ch dec i s i on -mak ing is 
a f f e c t e d by u n c e r t a i n t y . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r is o f t e n f a c e d w i t h b o t h a 
l a c k o f a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , and w i t h on ly p robab i l i s t i c knowledge o f the 
f u t u r e . We consider how lack o f know ledge o f t h e f u t u r e and p r o b a b i l i t y 
h a v e b e e n t r e a t e d , and e x a m i n e t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s tud ies o f th is p rocess . 
F r o m th i s , we sha l l argue f o r a d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t o f u n c e r t a i n t y , t a k i n g 
account o f dec is ion -maker ' s personal a t t i t u d e s . 
T Y P E S O F U N C E R T A I N T Y 
The t a k i n g o f any d e c i s i o n is r i d d e n w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y . The u n c e r t a i n t y 
may arise f r o m m a n y d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s b u t t h e r e a r e t w o m a i n t y p e s o f 
u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h we shal l examine sepa ra te l y . The c l ass i f i ca t i on invo lved 
f o l l o w s a t heme w h i c h w i l l emerge in the t r e a t m e n t o f th i s thes is . 
The f i r s t t y p e o f u n c e r t a i n t y a r i s e s f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s ' s i n t e r n a l 
e n v i r o n m e n t . The e v a l u t i o n o f any o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s p r e s e n t e d t o h i m 
r e q u i r e s t he d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o p l a c e v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s upon the d i f f e r e n t 
a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e . In m a n y cases he w i l l be a s k e d t o r a n k 
o r d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e s ( i n t e r - a t t r i b u t e ) , b u t he w i l l also be asked to g ive an 
e s t i m a t e o f the u t i l i t y assoc ia ted w i t h the var ious leve ls o f a t t a i n m e n t o f a 
s i n g l e a t t r i b u t e ( i n t r a - a t t r i b u t e ) . Th i s is an i n t r o s p e c t i v e p r o c e s s and 
requ i res the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o e x a m i n e h i s m o t i v e s and e x p e r i e n c e v e r y 
c a r e f u l l y . When f a c e d w i t h a d e c i s i o n w h i c h he has neve r had to make 
b e f o r e , th i s process o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n w i l l i n v o l v e l e a r n i n g b o t h m o r e a b o u t 
t h e d e c i s i o n to be made and o f his own p r i o r i t i e s and ob j ec t i ves . Because 
th is t ype o f u n c e r t a i n t y is d e r i v e d f r o m l a c k o f k n o w l e d g e i n i t s f u l l e s t 
s e n s e , r a t h e r t h a n l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n , t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y has no th ing to do 
w i t h randomness or p r o b a b i l i t y bu t is a m e n t a l phenomenon. x" 
S o m e o f t he i n t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y or imprec i s i on is language-based and may 
be descr ibed as f u z z y . The language wh i ch we use to d e s c r i b e n o r m a l l i f e 
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is n o t s c i e n t i f i c a l l y p r e c i s e , s i m p l y b e c a u s e i t n e e d n o t b e . S c i e n t i f i c 
p rec is ion is based upon n u m b e r s , a n d l a n g u a g e is n o t a d e q u a t e f o r t h e s e 
p u r p o s e s . M a n y peop le f i nd the p rec is ion o f numbers incomprehens ib le and 
p r e f e r to reason in the i m p r e c i s e f a s h i o n o f h u m a n s . T h i s t o p i c w i l l be 
discussed a t g rea te r l eng th in Chap te r 5. 
The u n c e r t a i n t y o f the second t ype is p a r t o f the e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d 
due to o u r i n c o m p l e t e knowledge o f i t . I f a dec i s ion -maker is requ i red to 
see i n t o the f u t u r e , he m i g h t be c o r r e c t p a r t o f t h e t i m e b u t t h e a r t o f 
p r o p h e c y is n o t p e r f e c t . T h u s t h e r e w i l l be u n c e r t a i n t y because o f the 
i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n ava i l ab le . A sk i l l ed d e c i s i o n - m a k e r or m a n a g e r m a y 
a c q u i r e s o m e f e e l f o r w h a t t h e f u t u r e may ho ld bu t some u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l 
a l w a y s r e m a i n . I t is t h i s s e c o n d t y p e o f p r o b a b i l i s t i c o r s t o c h a s t i c 
u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t I w ish to examine in th is s e c t i o n . 
P R O B A B I L I S T I C U N C E R T A I N T Y 
T h e r e seems t o be th ree possible ways o f t r e a t i n g f u t u r e u n c e r t a i n t y . The 
f i r s t way is to assume t h a t t he re is no u n c e r t a i n t y and t h a t t h e r e is o n l y 
one r e l e v a n t s t a t e o f n a t u r e in the f u t u r e . The second way is to assume 
t h a t the re are many possible f u t u r e s t a t e s o f n a t u r e b u t t h a t w e h a v e no 
k n o w l e d g e o f w h i c h is l i k e l y to h o l d , and so t h e y m u s t a l l be a s s u m e d 
equa l l y l i k e l y . The t h i r d way is to consider many possible s ta tes o f n a t u r e 
b u t t o h a v e s o m e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e i r r e l a t i v e l i k e l i h o o d , v ia p r o b a b i l i t y 
e s t i m a t e s . We sha l l consider each o f these me thods . 
In t h e e x a m p l e s o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g techn iques wh i ch were discussed at the 
end o f the last sec t i on , we saw how some took a c c o u n t o f u n c e r t a i n t y due 
t o t h e u n f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . We s h a l l i g n o r e f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g 
u n c e r t a i n t y due to va lue j udgemen ts . The B A S Y C m e t h o d ( M u m f o r d e t a l 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ) a s k e d t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g g r o u p to e s t i m a t e ' o p t i m i s t i c ' and 
' p e s s i m i s t i c ' f o r e c a s t s f o r t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e 
L i t c h f i e l d , H a n s e n and B e c k m o d e l (1976) assumes t ha t the p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f 
the various s tates o f na tu re are k n o w n . Some m e t h o d s s t a t e t h e n e e d t o 
r e c o g n i s e l a c k o f c e r t a i n t y bu t do not seem to know how best to handle i t 
and seem to assume t h a t only one s ta te o f na tu re w i l l p r e v a i l . T h e r e m a y 
be s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s where th is may be a reasonable assumpt ion , i .e. t h a t 
the re is no u n c e r t a i n t y . 
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T h e N o - U n c e r t a i n t y C a s e 
T h e a s s u m p t i o n o f no u n c e r t a i n t y m i g h t be reasonable for the se lec t i on o f 
some R & D p r o j e c t s , f o r e x a m p l e , where t h e d e p a r t m e n t is f a i r l y i n s u l a t e d 
f r o m t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d and any c h a n g e s l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t h e i r w o r k are 
judged too un l i ke l y to be cons ide red . The case w h e r e t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e 
d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e o u t c o m e a l s o o c c u r s w h e n t h e m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o b l e m is t o s e l e c t s o m e i t e m w h i c h is t a n g i b l e a n d 
p r e s e n t . Fo r e x a m p l e , in the case o f se lec t i ng a pocke t c a l c u l a t o r , a l l the 
a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l s c a n be e a s i l y m e a s u r e d and t e s t e d . 
T h e y do n o t l i e i n t h e f u t u r e b u t in the here and now. H o w e v e r , i f one 
o f the a t t r i b u t e s had been, say, r e l i a b i l i t y w h i c h c a n o n l y be m e a s u r e d as 
t i m e p a s s e s , t h e n s o m e u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l e n t e r . B u t s i n c e p o c k e t 
c a l c u l a t o r s a re a c h e a p c o m m o d i t y and h a v e a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e c o m i n g 
o b s o l e t e r a t h e r t h a n w e a r i n g o u t , t h e n t h i s a t t r i b u t e m a y n o t be w o r t h 
cons ider ing and the p r o b l e m is governed by only one s ta te o f n a t u r e . 
T h e Many S t a t e s of N a t u r e but No K n o w l e d g e C a s e 
L e t us move on to consider the case o f many s ta tes o f n a t u r e b u t t h e r e is 
no k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e l i k e l i h o o d . In th is case they are t r e a t e d as 
equ ip robab le . Cons ider Tab le 3 . 1 . T h e r e a r e n p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s o r 
s t r a teg ies fo r the f u t u r e and m possible s ta tes o f n a t u r e . 
Sta tes o f N a t u r e E\ E 2 E 3 . . . . E m 
St ra teg ies 
51 v u v 1 2 v 1 3 v l m 
5 2 V 2 i V 2 2 V 2 3 V 2 m 
53 V31 
s n v n l v n m 
Table 3.1 - P a y o f f under S ta te o f N a t u r e - S t ra tegy Pai rs 
E j d e n o t e s a s t a t e o f n a t u r e and Sj a s t r a t e g y . The expec ted va lue o f 
p a y o f f o f the s ta te o f na tu re - s t r a tegy pa i r is denoted by V j j . I f t h e r e is 
no k n o w l e d g e a b o u t the l i ke l i hoods o f the var ious s ta tes o f n a t u r e , t hen we 
may assume t h e m to be equa l ly l i k e l y . A number o f d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a f o r 
se lec t i ng a s t ra tegy have been suggested. These are l i s ted in Tab le 3.2. 
I t is easy to imag ine t h e case m i g h t a r i s e w h e r e e a c h d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i o n 
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D e c i s i o n C r i t e r i a f o r t h e s e c o n d case when there are many possible s ta tes 
o f na tu re and no knowledge about w h i c h w i l l o c c u r . See F i s h b u r n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 
M i l n o r (1954) , Pappis (1976) . 
m passible s ta tes , j = 1 , . . , m 
n possible a l t e r n a t i v e s , i = 1 , . . ,n 
V j j denotes expec ted p a y o f f o f a l t e r n a t i v e i under s t a t e - o f - n a t u r e j 
1) Lap lace c r i t e r i o n . Choose t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e wh ich max im ises 
V I/.. 
L \ 
2) M a x i m i m c r i t e r i o n . Choose t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e w h i c h max im ises 
h i 
3) M a x i m a x c r i t e r i o n . Choose t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e wh ich max im ises 
7 * { vtj 
4 ) H u r w i c z c r i t e r i o n . This a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e t w o p r e v i o u s m e t h o d s 
w h i c h a r e p e s s i m i s t i c a n d o p t i m i s t i c r e s p e c t i v e l y . A c o n s t a n t 
0£°< ^ 1 is chosen to take accoun t o f the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s i n - b e t w e e n 
a t t i t u d e . When o( - I the dec i s ion -maker is c o m p l e t e l y o p t i m i s t i c and 
when 0 he is c o m p l e t e l y pess im is t i c . T h e c r i t e r i o n is c h o s e n t o 
m a x i m i s e 
,<.m*H[fcj} • 0-*)' "f- K ) 
J 
5) M i n i m a x r e g r e t c r i t e r i o n . Choose the c r i t e r i o n t o m i n i m i s e 
Tab le 3 .2- Dec i s i on C r i t e r i a 
i. 
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meant t ha t a d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e would be selected as the best possible, 
see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1. Again the choice of the decision c r i t e r i o n to 
use is up to the dec is ion -maker . I t is his at t i tude towards risk which is 
important. 
The Many States of Nature and Some Knowledge Case 
We shall consider now the case where there is some i n f o r m a t i o n about the 
r e l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the s ta tes of n a t u r e . I f we assume tha t the 
choice of strategy has no e f fec t upon the states of nature, we may draw up 
a l i s t o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f t h e m , P j . The dec is ion c r i te r ion now used to 
compute the expec ted value of each of the S - E pa i rs and to se lec t the 
m a x i m u m . The tab le above would be replaced by one wi th entries reading 
Vjj x P j , see Table 3.4. To select the best s t r a tegy f r o m those poss ib le , 
we could take t h a t one wh ich o f fe rs the maximum expected payoff, which 
would be, in this case, S3 wh ich combines a h igh payo f f w i t h a probab le 
occurence. 
These c r i t e r i a are qu i te arb i t rary. Their only dist inct ion is that they can 
be expressed neatly in mathematics. We could adopt any decision c r i t e r i o n 
we choose, and apply i t , regardless of its 'mathematicalness'. For example, 
"If the most probable outcome is expected to occur w i t h g rea te r than 50% 
p r o b a b i l i t y and one of the s t ra teg ies is expected to have a payoff in the 
top quar te r of the range, then we ' l l t r y i t . O t h e r w i s e choose t h a t 
al ternat ive which is least l ikely to give us a bad deal". 
This is a reasonably pract ical decision cr i ter ion but only the f i rst pa r t cou ld 
be expressed m a t h e m a t i c a l l y . The second sentence contains expressions 
wi th vague d e f i n i t i o n s wh ich may be understood by the dec is ion -maker ' s 
colleagues but not by a computer, for example. 
T H E P S Y C H O L O G Y O F P R O B A B I L I T Y E S T I M A T I O N 
The psychology of decision-making and probabil i ty est imation has received a 
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N •* x Max 
+ (1-S)Min 
F i g u r e 3.1 The Hurwicz C r i t e r i o n 
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E 3 £ < S . ) 
2 8 8 fi.00 
S 2 5 5 5 5.00 
S 3 1 1 10 4.00 
S4 3 6 8 5.67 
P. 
J 
.3 . 1 .6 
P.V. . 
J 1J 
S l .6 .8 6.2 
S 2 1.5 .5 3.0 5.0 
S 3 .3 . 1 6.0 6.4 
.9 .6 4.8 6.3 
* denotes chosen a l t e r n a t i v e 
£ ( s.) = 1 » v.. £ (s.) - £ p j 
j = l j = l 
Table 3.4 Comparison of the No-Knowlcdp.c 
and Knowledge C r i t e r i a 
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The f i r s t a t t e m p t s at q u a n t i t a t i v e dec is ion -mak ing sought to combine 
objective probabil i ty es t ima tes w i t h ob jec t i ve values of the a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
These values were stated in terms of some objective payoff, say money, and 
the probabil i t ies were estimated as accurately as poss ib le . The o b j e c t i v e 
p a y o f f was rep laced wi th something to take account if the subjective worth 
of the a l t e r n a t i v e s in the manner of u t i l i t y t h e o r y . E v e n t u a l l y t h e 
o b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y was also changed to the subjective probabil i ty of the 
decision-maker leading to the so-called Subjective Expected U t i l i t y models. 
There are two m a t h e m a t i c a l techniques available wi th which to study how 
people estimate probabil i ty and how their u t i l i t y compares w i th the e x t e r n a l 
s t i m u l u s . These a re Bayes t h e o r e m and the c a l c u l a t i o n o f t he 
mathemat ical e x p e c t a t i o n . We sha l l discuss these techniques and the 
conclusions which can be drawn. 
Bayes Theorem 
Bayes theorem may be wr i t ten as fol lows: 
where Ej denotes the possible s tate of n a t u r e , P (Ep denotes t he p r i o r 
p r o b a b i l i t y and P ( E j l D ) denotes the posterior probabil i ty after receiving the 
informat ion D. P(D|Ep is the p robab i l i t y of D o c c u r r i n g i f the s ta te of 
nature is Ej . 
Consider again the payo f f tab le of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 We may star t o f f 
w i th no informat ion on the r e l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the f u t u r e s tates of 
na ture and assume t h a t they are a l l equal ly l i k e l y . If we know that a 
piece of information D w i l l g ive us a b e t t e r i nd i ca t i on of wh ich s ta te of 
na ture w i l l be t r u e , then i t may be w o r t h our whi le to obtain this extra 
informat ion. The acquisition of this extra in format ion m igh t invo lve some 
expense and Bayes theorem allows the calculation of how much extra outlay 
is reasonable so as to reduce uncertainty. 
Suppose the payo f f tab le is as before (see Table 3.5) but we know that the 
condit ional probabil i t ies of D occuring, given each of the E j . Using Bayes 
t heo rem we may ca l cu la te rev ised probabil i t ies for each E; in the l ight of 
H % ) . P ( Q | % ) P(Ej |D) 
I P(Ej). P(D|E,} 
J 
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V. . E 2 E 3 £ (S.) £ (S.ID) £(S.|D) 
s l 2 8 8 6.00* 6.61 5.53 
S 2 5 5 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 
S 3 1 1 1 4.00 7.23* 1 .53 
S4 3 6 8 5.67 6.61 4.88 
P(E..) .33 .33 .33 
.3 . 1 .9 
P(-fl)|Ej) .7 .9 . 1 
PCEjlD) 
















j = l 
P ( D | E i ) . P ( E ^ ) = .33 x 1.3 = .429 
P(-D) = .561 
Expected payoff = P(D) .£ * ( S . |D) + P(-D) . £ * ( S £ |D) 
= .429 x 7.23 + .561 x 5.53 
= 6.204 
Table 3.5 Bayesian Decision-Making 
( 
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the e x t r a i n f o r m a t i o n , the pos te r io r p r o b a b i l i t i e s . The expected payoff 
f rom each strategy may be calculated, g iven D or—»D. These are E(Sj | D) 
and E(Si j tD). We may now choose which s t ra tegy should be adopted to 
give the maximum payoff - S3 when D is true and when D is not t r u e . 
The probab i l i t ies of D and D are calculated simply and combined wi th the 
maximum payoffs in either case to g ive the ove ra l l expec ted p a y o f f . In 
th is case we see the expected payo f f would be 6.204, compared to 6.0 in 
the no-information case. Thus i t would be foolish to pay more than 0.204 
to find out if D or -»D is t rue. 
The psycho log ica l s tudies of behav iour under Bayesian condit ions involve 
tasks which require the decision-maker to rev ise his p r o b a b i l i t y es t ima tes 
upon the r e c e i p t of new i n f o r m a t i o n . Ph i l l ips and Edwards (1966) asked 
people to consider bags con ta in ing 100 poker ch ips , red or b l u e c h i p s 
p redomina ted in the bag, and the subjects were shown 20 chips f rom the 
bag one at a t ime wi th replacement. A f te r each new chip was shown, the 
s u b j e c t s r e v i s e d t h e i r p r e v i o u s i n t u i t i v e e s t i m a t e s o f w h e t h e r a 
predominant ly red or blue bad had been chosen. Ph i l l i ps and Edwards 
found that -
Revision was consistently smaller for subjects in 
this experiment than the amount predicted by 
Bayes theorem. 
T h i s tendency to e x t r a c t less c e r t a i n t y f r o m the i n f o r m a t i o n than the 
theoret ical amount available has been ca l l ed conse rva t i sm . Ph i l l i ps and 
Edwards conclude that -
The failure of Subjects to ext ract f rom the data 
al l the certainty that is theoret ical ly available 
is consistent and orderly and may re f lec t a general 
l imi ta t ion on human abi l i ty to process in format ion. 
The resu l ts ob ta ined by Phill ips and Edwards have been duplicated by other 
workers (see the rev iew by Slovic and L i c h t e n s t e i n , 1971). The m o s t 
popular exp lanat ion for this conservative behaviour is that the subjects have 
great d i f f i cu l t y in aggregating var ious p ieces of i n f o r m a t i o n to produce a 
s ingle response. -Man's l imi tat ions as an information processor prevents him 
f rom making fu l l use of the informat ion available. 
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Mathematical Expectat ion 
When a dec is ion-maker is faced w i t h a r i sky dec is ion , he may use the 
m a t h e m a t i c a l l y expec ted p r o f i t o f the a l t e r n a t i v e s to choose w h i c h t o 
i m p l e m e n t . This requ i res h i m to know the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the various 
outcomes and their payoffs. A r isky dec is ion is one wh ich may produce 
pro f i t or incur loss. 
State of Nature S\ S2 
Payoff A -10 +5 
- A 0 0 
Probabi l i ty P(Sj) 0.3 0.7 
The dec is ion-maker must decide whether or not to imp lemen t the risky 
strategy A. The mathematical ly expected pro f i t of A is -
( P A ) = 0.3 x -10 + 0.7 x +5 = -0.3 + 0.35 
= +0.05 
( P , A ) = 0.0 
The method advises h im to imp lemen t A . However , the decision-maker 
may feel that he is not wi l l ing to take the chance of incurring a heavy loss 
(-10) for such a smal l r e t u r n (+5). He might prefer not to implement A 
and play safe. 
When processing Bayesian in format ion, the decision-maker is playing a game 
against Nature which he may assume w i l l perversely take the course to do 
h i m the most h a r m . Hence, i f the decision-maker does not want to incur 
loss, he w i l l want to be sure when guessing Nature's future behaviour. 
The b e h a v i o u r o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r d e s c r i b e d above is known as 
risk-averse; he is wary of incurring loss. People may be r i sk -averse to a 
g r e a t e r or l esser d e g r e e and some are a lmost r i s k - n e u t r a l , i .e. t he i r 
behaviour is close to that predicted by mathematical expec ta t ion . A much 
ra re r i nd i v i dua l is the r i sk -seeker , who seems to enjoy the gamble for its 
own sake and choose high prof i t - low probabil i ty gambles. 
A t t i t u d e towards r isk may be s tud ied mathematical ly by presenting people 
wi th a series of 50-50 gambles of, for example, winning £x or £0 and asking 
t h e g a m b l e r to s ta te the amount o f money which he wou ld accept in 
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exchange for th is gamb le . We may then p lo t the "cer ta inty equivalent" 
against the mathematical expectation (here, x/2). See Figure 3.2. Such a 
graph is only t rue for probabi l i t ies of 50-50 which are unlikely to occur in 
Nature. It would be wrong to assume, for examp le , t ha t the c e r t a i n t y 
equ iva len t of £5 w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y 0.8 is the same as tha t for £400 wi th 
probabi l i ty 0.01. Such graphs can demons t ra te behaviour w i t h i n a f i xed 
range but can hardly be used as a serious prescriptive tool. 
For such graphs i t is t e m p t i n g to seek a m a t h e m a t i c a l re la t i onsh ip (e .g . 
Lindley, 1975). 
U s i n g such re la t i onsh ips the decis ion c r i t e r i o n could be bu i l t in to the 
decision-making technique. Howeve r , a dec is ion-maker 's a t t i t u d e is nut 
cons tan t and any changes wou ld have to be checked and the techn ique 
c o r r e c t e d to p reven t i t f r o m becoming m is lead ing . One reason f o r a 
c h a n g e in a t t i t u d e cou ld be a change in the dec is ion-maker 's f i nanc i a l 
p o s i t i o n . As his s t a r t i ng pos i t i on grows weaker he may b e c o m e m o r e 
r i sk -averse and, s i m i l a r l y , may become r i sk -neu t ra l or risk-seeking as his 
position strengthens. 
To summar ise , m a t h e m a t i c a l expectation by itself is not an adequate guide 
to choosing between strategies, since i t ignores the decision-maker's a t t i t u d e 
towards r i sk . This at t i tude may be explored by comparing mathematical ly 
expected quantit ies wi th their cer ta in ty equ iva len ts . However , for every 
comb ina t i on of probabil i t ies in the gamble a d i f ferent certainty equivalent is 
required. Not only is the extent to which a decis ion-maker dev ia tes f r o m 
r i s k - n e u t r a l i t y dependent upon the probabil it ies presented h im, but also upon 
his start ing posit ion. 
These e f f e c t s can become i m p o r t a n t in rea l l i f e as in a h i e r a r c h i c a l 
organisation, where the lower echelons are o f t e n responsible fo r p repa r ing 
r e p o r t s upon w h i c h the h i g h e r m e m b e r s base t h e i r dec is ions. The 
a l t e r n a t i v e s wh ich are presented w i l l requ i re some assessmen t o f t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s associated w i t h t h e m . Now i t can be tha t the a t t i t u d e 
towards risk of the compiler of the report w i l l influence his est imate of the 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s , tend ing to increase his es t ima tes for the safer, more l ikely 
al ternat ives, whilst decreasing his estimates for the more r isky or m a v e r i c k 
op t ions . This is hard to avoid and can only be stated as another instance 




C e r t a i n t y E q u i v a l e n t 
F i g u r e 3.2 Behaviour towards R i s k 
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The Connection between Ut i l i ty and Probabil i ty 
For the Sub jec t ive Expec ted U t i l i t y model to hold the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
p r o b a b i l i t y and u t i l i t y must be independent. The SEU model proposes that 
in a gamble the decision-maker maximises -
If the estimation of u t i l i t y and probabil i ty were in any way related then the 
SEU m o d e l w o u l d be unusable. In f a c t such a re la t i onsh ip has been 
established. 
I r w i n (1953) asked people to state whether or not they expected to draw a 
marked card f rom a pack. He found that : 
A signif icant ly greater number of "yes" responses occurred 
when a marked card was desirable than when it was undesirable. 
Edwards (1955) found tha t sub jec t i ve p r o b a b i l i t y funct ions obtained f rom 
bets on wh ich sub jec ts could on ly w i n or b r e a k e v e n i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
sub jec t i ve p r o b a b i l i t y exceeded objective probabil i ty at all points between 0 
and 1 . But functions obtained f rom bets on which subjects could only lose 
or b r e a k even i nd i ca ted tha t sub jec t i ve p r o b a b i l i t y equa l led o b j e c t i v e 
probabi l i ty. 
S l o v i c and L i c h t e n s t e i n ( 1968 ) used a ra the r unusual model o f r isky 
decision-making; namely: 
where A ( G ) is the attractiveness of the gamble. This mode l combines the 
var iab les add i t i ve l y instead of m u l t i p l i c a t i v e l y . They found "enormous" 
differences in the weights, both wi th in and between subjects wh ich suggests 
tha t the responses of many subjects were overwhelmingly determined by one 
or two of the risk dimensions and were remarkab ly unresponsive to large 
c h a n g e s in the v a l u e s o f t he less i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s . S lov ic and 
Lichtenstein also asked the subjects to w r i t e a paragraph descr ib ing how 
S(P w ) U(£ w ) + S(P L ) U(£ [_) 
where S(P yy) is the subjective probabil i ty of winning 
S(P |_) is the subjective probabil i ty of losing 
U(£ is the u t i l i t y of the amount to win 
U(£ i_) is the u t i l i t y of the amount to lose 
A ( G ) = J U . + W I P ^ / + W 2 ^ W + w 3 ' : ) L + w 4 ^ L 
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they went about evaluating the attractiveness of the gambles. They found 
that -
A large number clearly indicated that they believed certain 
dimensions to be far more important than others in determining 
their responses. For the most part , the regression weights 
derived f rom their responses ref lected their stated strategies. 
When e v a l u a t i n g the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f gambles , people seem to use 
s t ra teg ies wh ich r e f l e c t t he i r own be l i e f s on wh ich are the i m p o r t a n t 
d imensions and t h e i r l imi ted information processing capacity forces them to 
concen t ra te on some dimensions and i g n o r e o t h e r s . T h u s , p e o p l e ' s 
behaviour is not adequately modelled by the SEU models but they can state 
their own decision-making strategies. 
P R O B A B I L I T Y E S T I M A T I O N AS AN A R T 
Up to now I have been arguing that the est imation of probabil i ty is more of 
an ar t than a sc ience . The es t ima tes of p robab i l i t y are required to be 
s ta ted in the f o r m of numbers . This is i n cons i s t en t w i t h i t s h i g h l y 
subjective nature. The subject ivi ty of probabil i ty may be i l lustrated by -
1) lack of consistency amongst decision-makers being asked to 
estimate the probabil i ty of the same event, 
2) tendency to be influenced by the at t i tude of the assessor towards 
risk and u t i l i t y of the outcome, 
3) conservatism of people in their processing of information and 
subsequent estimation of probabi l i ty. 
If i t is the case that probabil i ty is a sub jec t ive aspect of any a l t e r n a t i v e , 
then the t r e a t m e n t which i t has received in the last has been on the wrong 
track. The payuffs associated wiLh Mie ulternatives eun invo lve sub jec t i ve 
va luat ion: ; and In mult ip ly thoue hy further subjective, error-prone figure:; l.u 
c a l c u l a t e e x p e c t e d p a y o f f w o u l d a p p e a r Lu he u n s o u n d . T h e 
dec is ion-maker 1 : ; cho ice of the a l t e r n a t i v e w i l l depend upon his at t i tude 
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towards r isk and the process of mu l t i p l y ing the subjective valuation of an 
al ternat ive by its subjective p robab i l i t y assumes t h a t the va l ua t i on of the 
al ternat ive is entirely independent of its l ikel ihood. 
Using the two premises that -
1) probabil i ty is a subjective aspect and 
2) the value of an alternative is not independent of its probabi l i ty, 
the only sensible so lu t ion is to b r ing p r o b a b i l i t y down to the level of an 
at t r ibute of the mul t i -a t t r ibute decision-making p r o b l e m , d iscard ing models 
such as the SEU model. To be sure, i t is a very special a t t r ibute and can 
not be treated in the same way as the o ther a t t r i b u t e s , but we shal l look 
at this d i f f i cu l ty again later . (See Chapter 8) 
I f we accord probabil i ty the status of a subjective a t t r i b u t e , then we must 
consider ca re fu l y how it is to be measured. In everydoy terms probabil i ty 
is discussed using verbal statement of relat ive l ikel ihood. For example -
" I don't think i t wi l l rain tomorrow." 
"It's more likely that i t w i l l rain tomorrow than 
that i t w i l l snow." 
F ine (1973) argues the case of the various means of stat ing probabil i ty and 
the theories behind t h e m . His conc lus ion is t ha t the only rea l sor t of 
p r o b a b i l i t y is compa ra t i ve probabi l i ty and I would agree w i th this posit ion. 
In many books (see the Review by Slovic, Fischhoff and L i c h t e n s t e i n , 1977, 
p p . 1 8 - 2 0 ) , w h i c h a t t e m p t to t r a i n the dec is ion-maker in the ar t of 
e s t i m a t i n g p r o b a b i l i t y , they use compa ra t i ve p r o b a b i l i t y as a means o f 
g e t t i n g across the relat ive l ikelihood of certa in events. For instance, that 
an elephant wi l l walk down the road or that a penny w i l l come down heads 
when tossed. Through everyday experience we become accustomed to the 
relat ive l i ke l ihood of c e r t a i n events and can assess wh ich are the more 
l i k e l y w i t h o u t ever t ak i ng recourse to numbers . No one ever states in 
ordinary conversation that -
" I t wi l l rain tomorrow wi th probabil i ty .5 . " 
Such a statement could be made, if repeated measurements could be taken 
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ove r the year to g ive an annual average, or over a long span of t i m e 
assessing the probabil i ty of i t raining on tomorrow's date. But the t roub le 
w i t h such ' o b j e c t i v e ' measurements is that they do not take account of the 
weather conditions which are p reva i l i ng at th is t i m e . I t is a f ea tu re of 
human reasoning tha t we take account of facts and intuit ions in a strange 
and subtle way. The conclusions that are reached by th is process are not 
those which the numer i ca l methods p r e d i c t , but that need not necessarily 
means that they are w r o n g . Ra the r than being sco rn fu l l y d ismissed as 
u n s c i e n t i f i c , the process of human reasoning i tself should be examined more 
closely for the insight which i t can give. 
I f we adopt the pos i t ion tha t p r o b a b i l i t y is a sub jec t i ve a t t r i b u t e of a 
decision-making al ternat ive, then this wi l l have implications upon the way in 
wh ich i t may be t r e a t e d . As examples of other subjective at t r ibutes, we 
may c i t e Norman churches, peace fu l s u r r o u n d i n g s , c o u n t r y w a l k s and 
p res t i ge . These aspects cannot be measured in meaningful units and i t is 
certainly d i f f i cu l t to measure them in units of money. However, they may 
be descr ibed ve rba l l y and their quality is fe l t . Probabi l i ty can be treated 
in this way too. We can describe our feelings about p r o b a b i l i t y in words , 
as in the two sentences on the weather earl ier. Recall too the decision 
cr i ter ion ment ioned ea r l i e r wh ich invo lved verba l s ta temen ts . We may 
a t t e m p t to measure p r o b a b i l i t y verbal ly since i t has many of the features 
of other subjective a t t r i b u t e s . But because of dec is ion -makers ' spec ia l 
a t t i t u d e s towards r isk i t wi l l have to be accorded a d i f ferent status in the 
decision cr i ter ia . Verbal measurements of p r o b a b i l i t y have always been 
ignored in the past for reasons such as "words are only useful to convey 
meaning provided that the wr i ter and the reader (or speaker and l i s t ene r ) 
agree on the meaning to be ascr ibed to the words" , (Moore and Thomas 
(1975).) 
Moore and Thomas took a l is t of ten expressions commonly used to convey 
uncertainty and asked 250 executives at the London Business School to rank 
order the phrases in decreasing order of uncertainty. The found that each 
phrase was placed wi th in a wide range of ranks. For examp le , " E x p e c t e d " 
was ranked anywhere be tween 1st and 6 t h most u n c e r t a i n ! Moore and 
Thomas conclude that -
there is a clear need for the scale to be a numerical 
one in order to el iminate doubts as to the relat ive 
orderings of d i f ferent uncertainty statements. 
- 70 -
We may challenge Moore and Thomas' conclusion on four points 
a) The execu t ives t h e y used w e r e "on m i d d l e s e n i o r m a n a g e m e n t 
p rogrammes at the School and elsewhere". These people could hardly 
be e x p e c t e d to f o r m a c o h e r e n t g r o u p , s h a r i n g a c o m m o n 
unders tand ing of the meaning of words. Within a group, the formal , 
verbal transfer of in format ion is e f f e c t i v e , and so one would expec t 
t h a t w i t h i n a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g g r o u p , accus tomed to discussing 
uncer ta inty , the rank ing of phrases would show less dev i a t i on than 
Moore and Thomas found. 
b) The expressions which Moore and Thomas used were obtained f rom an 
art ic le and not f rom the conversa t ion of the group members . One 
wou ld also expect that not all of these words would be commonly used 
by a l l t he e x e c u t i v e s t h e y t e s t e d . In p r a c t i c e , on l y ; i f e w 
graduat ions of probabil i ty are perceived and so only a small vocabulary 
is needed. When asking people to rank order expressions wh ich mny 
n o t be p a r t o f t h e i r usual vocabu la ry , one would expec t to f ind 
inconsistency. This is because the reader may not have any f i xed 
meaning ascr ibed to the words but only a vague notion, rather than 
sharing a meaning wi th the wr i te r . 
c) T h i r d l y , the execut ives were asked to order the phrases in "decreasing 
order of u n c e r t a i n t y " . We have a l ready seen in th is chapter how 
u n c e r t a i n t y may be d e r i v e d f r o m lack of knowledge as we l l as 
stochastic probabi l i ty but no such d i s t i n c t i o n is made here a l though 
Moore and Thomas move direct ly to the assessment of probabi l i ty. 
d) Final ly, the purpose of adopting a numer i ca l scale would seem to be 
to ensure u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the " r e l a t i v e order ing: ; of d i f f e r e n t 
uncertainty statements". If ordering is a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n wh ich is 
r equ i red , then a numer i ca l scale prov ides more i n fo rma t i on than is 
necessary, since an ordinal scale would be enough. Such a scale can 
be prov ided by verba l s t a t e m e n t s . We may also recall that the use 
of words may be c a r e f u l l y s t r u c t u r e d , using a s imple g rammar and 
thereby el iminat ing doubts as to relat ive orderings. 
The possibility of using verba l measurement of p r o b a b i l i t y seems to have 
been o v e r l o o k e d . In a cu l t u re wh ich regards s c i e n t i f i c p rec is ion as 
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des i rab le , the use of numbers is regarded as respec tab le and the use of 
words as an unnecessary defeat. 
S O U R C E S O F U N C E R T A I N T Y AND METHODS O F H A N D L I N G IT 
To complete the picture on u n c e r t a i n t y , le t us look at where u n c e r t a i n t y 
may ar ise. These are th ree ma in sources wh ich may be identi f ied w i th 
various parts of the decision-making process. 
The f i r s t source is in the process of measur ing. Where the alternatives 
are tangible the measur ing process may not be comp le te or e x a c t . This 
type of uncertainty is due to lack of information and should be reducible. 
The second source l ies in the p rob lem of f o r e c a s t i n g . The choice of a 
s t r a t e g y is l i ke a game w i t h Na tu re where Na tu re is an unpred ic tab le 
opponent. One cannot know which strategy she wi l l adopt . This type of 
u n c e r t a i n t y can never be removed entirely although the decision-maker may 
have some idea of the relat ive likelihood of the possible states of n a t u r e . 
Some s t ra teg ies invo lve forecasting to estimate their l ikely benefits and so 
the measurement of the alternatives can i nco rpo ra te u n c e r t a i n t y f r o m th is 
source as wel l . 
The t h i r d source is in value judgements . This may be best described as 
due to lack of self-knowledge. The decis ion-maker may be unsure of the 
value which he places upon the d i f f e ren t aspects of the al ternat ives, both 
when comparing aspects and when compar ing levels of the some aspect . 
Bu t i f through pract ice the decision-maker does get to know himself bet ter , 
there wi l l remain a hard core of imprecision which is due to the na tu re of 
the human reasoning process and the language which we use. 
Looking back to the decision techniques presented in an e a r l i e r sec t i on , we 
may see w h i c h types o f u n c e r t a i n t y they t a c k l e d . For example , the 
BASYC technique ( M u m f o r d e t a l , 1978) w h i c h used o p t i m i s t i c and 
pess im is t i c es t ima tes of the measurement of a t t r i b u t e s , ef fect ive ly took 
bo th f o recas t i ng e r r o r and m e a s u r e m e n t e r r o r i n t o a c c o u n t . The 
w i t h i n - a t t r i b u t e error may appear in the opt imist ic and pessimistic estimates 
but the in ter-at t r ibute error is not so immedia te . The we igh ts wh ich are 
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assigned to the attributes are a value judgement but it is stressed in the 
BASYC technique that the results which are obtained must be tested for 
sensit ivity to f luctuations in the weighting values. For example, a heavy 
weight when combined wi th a high score may contribute a subs tan t i a l 
amount to the to ta l value of that al ternative. There are processes for 
testing for this possibility but so far they remain rather ad hoc. 
The method of Goodwin (1972) tests in particular for sensitivity due to 
slight changes in the weights, so he does test for e r ro r in the value 
judgements. He also changes the scores or measurements slightly, thereby 
testing for error of the other two types. 
The Dean and Nishry (1965) method makes no explicit treatment of error or 
uncertainty at all and indeed would seem to incorporate some procedures 
which could increase the overall error. 
The L i t c h f i e l d , Hansen and Beck (1976) model requires a great deal of 
subjective information. This information could be very uncertain and I 
wonder how important they think this is. Their use of a Monte Carlo 
method would give some indication of the possible spread of results and 
some indication of their sensitivity. 
In this section, I have examined some of the aspects of uncertainty. This 
is by no means an exhaustive treatment, and many of the views expressed 
can be disputed. The treatment of probabili ty or uncertainty is highly 
problematic but a suggestion has been made, reducing the status of 
probabil i ty to a subjective a t t r ibute , although retaining the possibility of 
according it special treatment in the decision algorithm. This idea w i l l be 
developed further in later chapters. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The nature of uncertainty as i t is manifested in decision-making was 
examined in this chapter. The sources of uncertainty were listed but in 
this chapter only stochastic uncertainty was treated. 
Methods of dealing with this type of uncertainty were demonstrated under 
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three d i f fe ren t sets of assumptions of knowledge about the future. It was 
shown that the criteria for selecting a strategy, under the assumption of no 
knowledge of the future and many states of nature, could each lead to a 
different answer so that the choice of strategy depended upon the c r i t e r ion 
adopted. 
Where there is some knowledge about the relative likelihood of the many 
future states of nature this is usually stated as a numerical probabil i ty . 
This was examined more thoroughly under the paradigms of Bayes' theorem 
and expected value. The decision-maker's at t i tude towards risk was seen 
to be important and how this pessimism showed itself as conservatism in 
the Bayesian processing of information. Furthermore, the evidence for an 
interaction between the assessment of probability and utili ty was cited and 
how this is also usually at t r ibuted to the subjects' l imi ted in fo rmat ion 
processing capacity. 
F rom this i t was argued tha t expected value models, whether using 
objective or subjective values of the probabili ty and financial value were 
misleading and that the probability of an alternative producing the desired 
result should be considered as a special attribute of that al ternat ive. The 
usual reasons for using numer ica l p r o b a b i l i t y as a measurement of 
uncertainty rather than verbal statements were examined and i t was argued 
that the assessment of uncertainty could be done with careful use of words. 
The chapter closed wi th a brief review of those methods presented in 
Chapter 2 considering how uncertainty affected their answers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
U T I L I T Y 
MORAL AS OPPOSED TO MONETARY WORTH 
The concept of " u t i l i t y " arose f rom the study of gambles - how to decide 
which of several available cash gambles was the most advantageous. The 
method of dec id ing between them was to invoke the p r i n c i p l e of 
mathematical expectation. This fol lows f rom the law of large numbers, 
that in the long run, over repeated trials, the gambler's overall gain or loss 
may be estimated. Mathematicians in the eighteenth century saw i t as 
paradoxical that seemingly prudent individuals would reject the gambles 
which this law recommended (Savage, 1954, p.92). 
Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782) seems to have been the first to point out that 
this principle was only a rule of thumb, and quotes the so-ca l led St. 
Petersburg paradox as an i l lus t ra t ion . The argument proceeds roughly as 
follows: 
Suppose upon paying an entrance fee, n person had the opportunity to 
participate in a gamble which could provide an in f in i t e amount of wealth. 
The gamble is this: a coin is tossed and when a head appears, the game 
stops. If the game ends on the nth toss, the gambler wins £ 2 n . Thus, 
the mathematical expectation is 
1 . 2 + 1 . 2 Z + ... + 1 . 2 n + ... = 1 + 1 + 1 + ... 
2 2 2 2 n 
= 06 
Hence, no matter how large the entrance fee, even if it were one's entire 
existing wealth, the gambler should s t i l l accept the bet, despite the 50% 
chance of the game ending on the first toss and the player being lef t with 
only £1 . 
Hence the value of a gamble is not its expected monetary worth , but 
depends upon the gambler himself, and the "moral wor th" of the outcomes 
to h i m . Bernr /u l l i postulated that people seek to maximise not the 
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mathemat ical ly expected amount, but the expected moral value of the 
gamble. 
The notion of utility in gambling problems was considered by Ramsey in the 
1920's, but interest in the subject was rev ived by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's axiomatic treatment of u t i l i t y in 1947. Since then, other 
systems of axions leading to the u t i l i t y concept have been proposed, by 
Herstein and Milnor (1953), Hausner (1954), Savage (1954), Luce and Raiffa 
(1957), Prat t , Ra i f f a and Schaifer (1965) and Fishburn (1970), amongst 
others. We shall consider axioms from these systems in a later section. 
THE PURPOSE OF UTILITY THEORY 
With the axiomistion of the concept of uti l i ty, it became possible to assign 
a numerical value to the "moral expectation" of a gamble and thereby 
p r e d i c t a grambler ' s choice between gambles, assuming he wishes to 
maximise expected u t i l i t y . Fishburn (1970) states what he ca l l s the 
"fundamental theorem of uti l i ty". 
This has to do with axioms for preferences which guarantee, in a 
fo rmal mathematical sense, the a b i l i t y to assign a number 
( u t i l i t y ) to each alternative so that, for any two alternatives, one 
is preferred to the other if and only if the ut i l i ty of the f i r s t is 
greater than the util i ty of the second. 
The purpose of the theory would seem to be the prediction of preferences, 
purely on whether one number is greater than another. However, because 
of the power of numbers and their association wi th the physical sciences 
and measurements, many have been inclined to believe that i t is possible to 
measure the "moral value" of an al ternat ive, i.e. to make an "objective 
measurement" of the subjective feelings of the decision-maker. 
Most theories of util i ty appeal to the existence of the "rational" person, i .e. 
one who obeys the axioms. 
I am about to build up a highly idealised theory of the behaviour 
of a "rational" person with respect to decisions. In doing so I 
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w i l l , of course, have to ask you to agree with me that such and 
such maxims of behaviour are "rational". (Savage, 1954, p70) 
The implicat ion becomes that if a decision-maker does not obey the laws of 
rational behaviour (which have been laid down to achieve the goal of the 
numerical measurement of u t i l i t y ) then that dec is ion-maker is irrational. 
The definition of a rational decision-maker is, therefore, one who takes his 
decision in a manner which is consistent with the numerical measurement of 
ut i l i ty . This is becoming painfully reminiscent of the a t t i tude of the 18th 
Century mathematicians who believed in the principle of mathematical 
expectation as being the criterion for rationality. 
We can see a dilemma or paradox emerging in u t i l i t y theory. I f the 
purpose of a u t i l i ty theory is to predict preferences then that theory is 
purely descriptive of the decision-maker's behaviour. If it must lay down 
definit ions of rational behaviour in order to do so, then i t becomes a 
normative theory. This choice between normative and descriptive theories 
has plagued decision theorists for decades. 
In our imperfec t , irrational way, decision-maker's may choose to obey some 
of the axioms which the theory requires, thereby setting standards of 
consis tency and r a t i o n a l i t y . This is similar to logic where rules of 
consistency are set down and voluntari ly obeyed. A decision-maker may 
accept an axiom, such as t r ans i t iv i ty of choice, as a standard of rational 
behaviour and so long as that axiom never declares that he should make a 
decision which he could not accept, then that axiom if fair. The purpose 
of a no rma t ive theory is to prescr ibe courses of a c t i o n f o r t h e 
decison-maker, on the basis of his beliefs, values and standards of consistent 
behaviour. 
Most decision aids are inclined to be normative in the sense that they study 
beliefs and values, test for standards of consistent behaviour and prescribe 
courses of action. A purely descriptive theory would sti l l leave the burden 
of decision-making with the decision-maker, since i t only aims to describe 
the beliefs and values of the decision-maker and the manner in which he 
incorporates them into a theory. 
Fishburn (1968) suggests three purposes of the normative theory of ut i l i ty . 
These may be summarised: 
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1) t o s e r v e as a n o r m a t i v e g u i d e , i n d i c a t i n g when the 
decision-maker's preferences appear to v i o l a t e a " r a t i o n a l " 
preference assumption; 
2) to help a decision-maker to determine his preferences amongst 
complex alternatives, characterised by mult i-dimensionali ty and 
uncertainty; 
3) to enable the decision-maker's "preferences to be transformed into 
a numerical u t i l i t y s tructure to be used in an o p t i m i s a t i o n 
algorithm". 
These purposes seem fa i r and reasonable and in the next section we shall 
look at the axioms which normative theories require, and discuss whether 
they are indeed suitable normative guides for decision-makers to adopt. 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE AXIOMS 
In this section, we shall examine some of the axioms which are presented 
as bases for theories of u t i l i t y , both wi th and without risk, and in the 
single and milti-dimensional cases. 
As a broad classif icat ion ot the types of axiom presented, we suggest the 
following: 





I shall discuss the axioms under these headings but will explain notation and 
the concept of a mixture set beforehand. 
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Nota t ion 
The separate authors tend to adopt their own system of notat ion, but, 
within the chapter, we shall use von Neumann and Morgenstern's notation 
and Keeney and Raiffa's multi-attribute notation. 
are items to be compared 
are probabilities associated with the items 
denotes a gamble in which the gambler may 
expect to win u with probability of and v 
with probability (1- oL). 
means that u is preferred or indifferent to v 
means that the decision-maker is indifferent 
is attribute i 
is the level of attribute i 
is the set of levels of the attributes, 
complementary to x. 
The u t i l i t y axioms apply to preferences upon a commodity which must obey 
certain rules. When von Neumann and Morgenstern laid down their axioms, 
many of these defined the mixture set itself. The distinction between the 
mixture set and the axioms of preference has been made since, but the best 
description of the mixture set belongs to von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
although they do not use the term. 
We shall therefore assume that the aim of all participants in 
the economic system, consumers as wel l as entrepreneurs, is 
money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is 
supposed to be unrestrictedly divisible and substitutable, f reely 
transferable and identical , even in the quantitative sense, with 
whatever "satisfaction" or "util i ty" is desired by each participant. 
We list Herstein and Milnor's def ini t ion of the mixture set below, but see 
also Hausner (1954) 
A sul. ^ ' ; i "aid to be a mixture set if for nny u,v € £ und for 
any o(, wu can associate another element, which wo write au 
Thus, u,v,w,.... 
o^u + (l-o()v 
u >,pv 
u = p V 
x i 
The Mixture Set 
o(u + (1- oOv, 
- 79 -
which is again in 5 > a r , d where: 
1) lu + ( l - l ) v = p u 
2) du + (1-oOv =p Q-cOv + (*u 
3) p [ c(u + (l-o()v J + ( l - jB)v = {p« )u + (1- ^9«)v 
The notation has been changed to agree with earlier remarks. 
The third condition in this l ist sometimes appears as a separate axiom, 
known as Subst i tutabi l i ty . This states that a lottery may have as a prize 
another lo t tery t i cke t and tha t the p r o b a b i l i t i e s are the o b j e c t i v e 
probabilities calculated from the lotteries. 
Simple Ordering 
A relation is a simple ordering among items u,v,w,... if and only if for 
every u,v,w: 
Either u ^ v or v ) p u 
If u } p v, and v w, then u £p w. 
The f i r s t requirement above defines complete ordering. Each system of 
axioms requires a complete ordering amongst al ternative together wi th 
transitivity of preferences. The relation )^ p is also reflexive since: 
x > / p x 
The ordering axioms require that every alternative can be compared with 
every other. Thus, a util i ty can not be derived for any two alternatives 
which cannot be compared. The notion of transitivity of preferences is 
more controversial . For any system of assigning u t i l i t y values, the 
t r ans i t iv i ty axiom gives it meaning, since the numerical utilities will always 
predict a s t r ic t ordering of the alternatives, and this must match the 
preference ordering of the decision-maker. 
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Archimedean 
The Archimedean axiom is as follows: 
If u v £ p w, there exists an o( such that 
o<u + (1-oC) w =p v 
This axiom is included in all the axiomatic systems quoted herein, with the 
highly deliberate, exception of Hausner. The purpose of the Archimedean 
postulate is to bring the measurement of utili ty onto the real number line. 
It is this postulate or axiom which gives u t i l i t y its handle onto numerical 
measurement, so for this reason, i t is one of the most important axioms 
which is commonly used. 
Monotonicity 
This axiom is similar to the previous in that i t allows that preference 
between a pair of items to be predicted as a result of preferences between 
gambles, but this time involving different probabilities: 
If u }p v, then 
d u + (1-oOv >/ppu + (l-y8)v 
if and only if ° \ ^ A> 
Combining 
These axioms allow preferences amongst prizes to be deduced from the 
decision-maker's preferences amongst gambles, and vice versa. The axioms 
are: 
If o(u + (l-o<)v >h o(u + (1-oOw for 0 < « < 1, 
- 81 -
Multi-Attribute 
We present the conditions necessary for a decision-maker's utili ty function 
to be either additive of multiplicative. The conditions for probability-less 
u t i l i t y or 'va lue ' are presented with those for u t i l i t y , assessed using 
probability. 
1. Additive probability-less multi-attribute value theory 
Given attributes X i , . . . , X n , n ^. 3, an additive probability-less uti l i ty function 
n 
v(xi , X2,—»xn) = ^ V i ( x i ) 
i'i 
exists if and only if the attributes are mutually preferentially independent 
i.e. if [ ( / , z') > / p (y", z') ] = > 
[(y '» z) >, ? ( V V ) ] for all z,y',y". 
where y and z represent complementary subsets of the attributes 
This may also be stated as, for any pair of a t t r ibu tes ( X j , X j ) to be 
preferent ia l ly independent of the other n-2 attributes, preferences between 
(Xp Xp pairs, given that the levels of the other n-2 attributes are held 
f i x e d , do not depend on the level at which those attr ibutes are f i xed . 
Preferential independence implies that the trade-offs between attr ibutes X\ 
and Xj do not depend on X i , . . . , X | < , . . . , X n , k = i , j . 
See Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. I l l ) for this result and references to other 
workers. 
2. Additive multi-attribute util i ty function with probability 
The n-attribute additive uti l i ty function 
A 1*, 
u(x) = ^ k i u'^*$ = ^ u k » ' 
is appropriate if and only if the additive independence condition holds 
among attributes, X j , X2,..., X n where: 
1) u is normalised by u( x ' , x* x" ) - U und 
u( x* , x t" x * ) = 1 
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2) u[ is a conditional util i ty function of Xj normalised by 
uj(x" ) = 0 and Uj(x * ) = 1 
3) kj = u(x* , x* ), i = l,2,...,n 
See Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 295) and Fishburn (1964, 1968, 1970). See 
Figure 4.1. 
OR 
An individual's u t i l i t y funct ion is additive if and only i f his preference 
between any two lotteries 
l _ l = £(x, , x,1 ) + i (x* , x* ) 
and 
l _ 2 = i (xj, Xj ») + i (x* , x? ) 
_ _ a . -mCL b — b 
is the same for all x j , for any x j ' , x j " , x j , x j , X j , x-
See Figure 4.2 
If L X > p L 2 < = > L i ' > p L 2 ' 
for additive ut i l i ty. 
See Pollak (1967). 
3. Multiplicative, multi-attribute util i ty function with probability 
If the additive, independence condition holds and 
) kj = 1 
»'•/ 
then the additive util i ty function is appropriate. If 
I k i M 
then the uti l i ty function is multiplicative: 
1 + ku(x) = 7V 1 + kkiujUj) 
in 
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(x ,y ) (x ,y ) 
(x ,y ) 
Figure 4.1 Additive M u l t i - A t t r i b u t e U t i l i t y 






Lj i s JA + JB, L 2 i s JC + JD. Note that A and C have the same 
amount of a t t r i b u t e X^ . Whatever preference we have between Lj 
and L 2 we must also have, i f the level x,, i n A and C i s changed, 
e.g. both are moved to A' and C'. 
Figure 4.2 Lotteries and Additive U t i l i t y 
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k may be determined by evaluating at x* 
1 + k = 7t (1 + kkj) 
The necessary and suf f ic ien t conditions for the additive value function are 
necessary for the multiplicative value function. 
If attributes X]_, X2> •••X n are mutually util i ty independent, then 
u(x) = ) kjujCxj) 
rt 
+ k ^ k j k j U j ( x j ) Uj (x j ) 
n 
k z ) k j k j k ] U i ( x i ) Uj(xp u\(x[) 
+ k n _ 1 k ik2 . . .k n uj(x i ) U2U2) u n ( x n ) 
where 
1) u is normalised by u(x\, x ^ . - . X p ) = 0 and 
u(xj, X2,...Xp) = 1 
2) Uj(xj) is a conditional util i ty function on X, normalised by 
Uj(x^) = 0 and Uj(xj) = 1, i = l,2,..n 
3) kj = u(x"itxp 
4) k is a scaling constant that is a solution to 
7t (1 + kkO 
See Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p.289) 
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EXAMINATION OF THE AXIOMS 
We shal l now examine the axioms of u t i l i t y as listed in the previous 
section, remembering all the while that a theory of u t i l i t y , however 
convenient its use may be, is only as good as its axioms. 
Ordering 
The two main assumptions here concern the comparability of alternatives 
and the transitivity of preference. 
I t may be the case that a decision-maker feels unable to compare two 
alternatives which are presented to him because they bear no s imi la r i ty to 
one another. An example might be choosing between a new car or a 
lifetime's supply of cornflakes, but as a decision-maker's inability to state a 
p re fe rence between the two is a d i f f e r en t matter and may be due to 
indifference or lack of discriminatory power. 
Trans i t iv i ty of preference is more interesting and is one axiom of choice 
which has been experimentally tested. Papandreou (1953) found tha t 
t r a n s i t i v i t y of choice occurred amongst commodity bundles, i.e. using 
probability-less, mul t i - a t t r ibu te u t i l i t i e s . Edwards (1953) found tha t 
in t rans i t iv i ty of choice was marked in paired comparisons of bets, i.e. single 
attribute utilities wi th probabi l i ty . In a later paper, Edwards (1961) is 
s c e p t i c a l about the t rans i t iv i ty of choices. The notion of stochastic 
t rans i t iv i ty has since been developed, based on assumptions of the 
probability of choosing A over B. He says: 
As a basis for psychological theorising algebraic t rans i t iv i ty is 
dead and stochastic t rans i t iv i ty , strong and weak, has yet to be 
exposed to the adverse climate of hostile experiments .. . the 
question for experimenters to answer is not whether any form of 
transitivity holds but rather under what circumstances do various 
assumptions about transitivity hold and under what circumstances 
they do not. 
Consider Table 4.1. 
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Probability- Yes Yes 
less (More is better (Papandreou) 
than less) 
With No ? 
Probability (Edwards) (Probably No) 
Table 4.1 
We must also consider the question of transitivity of indifference. Many 
util i ty theories assume that the binary relat ion of indifference w i l l define 
equivalence classes on the set of possible alternatives, 
x x reflexive 
x ) p y y >,p * symmetric 
x )p y » y$p z => x >,p z transitive 
However, the condition of transitivity of indifference may be violated: 
x = p yi y = p z but x ^ p z 
Some experiments (e.g. May, 1954) tested transitivity of choice, but did not 
permit respondents to record indifference between alternatives. 
Let us conclude this discussion on t rans i t iv i ty of choice by saying that 
transitivity is generally obeyed for riskless alternatives, and may also be 
adopted as a normative rule. Transitivity of choice does not hold so well 
for risky alternatives, und i t is doubtful whether is should be adopted in 
this case as n normative rule because of tho gambler's preference or 
aversion for certain probabilities, (Edwards, 1953). 
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T v e r s k y ( 1 9 6 9 ) s h o w s t h a t t r a n s i t i v i t y o f c h o i c e be tween gambles may be 
v i o l a t e d w h e n p e o p l e c h o o s e a c c o r d i n g t o l e x i c o g r a p h i c s e m i - o r d e r i n g 
d e c i s i o n r u l e s . T r a n s i t i v i t y o f i n d i f f e r e n c e is o n l y c o r r e c t o v e r s h o r t 
r a n g e s . T h i s m a y be b e c a u s e o f " i n d i f f e r e n c e t h r e s h o l d s " , i . e . t w o 
a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e p r e f e r e n t i a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t , b u t o n c e t h e p r e f e r e n c e 
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m b e c o m e s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e t h r e s h o l d v a l u e , t h e n 
the re is a d i s t i n c t p r e f e r e n c e be tween t h e m . 
T h e A r c h i m e d e a n P o s t u l a t e 
T h e p u r p o s e o f the A r c h i m e d e a n pos tu la te is t o g ive a n u m e r i c a l assessment 
o f the u t i l i t i e s . I t requ i res t h a t the u t i l i t i e s are de f i ned w i t h l o t t e r i e s , so 
t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e does n o t w o r k f o r p r o b a b i l i t y - l e s s u t i l i t i e s . 
G iven the A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e , i t is possib le to d e f i n e a u t i l i t y w h i c h is 
unique up to a pos i t i ve l inear t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 
The A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e : 
I f u ) p v ) p w , t he re ex is ts an oC such t ha t 
o^u + ( l - o ( ) w = p v 
is d i f f i c u l t t o t e s t i n p r a c t i c e . I t s e e m s p laus ib le t ha t i f is near 1 
t hen « (u + ( 1 - «()w is p r e f e r r e d and as o( is near 0 , so v is p r e f e r r e d o v e r 
olu + ( l - o ( ) w . A s o( is s m o o t h l y v a r i e d , so t h e r e m u s t be p o i n t o f 
invers ion where the t w o a l t e r n a t i v e s are i n d i f f e r e n t . 
T h i s A r c h i m e d e a n pos tu la te is o f t e n used as a d i r e c t means o f assessing the 
businessman's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i s k ( H a m m o n d , 1 9 6 7 ; S w a l m , 1 9 6 6 ; P r a t t , 
R a i f f a and S c h l a i f f e r , 1964; M i l l e r and S ta r r , 1969) . 
There are t w o v a r i a t i o n s on t h e t h e m e . T h e f i r s t is t o f i x o( a t 0 . 5 , 
s a y , c h o o s e v a l u e s f o r u a n d w , and ask t h e dec i s ion -maker t o p rov ide v , 
i .e. the amoun t w h i c h he w o u l d e x c h a n g e f o r t h e c h a n c e t o p l a y t h e b e t 
w h e n he had an equa l poss ib i l i t y o f w inn ing u and w. The o the r m e t h o d Is 
to f i x u,v and w , and ask t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r f o r t h e v a l u e o f o( w h i c h 
w o u l d m a k e h i m i n d i f f e r e n t . I t w o u l d be i n t e r e s t i n g to compare resu l ts 
ob ta ined by bo th me thods , bu t I am not aware o f any ser ious a t t e m p t t o do 
so. 
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H a u s n e r ( 1 9 5 4 ) o m i t s the A r c h i m e d e a n pos tu la te so as to genera l ise the von 
Neumann and M o r g e n s t e m theo ry o f u t i l i t y . In c o m m e n t i n g o n H a u s n e r ' s 
w o r k , T h r a l l ( 1 9 5 4 ) says t h a t t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e " l i m i t s u t i l i t y 
spaces to one d imens ion , i .e. to rea l n u m b e r s " . A s a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e o f 
t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e , he s u g g e s t s t h a t i f u = " b e g iven 2 c o m m o n 
p ins " , v = "be g iven 1 c o m m o n p i n " and w = " b e h a n g e d a t s u n d o w n " , t h e n 
we wou ld e x p e c t 
u >/ p v } p w , 
but no o( ex is ts such t h a t 
0^ u + (1-o t )w = p v. 
T h r a l l does say t h a t in m u c h o f e c o n o m i c s , t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o s t u l a t e is 
l i k e l y t o h o l d and n o n - A r c h i m e d e a n , m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l u t i l i t i e s m a y be 
use fu l in game t h e o r y . 
My basic ob jec t i ons to the A r c h i m e d e a n pos tu la te are as f o l l o w s : 
1 ) I t t e n d s to p l a c e a h i g h a c c u r a c y on t h e v a l u e s o f w h i c h t h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r m a y p r o d u c e . T h i s m a y l e a d t o i n c o n s i s t e n c y 
l a te r on. 
2 ) I t a ssumes t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y is e q u a l to o b j e c t i v e 
p r o b a b i l i t y . 
3) I ts use as a n o r m a t i v e ru le o f behav iou r is ques t ionab le . 
M o n o t o n i c i t y 
T h i s a x i o m is s i m i l a r t o t h e p r e v i o u s , b u t c o n s i d e r s t h e e f f e c t s o f 
p r o b a b i l i t y , r a the r than p re fe rences b e t w e e n a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
I f u } p v , 
</u + ( l - « O v ^ p + ( l -y9 ) v i f and only * >/ 
This means t h a t w i t h t w o l o t t e r i e s , one s h o u l d s e l e c t t h e l o t t e r y w h i c h 
renders the more p r e f e r r e d a l t e r n a t i v e more p robab le . 
In suggest ing th is a x i o m , Luce and R a i f f a a lso p u t f o r w a r d s o m e e x a m p l e s 
in w h i c h i t m a y be i n v a l i d . For i ns tance , a moun ta ineer a lmoBt c e r t a i n l y 
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p r e f e r s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e " l i f e " to " d e a t h " , b u t w h i l e c l i m b i n g moun ta ins , he is 
p r e f e r r i n g the l o t t e r y o f l i f e and dea th to the sa fe r be t o f l i f e , i . e . s t a y i n g 
a t h o m e . B u t , t h e t h r i l l o f c l i m b i n g is more than the l o t t e r y o f l i f e and 
dea th and i t is p robab ly t h i s e x t r a d i m e n s i o n o f e x c i t e m e n t w h i c h m a k e s 
th is a x i o m i n v a l i d in such cases. 
A s a n o r m a t i v e c r i t e r i o n , t h i s a x i o m w o u l d be f a i r f o r o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e s , as in g a m b l e s f o r m o n e y . A s t h e d i m e n s i o n a l i t y o f t h e 
p r o b l e m g r o w s , t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n be tween the p robab i l i t i e s and 
a l t e r n a t i v e s makes th i s a x i o m more s t ra ined and less u s e f u l as a n o r m a t i v e 
c r i t e r i o n . 
C o m b i n g and the S u r e - T h i n g P r i n c i p l e 
These two ax ioms w i l l be t r e a t e d toge the r since one is t h e c o n v e r s e o f t h e 
o t h e r . 
o<u + ( l - o ( ) v } p r f u + ( l - o < ) w f - ^ v > / p w 
T h e l e f t w a r d s p o i n t i n g a r r o w is an a x i o m o f H a u s n e r and H e r s t e i n a n d 
M i l n o r , a l t h o u g h t h e y use i n d i f f e r e n c e . H a u s n e r has t h e r i g h t w a r d s 
p o i n t i n g a r row as an a x i o m as w e l l . 
H e r s t e i n and M i l n o r s ta te t h a t the c o m b i n i n g a x i o m means t h a t : 
I f an i nd i v i dua l is i n d i f f e r e n t as t o a c h o i c e b e t w e e n a a n d a 1 , 
t h e n he is a lso i n d i f f e r e n t t o a c h o i c e o f A and A ' , whe re A 
r e p r e s e n t s a 5 0 - 5 0 c h a n g e o f g e t t i n g a o r b and A ' a 5 0 - 5 0 
change o f g e t t i n g a' or b, fo r any p rospec t b. 
bu t they e x t e n d the a x i o m to cover any cL , 0 £ o< ^ 1 
F i s h b u r n ( 1 9 7 0 , p. 108) c i t e s th is a x i o m , w i t h l e f t w a r d a r row as a n o r m a t i v e 
c r i t e r i o n . Cons ider the f o l l o w i n g p a y o f f m a t r i x : 
J - A 
Opt ion A u V 
O p t i o n 13 u w 
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I f v is p r e f e r r e d to w , then the gamb le r should p re fe r A to B, w h a t e v e r the 
p r o b a b i l i t y , o( . 
W h a t e v e r , t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e a r r o w , th is a x i o m wou ld seem to be a good 
g u i d e t o w a r d s c o n s i s t e n t b e h a v i o u r , i . e . as Savage ' s t h e o r y o f p e r s o n a l 
p r o b a b i l i t y and is known by h i m as the Sure -Th ing P r i n c i p l e . 
As a f o u n d a t i o n o f behav iou ra l dec is ion t h e o r y , Savage's s u r e - t h i n g p r i n c i p l e 
has had i t s ups and d o w n s . In 1 9 5 3 , A l l a i s p u b l i s h e d a famous coun te r 
e x a m p l e , and i n 1 9 6 1 , E l l s b e r g s u g g e s t e d a n o t h e r . In t h e s a m e y e a r , 
Edwards def ines and c o m m e n t s on the su re - t h i ng p r i nc i p l e as f o l l o w s : 
The sure t h i n g p r i n c i p l e ... asse r t s t h a t i f a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n A 
is a t l e a s t as g o o d as c o u r s e o f a c t i o n B in a l l possib le f u t u r e 
s ta tes o f the w o r l d , and is d e f i n i t e l y b e t t e r in one o r m o r e , t h e n 
B s h o u l d n e v e r b e p r e f e r r e d t o A ; i t is a b o u t t h e o n l y 
u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t e d and u n i v e r s a l l y e m p i r i c a l l y c o n f i r m e d 
p r i n c i p l e in dec is ion t h e o r y . 
H o w e v e r , i n 1 9 7 4 , S lov ic and Tversky cha l lenge th is c l a i m . They po in t ou t 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a re q u i c k t o r e v i s e t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s a n d c o n f o r m t o 
t r a n s i t i v i t y once t h e i r v i o l a t i o n o f i t is demons t ra ted to t h e m ( M a c C r i m m o n , 
1 9 6 8 ; T v e r s k y , 1 9 6 9 ) , a n d w o n d e r e d i f t h e s a m e w e r e t r u e o f t h e 
s u r e - t h i n g p r i n c i p l e . S u b j e c t s were asked to choose amongst the gambles 
as shown i n T a b l e 4 . 2 . T h e s u r e t h i n g p r i n c i p l e says t o c h o o s e e i t h e r 
g a m b l e s 1 and 3 o r 2 and 4 , b u t A l l a i s and E l l sberg r e c o m m e n d 1 and 4 . 
H a v i n g made t h e i r cho ices , sub jec ts were p resen ted w i t h e i t h e r t he A l l a i s o r 
Savage a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e i r c h o i c e . I t was found t h a t 17 o f 29 chose 
acco rd ing to A l l a i s on t h e i r f i r s t c h o i c e , and a f t e r h e a r i n g t h e c o u n t e r -
a r g u m e n t s , 19 o f 29 chose acco rd ing to A l l a i s on the second c h o i c e . 
A t t h e e n d o f t h e i r p a p e r , S l o v i c and T v e r s k y p r e s e n t a h y p o t h e t i c a l 
d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n Savage and A l l a i s , w h i c h cou ld suggest t h a t they too are 
unsure w h i c h pos i t i on to adop t . Savage 's a x i o m does r e q u i r e a v e r y c o o l 
l o o k a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , and is a n o r m a t i v e p rocedu re . A l l a i s 
tends to appeal to c a u t i o n , m a k i n g m o r e o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e i m p o r t a n c e o f 
r i s k . T h e a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o u r o f c h o i c e i n b o t h t h e A l l a i s and Savage 
ways are p resen ted in an appendix to th is chap te r . 
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S i n c e t h e a r g u m e n t s f o r and a g a i n s t t h e s u r e - t h i n g p r i n c i p l e a r e b o t h 
c o m p e l l i n g and accep ted by o rd ina ry d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , t h e n t h e r e s e e m s no 
r e a s o n a b l e c r i t e r i o n fo r choosing be tween t h e m . I f Savage's a x i o m is to be 
used as pa r t o f a t heo ry o f u t i l i t y , t hen any d e c i s i o n - m a k e r w h o w i s h e s t o 
use t h a t t h e o r y should e i t h e r i n t u i t i v e l y obey Savage's a x i o m or accep t i t as 
a n o r m a t i v e c r i t e r i o n . Any t h e o r y o f u t i l i t y , e m b o d y i n g t h i s a x i o m w i l l 
g i v e i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s w h e n a p p l i e d t o a dec i s i on -make r who does not 
w ish to choose acco rd ing to the s u r e - t h i n g p r i n c i p l e . T h e r e is a case f o r 
s e p a r a t e t h e o r i e s o f u t i l i t y , one to be a p p l i e d t o s u r e - t h i n g p r i n c i p l e 
b e l i e v e r s , and another f o r those who do no t be l i eve . 
I m a g i n e t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s - e a c h i n v o l v i n g a pa i r o f 
gamb les : 
S i t ua t i on X 
Gamb le 1 
Gamb le 2 
P r o b a b i l i t y 





A m o u n t 
to w i n 
£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 0 
S i t u a t i o n Y 
Gamb le 3 
Gamb le 4 




£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 0 
£ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 0 
Tab le 4.2 Cho ice B e t w e e n Gambles 
M u l t i - A t t r i b u t e U t i l i t y 
T h e a i m o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y t heo ry is to enable the dec i s i on -make r to 
e x p r e s s h i s u t i l i t y o f t h e m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e a l t e r n a t i v e s as a s i m p l e 
c o m b i n a t i o n o f t he u t i l i t i e s o f t h e separa te a t t r i b u t e s . Thus, the ove ra l l 
u t i l i t y may be ob ta ined c o n v e n i e n t l y by a d d i t i o n or m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 
s e p a r a t e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s . The cond i t i ons necessary to ach ieve these goals 
have a l ready been l i s t e d . We may make the f o l l o w i n g c o m m e n t s . 
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F i r s t l y , t h e c r i t e r i a o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a r e n o t n o r m a t i v e . T h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r m a y or m a y n o t a d h e r e t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f b e h a v i o u r 
r e q u i r e d f o r a c o n v e n i e n t l y m o d e l l e d u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . In desc r ip t i ons o f 
p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n , the dec is ion -makers do usual ly obey these c r i t e r i a , b u t 
some methods have been suggested to handle less conven ien t u t i l i t y mode ls . 
In order to decide w h e t h e r a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r does o b e y t h e s e c r i t e r i a , t h e 
a n a l y s t m u s t h a v e s e n s i t i v e t e s t i n g t e c h n i q u e s (Keeney and R a i f f a , 1976). 
H o w e v e r , as t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e p r o b l e m g r o w s and m o r e a n d m o r e 
a t t r i b u t e s a r e i n v o l v e d , t h e s e t e s t i n g t e c h n i q u e s b e c o m e more and more 
t i m e - c o n s u m i n g and b o r i n g . Since the t e s t i n g p r o c e d u r e s p r o v i d e l i t t l e i n 
t h e w a y o f t r a i n i n g or se l f - i ns i gh t f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , one wonders how 
v a l u a b l e t h e t e s t i n g p r o c e d u r e s a r e , and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e v a l u e o f t h e 
dec is ions based upon t h e m . 
T h i s l o n g p r o c e s s o f p r e l i m i n a r y t e s t i n g keeps the c o n t r o l o f the dec is ion 
analysis in t h e hands o f t h e a n a l y s t , and n o t t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . A n y 
d e c i s i o n a i d m u s t " i n t e r f a c e " w i t h the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . I f the dec is ion a id 
is s i m p l e t o u s e , t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r m a y n o t e v e n be a w a r e o f t h e 
i n t e r f a c e . As t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e t e c h n i q u e i n c r e a s e s , the i n t e r f a c e 
be tween d e c i s i o n - m a k e r and t e c h n i q u e w i d e n s , and h e l p m a y be n e e d e d . 
A n a n a l y s t c a n a d v i s e and e x p l a i n . As t h e t e c h n i q u e g r o w s e v e r m o r e 
c o m p l e x , and only the m a t h e m a t i c a l l y able can c o m p r e h e n d , so t h e a n a l y s t , 
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s , a c q u i r e s m o r e and more c o n t r o l over the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
p r o c e s s and m a y e x e r t p r e s s u r e o n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o a d o p t h i s 
p e r s p e c t i v e . Th i s b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l d i a l o g u e s 
b e t w e e n Ana l ys t and Assessor in Keeney and R a i f f a ' s book (1976) . 
The p r e f e r e n t i a l i n d i f f e r e n c e assumpt ion requ i res t h a t cons tan t t r a d e - o f f s be 
m a i n t a i n e d th roughou t the range o f v a r i a t i o n o f x j . Thus, when c o n s i d e r i n g 
a s y s t e m c h a n g e , f o r e x a m p l e , t he i m p o r t a n c e o f the a t t r i b u t e s must no t 
vary as the l eve l o f p e r f o r m a n c e moves f r o m t h e i n t o l e r a b l e t o t h e i d e a l . 
T h i s is u n l i k e l y i n p r a c t i c e , as f o r e x a m p l e w i t h j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n . The 
B A S Y C t e c h n i q u e ( M u m f o r d e t a i , 1 9 7 8 ) is p r o n e t o e r r o r s o f t h i s k i n d 
b e c a u s e o f i t s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e m i d p o i n t o f the u t i l i t y range co inc ides 
w i t h the present p o s i t i o n . 
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W E I G H T S A N D S C A L I N G F A C T O R S 
L e t us l o o k c l o s e l y a t t h e s c a l i n g f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d , t h e k j . Each k, is 
de f ined so t h a t : 
u ( x j * , xfi) = k j 
H e n c e e a c h k j r e p r e s e n t s the amoun t o f s a t i s f a c t i o n wh i ch is ob ta i ned f r o m 
t h a t a t t r i b u t e a t i t s h i g h e s t l e v e l , w h e n t h e l e v e l s o f a l l t h e o t h e r 
p r e f e r e n c e v a r i a b l e s a re h e l d a t t h e i r l owes t l e v e l . I f the a t t r i b u t e s are 
m u t u a l l y p r e f e r e n t i a l l y independent , t hen these we igh t s w i l l r e m a i n c o n s t a n t , 
w h a t e v e r t h e l eve l o f f u l f i l m e n t o f the o ther a t t r i b u t e s , i nc lud ing the s ta tus 
q u o l e v e l s . H e n c e , i f t h e w e i g h t s a c c o r d e d t o e a c h a t t r i b u t e a r e 
d e t e r m i n e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s ta tus quo, these we igh ts are on ly v a l i d so 
long as a l l the a t t r i b u t e s are m u t u a l l y p r e f e r e n t i a l l y independent . 
T h e f a i l u r e o f p r e f e r e n t i a l i n d e p e n d e n c e is m a n i f e s t e d as n o n - c o n s t a n t 
w e i g h t s , as i n an a s y m m e t r y o f w e i g h t s a b o u t t h e s t a t u s q u o . A s a n 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , a g r o u p o f w o r k e r s w e r e a s k e d t o r a n k o r d e r a n u m b e r o f 
o b j e c t i v e s . Some of the o b j e c t i v e s r e f e r r e d to t h e i r own w o r k i n g l i f e , a n d 
o t h e r s w e r e o f a m o r e a l t r u i s t i c n a t u r e , dea l ing w i t h the i n te res t s o f o the r 
user groups and the purpose of t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n . T o o u r s u r p r i s e , t h e i r 
o w n j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n was ranked w e l l down the l i s t , w i t h the more a l t r u i s t i c 
o b j e c t i v e s ranked h igher . When asked w h y t h i s w a s so , t h e y r e p l i e d t h a t 
t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e i r own cond i t i ons was r e l a t i v e l y u n i m p o r t a n t , because 
t hey were reasonably happy a l ready . 
I n a s e c o n d c a s e , a g r o u p o f managers were hav ing to face impend ing cu ts 
in t h e i r budget and wan ted to dec ide b e f o r e h a n d h o w t h e s e c u t s s h o u l d be 
d i s t r i b u t e d o v e r t he s e r v i c e w h i c h they p r o v i d e d . They were asked to l i s t 
the ob jec t i ves o f the o rgan i sa t i on , bu t to s t a t e t h e m as i f i m p r o v i n g t h e m 
f r o m the p r e s e n t l e v e l , i .e . " I m p r o v e the l eve l o f p r o v i s i o n " . This assumed 
t h a t the we igh t s w h i c h we re assigned fo r the " I m p r o v e " o b j e c t i v e s w o u l d be 
t h e s a m e as f o r " M a i n t a i n " and " D o n o t decrease" ob jec t i ves on the same 
p e r f o r m a n c e v a r i a b l e . T h e m a n a g e r s r e a l i s e d t h a t w h a t t h e y w e r e b e i n g 
a s k e d to do w a s n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h e p r o b l e m , and so t h e p r o j e c t w a s 
abandoned. 
T h e r e is an o b s e r v a b l e a s y m m e t r y about the s ta tus quo in the a l l o c a t i o n o f 
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w e i g h t s . A g r o u p m a y p e r c e i v e the i m p o r t a n c e o f i m p r o v i n g on the l eve l 
o f a p e r f o r m a n c e v a r i a b l e as q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f 
m a i n t a i n i n g or n o t d e c r e a s i n g t h a t l e v e l . This is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r ue when 
h igh l y sub jec t i ve or e m o t i v e issues are i n v o l v e d . T h i s m e a n s t h a t i n s u c h 
c a s e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l i ndependence is unreasonab le , and so 
a d d i t i v e u t i l i t y cannot be used. 
N A T U R A L O P E R A T I O N S 
We h a v e l o o k e d , i n some d e t a i l , a t the founda t ions o f u t i l i t y t heo ry and the 
a x i o m s i t s u p p o s e s . Some a x i o m s h a v e a g r e a t e r i n t u i t i v e a p p e a l t h a n 
o t h e r s , a n d s o m e m a y be c o n s i d e r e d as n o r m a t i v e c r i t e r i a o f r a t i o n a l 
behav iou r . A genera l ised t heo ry o f u t i l i t y s h o u l d be b a s e d on t h e f e w e s t 
and m o s t t r a n s p a r e n t a x i o m s , bu t to do th is we may need to re l i nqu ish the 
i dea l o f n u m e r i c a l l y m e a s u r a b l e u t i l i t i e s and l o w e r o u r s i g h t s t o w a r d s a 
d e s c r i p t i v e t heo ry o f u t i l i t y , w h i c h is in danger o f b e c o m i n g t a u t o l o g i c a l . 
I p r e f e r x to y because u(x) is g r e a t e r t han u(y) because 
I p re fe r x to y 
T h i s e n c o u r a g e s the a t t i t u d e t h a t " t h e only ' n a t u r a l ' d a t u m in th is d o m a i n is 
the r e l a t i o n " g r e a t e r " , i . e . t h e c o n c e p t o f p r e f e r e n c e " ( v o n N e u m a n n a n d 
M o r g e n s t e r n , 1947 p.3). 
One w o n d e r s i f we a re i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c c o u n t f o r the f a i l u r e o f u t i l i t y 
t heo ry to be taken up as a c o n v i n c i n g t o o l (see B e l l , K e e n e y a n d R a i f f a , 
1 9 7 7 , p. 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 ) . I t r e q u i r e s s t a n d a r d s o f c o n s i s t e n c y and r a t i o n a l i t y 
w h i c h a re d i f f i c u l t e v e n f o r d e c i s i o n a n a l y s t s t h e m s e l v e s t o a t t a i n . 
H o w e v e r , s i n c e m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e d e c i s i c n - m a k i n g is a d i f f i c u l t and c o m p l e x 
task, some m e t h o d of ass is t ing t h a t p r o c e s s is r e q u i r e d . A n o f f s h o o t o r 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c lass ica l u t i l i t y t h e o r y may be r e q u i r e d . 
We have argued t h a t in sys tems w h i c h s t r o n g l y i n v o l v e t h e h u m a n f a c t o r , 
p r e f e r e n t i a l independence among a t t r i b u t e s becomes less and less s t r ong , and 
m a y b e o b s e r v e d i n t h e s t a t e m e n t s o f r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s m a k e . I f we look at the m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e p rob lems i nvo l v i ng 
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h i g h l y s u b j e c t i v e a t t r i b u t e s , we are l i ke l y to f i n d the f a i l u re o f p r e f e r e n t i a l 
independence and hence o f add i t i ve value t h e o r y . 
O f w h a t u s e , t h e n , i s a m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e v a l u e t h e o r y , i n t h e s e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? T h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r p r e f e r e n t i a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a r e 
t i m e - c o n s u m i n g to t es t , and are l i ke l y no t to ho ld . F i s h b u m (1964) says: 
In v i r t u a l l y a l l dec is ion s i tua t ions i n w h i c h i n d e p e n d e n c e is used 
i t m u s t be t a k e n as an assumpt ion . The f i r s t reason fo r th is is 
t h a t i t is s i m p l y t o o g r e a t a t a s k t o a t t e m p t c o m p l e t e 
v e r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e independence hypothes is - the e f f o r t m i g h t be 
b e t t e r s p e n t on o t h e r t h i n g s . T h e s e c o n d and p e r h a p s m o r e 
i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n f o r s t a t i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e as an assumpt ion is 
because i t o f t e n y ie lds an a p p r o x i m a t i o n ( t o a v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ) . A l t h o u g h in many instances i t may be a good 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n , i t is never the less an a p p r o x i m a t i o n and s h o u l d be 
r e c o g n i s e d as s u c h . I t m a y a lso be an a p p r o x i m a t i o n w h i c h 
m u s t be m a d e i n o r d e r t o t r e a t a p r o b l e m a n a l y t i c a l l y o r 
" o b j e c t i v e l y " . 
T h e v a l u e o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e va lue theo ry wou ld seem to be in i ts a b i l i t y to 
s t r u c t u r e the dec i s i on -mak ing process . Bu t the m a t h e m a t i c a l m o d e l is o n l y 
an a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e t r u e sub jec t i ve v a l u a t i o n , wh i ch must be the f i n a l 
c r i t e r i o n f o r d e c i d i n g w h i c h a l t e r n a t i v e t o c h o o s e . T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l 
m e t h o d can assist the sub jec t i ve assessment bu t can never who l l y rep lace i t . 
We have argued t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l w e a k n e s s e s o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y 
t h e o r y r e n d e r i t an a p p r o x i m a t i o n o n l y , b u t as s u c h is should have some 
uses as a dec is ion a i d . H o w e v e r , w e s h a l l now a r g u e t h a t t h e p r a c t i c a l 
use o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y t h e o r y i n t roduces e r ro rs and d i s t o r t i ons w h i c h 
make i t d isadvantageous and i n a c c u r a t e . 
D I S A D V A N T A G E S O F M U L T I - A T T R I B U T E U T I L I T Y T H E O R Y 
I t may be argued t h a t the r oo t o f many o f these d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e s i n t h e use 
o f n u m b e r s t o d e s c r i b e w h a t a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y s u b j e c t i v e o p i n i o n s and 
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f e e l i n g s . T h e s e i d e a s a r e v a g u e and i m p r e c i s e b u t a s s u m e a q u i t e 
spur ious impress ion o f accu racy when s ta ted n u m e r i c a l l y . 
F o r e x a m p l e , we m a y s a y , c o l l o q u i a l l y , t h a t one o b j e c t i v e is t w i c e as 
i m p o r t a n t as ano ther ; we do not mean e x a c t l y t h a t i f one has a w e i g h t o f 
10 p o i n t s t h e o t h e r s h o u l d h a v e a w e i g h t o f 2 0 , a l t h o u g h t h i s is t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the n u m e r i c a l me thods use. We a r e m e r e l y t a l k i n g a b o u t a 
b i g d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e o f the o b j e c t i v e s . To t r ans l a te 
t h e s e s u b j e c t i v e c o m m e n t s i n t o p r e c i s e n u m b e r s c a n c r e a t e s u s p i c i o n , 
depend ing on the numeracy o f the users. 
The best examp le o f t h i s " c u l t o f numbers " is c o s t b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s , w h e r e 
t h e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s o f a p r o p o s e d sys tem change are compared d i r e c t l y 
by r e d u c i n g e v e r y t h i n g to t h e l o w e s t c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r o f f i n a n c i a l 
v a l u e . The c o m p l e x m a t h e m a t i c s i n v o l v e d l e a v e s m o s t o f the a f f e c t e d 
p a r t i e s b a f f l e d , b e w i l d e r e d and a l i e n a t e d ( L e i t c h , 1 9 7 7 ) . W h i l e i t i s 
r e a s o n a b l e and p o s s i b l e t o f o r e c a s t d e a t h s , i n j u r i e s and i n c r e a s e d noise 
l eve l s , e t c . , w h i c h w i l l be c a u s e d by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a new r o a d o r 
a i r p o r t , to p l ace m o n e t a r y values on these e m o t i v e aspects is repugnant and 
unrea l to many peop le . Cos t b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s , d e s p i t e s o m e s u c c e s s , has 
b e e n i n a d e q u a t e f o r c o p i n g w i t h the sub jec t i ve l y va lued issues wh ich a f f e c t 
people 's l i ves . 
T h i s e m p h a s i s on numbers has ano ther i d e n t i f i a b l e e f f e c t - upon the t ype o f 
o b j e c t i v e s wh i ch are se lec ted as re levan t to the p r o b l e m . To c o m p a r e t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s t h e y m u s t be m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to scales de r i ved f r o m the 
o b j e c t i v e s . In p r a c t i c e , th i s means t h a t the o n l y o b j e c t i v e s w h i c h c a n be 
h a n d l e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y a re t h o s e w h i c h a r e q u a n t i f i a b l e , such as speed o f 
s e r v i c e , C P U s to re , f r equency o f b reakdown and cos t . T h o s e a t t r i b u t e s o f 
a n y s y s t e m c h a n g e w h i c h i m p i n g e d i r e c t l y upon the q u a l i f y o f l i f e o f the 
people who are a f f e c t e d are o f t e n r e l e g a t e d t o a " s e c o n d d i v i s i o n " s i m p l y 
b e c a u s e t h e y c a n n o t be e a s i l y m e a s u r e d a n d n o t b e c a u s e o f l esser 
i m p o r t a n c e . In f a c t , t h e i r v e r y s u b j e c t i v i t y m a y i n d i c a t e a d e e p e r 
r e l e v a n c e . S o , o b j e c t i v e s i n v o l v i n g g o o d w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s , j o b 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , a p leasant e n v i r o n m e n t and p r e s t i g e , e t c . , a re u s e d t o r e s o l v e 
t h e f i n e r p o i n t s o f d e c i s i o n s made acco rd ing to the q u a n t i f i a b l e o b j e c t i v e s , 
when in e f f e c t ignor ing such qua l i t i e s has led to the p r e m a t u r e d o w n f a l l o f 
appa ren t l y impeccab le sys tem designs. 
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T h e p r e c i s i o n w h i c h n u m e r i c a l e s t i m a t e s demands can cause d i s t r a c t i o n and 
t i m e - w a s t i n g in t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . S u b j e c t i v e q u a n t i t i e s a r e 
i n h e r e n t l y imp rec i se and so i t becomes po in t less to t r y to p lace an accu ra te 
m e a s u r m e n t upon t h e m . The e s t i m a t e s a re i m p r e c i s e b u t t h i s is o f t e n 
f o r g o t t e n l a t e r w h e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e e s t i m a t s a re t r e a t e d t o g e t h e r w i t h 
genuine o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e m e n t s to p r o d u c e an a n s w e r q u o t e d t o s e v e r a l 
d e c i m a l p l a c e s . The A r c h i m e d e a n pos tu la te in u t i l i t y e s t i m a t i o n is a p r i m e 
c u l p r i t in th is respec t , s ince i t requ i res very h i gh d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o w e r s on 
the pa r t o f the dec i s i on -make r . 
We h a v e a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d t h e t h e o r y o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y f r o m a 
p r a c t i c a l pe rspec t i ve and found i t l a c k i n g as a m o d e l o f h u m a n b e h a v i o u r . 
T h e a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n is i n t e n d e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y 
t h e o r y is i n a d e q u a t e i n p r a c t i c e , e v e n as an a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o h u m a n 
b e h a v i o u r . The r e a s o n f o r t h i s is t h e e m p h a s i s w h i c h i t p laces on the 
prec ise n u m e r i c a l m e a s u r e m e n t o f h u m a n o p i n i o n s . T h i s causes s e v e r a l 
u n d e s i r a b l e e f f e c t s , s u c h as t h e f i n a n c i a l m e a s u r e m e n t o f e m o t i v e 
q u a n t i t i e s , a s e l e c t i o n e f f e c t on t h e t y p e s o f o b j e c t i v e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e 
p r o b l e m a n d a d a n g e r o u s a n d t i m e - w a s t i n g o v e r - p r e c i s i a t i o n o f t h e 
sub jec t i ve e s t i m a t e s . 
S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r , we h a v e r e v i e w e d the ideas o f u t i l i t y t heo ry and discussed 
t h e m in the l i gh t o f n o r m a t i v e and d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i e s . The t h e o r e t i c a l 
and p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y t heo ry were cons idered . 
A t th i s s tage we m a y c o n c l u d e t h a t any v a l u e t h e o r y s h o u l d a d o p t o n l y 
t h o s e a x i o m s w h i c h a re a c c e p t e d as r e a s o n a b l e , n o r m a t i v e s t a n d a r d s o f 
behav iou r . These are : 
1) t h a t p re fe rnces can be made 
2) t h a t p re fe rence is t r a n s i t i v e , but no t i n d i f f e r e n c e . 
A x i o m s i n v o l v i n g l o t t e r i e s a r e o n l y n p p r o p r i a t e in cnues w h e r e t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s are o b j e c t i v e l y k n o w n , wh i ch is r a r e l y , i f evo r , the cnoe in r e a l 
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l i f e . M u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y t h e o r y acto oa an a p p r o x i m a t i o n and ha3 va lue 
as a means of s t r u c t u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . H o w e v e r , i t has 
d i s a d v a n t a g e s d u e t o i t s e m p h a s i s on n u m b e r s . T h e t w o s t a n d a r d s 
m e n t i o n e d above are not enough to de r i ve a un ique , n u m e r i c a l u t i l i t y , w h i c h 
may not be a bad t h i n g . 
A b e t t e r t h e o r y o f u t i l i t y o r va lue should i n c o r p o r a t e the s t r u c t u r i n g ideas 
o f m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y t h e o r y , b u t a v o i d i t s t i m e - w a s t i n g and d i s t o r t i n q 
s i d e - e f f e c t s . A n a t t e m p t to do so is p resen ted in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8. 
A P P E N D I X 
Imag ine the f o l l o w i n g t w o dec is ion s i t ua t i ons - each i nvo l v i ng a p a i r o f 
gamb les : 
P r o b a b i l i t y A m o u n t 
o f w inn ing to w i n 
S i t ua t i on X 
Gamb le 1 100% £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Gamb le 2 10% £ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
89% £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
1% £ 0 
S i t ua t i on Y 
Gamb le 3 1 1 % £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
89% £ 0 
Gamb le 4 10% £ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
90% £ 0 
Tab le 4.2 Cho ice B e t w e e n Gambles 
A l l a i s ' a r g u m e n t 
I w o u l d c h o o s e G a m b l e 1 over Gamb le 2 in S i t ua t i on X and Gamb le 4 ove r 
G a m b l e 3 i n S i t u a t i o n Y . In S i t u a t i o n X , I h a v e a c h o i c e b e t w e e n 
£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 f o r c e r t a i n and a g a m b l e w h e r e I m i g h t end up w i t h n o t h i n g . 
Why gamb 'e? The sma l l p r o b a b i l i t y o f m i s s i n g t h e c h a n c e o f a l i f e t i m e 
seems v e r y u n a t t r a c t i v e t o m e . In S i t u a t i o n Y , the re is a good chance 
t h a t I w i l l end up w i t h n o t h i n g no m a t t e r w h a t I d o . The c h a n c e o f 
g e t t i n g £ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 is a l m o s t as g o o d as g e t t i n g £1 ,000,000, so I m i g h t as 
w e l l go f o r the £5,000,000 and choose Gamb le 4 over Gamb le 3. 
Savage's a r g u m e n t 
One w a y i n w h i c h G a m b l e s 1,2,3 and 4 c o u l d be p layed is by means o f a 
l o t t e r y . Suppose we had 100 n u m b e r e d t i c k e t s i n a b o w l w h e r e 1 t i c k e t 
w o u l d be s e l e c t e d a t r a n d o m to d e t e r m i n e the o u t c o m e . The fou r gambles 
c a n t h u s be r e p r e s e n t e d as i n t h e t a b l e b e l o w . T h e p a y o f f s a r e t h e 
a m o u n t s t h a t w o u l d be won i f a t i c k e t whose number appears a t the top o f 
the co lumn is d r a w n . 
T i c k e t Numbe r 
1 2 - 1 1 12 -100 
S i t ua t i on X 
Gamb le 1 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Gamb le 2 £ 0 £ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
S i t ua t i on Y 
Gamb le 3 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 0 
Gamb le 4 £ 0 £ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 0 
N o w , i f one o f t h e t i c k e t s numbered f r o m 12 th rough 100 is d r a w n , i t w i l l 
not m a t t e r , in e i t h e r s i t u a t i o n , wh i ch gamb le I c h o o s e . I t h e r e f o r e f o c u s 
on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one o f t h e t i c k e t s numbered 1-11 w i l l be d r a w n , in 
w h i c h case S i tua t i ons X and Y are e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l . M y d e c i s i o n i n b o t h 
s i t u a t i o n s d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r I w o u l d r a t h e r h a v e an o u t r i g h t g i f t o f 
£1,000,000 or gamble to w i n £5 ,000,000. 
(a) I f I p r e f e r t h e g i f t o f £1 ,000,000, I should choose Gamb le 1 over 
Gamb le 2 and Gamb le 3 over Gamb le 4 . 
(b) I f I p r e f e r t h e g a m b l e f o r £5 ,000 ,000 , I should choose Gamb le 2 
over Gamb le 1 and Gamb le 4 over Gamb le 3. 
N o o t h e r p a i r s o f cho i ces are l o g i c a l . I imag ine t h a t I wou ld choose 
Gamb le 1 over Gamb le 3. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
F U Z Z Y S E T T H E O R Y 
I n t he p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s , we have argued against the use o f numbers in the 
dec i s ion -mak ing process. A new branch o f m a t h e m a t i c s is b e i n g d e v e l o p e d 
w h i c h l o o k s more c lose ly a t the human process o f reason ing. This is fuzzy 
set t h e o r y and f u z z y l o g i c . See t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y by G a i n e s & K o h o u t 
( 1 9 7 7 ) f o r r e f e r e n c e s . In t h i s c h a p t e r we s h a l l e x a m i n e t h e n o t i o n o f 
f uzzy sets, i ts a ims , usefu lness, weaknesses and re levance to t h i s p r o b l e m . 
E X P L A N A T I O N 
T o e x p l a i n w h a t is m e a n t by f uzzy set t heo ry is a lmos t impossib le w i t h o u t 
say ing someth ing of i t s purpose as w e l l . H o w e v e r , we shal l t r y . 
W i t h o r d i n a r y s e t t h e o r y , we n a m e a se t and d e c i d e w h i c h i t e m s a r e 
e lemen ts and wh ich are n o t . Thus, we may de f ine the set o f m e n a n d c a n 
c h o o s e e a s i l y w h i c h p e o p l e a re m e m b e r s o f t h i s se t and w h i c h are no t . 
We m a y d e f i n e s u b s e t s o f t h e s e t o f m e n , such as t h o s e m e n w h o a r e 
p a r e n t s . H o w e v e r , w e c a n de f ine the set o f paren ts sepa ra te l y , t a k i n g as 
i ts members parents o f bo th sexes. The i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e s e t o f p a r e n t s 
w i t h t he se t o f m e n t e l l s us w h i c h m e n a re p a r e n t s . The union o f bo th 
these sets g ives the set o f paren ts and m e n . 
T h i s is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d enough, because i t is usual ly easy to decide whe the r 
a g iven i nd i v idua l is ma le or is a p a r e n t . H o w e v e r , i f the se ts i n q u e s t i o n 
h a d b e e n t he se t s o f t a l l m e n or t h e se t o f k i n d pa ren ts , then we wou ld 
h a v e f o u n d i t less easy t o be c o m p l e t e l y su re a b o u t w h e t h e r a g i v e n 
i n d i v i d u a l was a m e m b e r o f e i t h e r se t or n o t . The ad jec t i ves ' t a l l ' and 
' k i nd 1 , a l though c o m m o n l y a n d n a t u r a l l y used i n n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , do n o t 
l e n d t h e m s e l v e s e a s i l y t o p r e c i s i a t i o n , w h i c h is n e c e s s a r y i f we need to 
make 'yes-no ' rep l ies . 
I " u / / y sM. t h e o r y n t .Lempts t o O H S O Llii:'. i l i l e m m n liy n l l ow in i ] i t ems to bo 
m e m b e r s o l no in w i t h s o m e t h i n g loaa t h u n t h e f i r m n o o u o f t h e ' y e u - n o ' 
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d e c i s i o n . O r d i n a r y set t heo ry a l l ows i t ems to be members w i t h a grade o f 
membersh ip o f e i t h e r 0 or 1 . They are e i t h e r members o f t h e s e t o r t h e y 
a re n o t . F u z z y se t t h e o r y a l lows i t ems to be e lements o f the set w i t h a 
grade o f membersh ip w h i c h can l ie anywhere i n t h e r a n g e 0 t o 1 . T h e s e 
g r a d e s o f m e m b e r s h i p a r e d e f i n e d s u b j e c t i v e l y , r e f l e c t i n g the ind iv idua l ' s 
own op in ion o f the t r u t h o f the s t a t e m e n t t h a t " I t e m A is a m e m b e r o f t h e 
A s w i t h o r d i n a r y s e t s , f u z z y se ts c a n be s u b j e c t t o t h e l a w s o f u n i o n , 
i n t e r s e c t i o n , c o m p l e m e n t a t i o n , i d e m p o t e n c e , e t c . , i n s u c h a w a y t h a t 
o r d i n a r y se ts a p p e a r as a s p e c i a l case o f f uzzy sets . For f u r t h e r de ta i l s 
see, e .g . Zadeh (1973,1977). 
P U R P O S E 
I n t he a b o v e s e c t i o n , i t was men t i oned t h a t the grades o f membersh ip we re 
de f ined s u b j e c t i v e l y . Th is is a very i m p o r t a n t aspec t o f f u z z y s e t t h e o r y , 
and has b e e n t he s o u r c e o f i t s g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h and loudest c o n t r o v e r s y . 
In a semina l work on the s u b j e c t , Z a d e h ( 1 9 7 3 ) has t h i s t o say a b o u t t h e 
purpose o f f uzzy set t h e o r y : 
E s s e n t i a l l y , ou r c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t the conven t i ona l q u a n t i t a t i v e 
techn iques o f sys tem analysis are i n t r i n s i c a l l y unsu i ted f o r d e a l i n g 
w i t h h u m a n i s t i c s y s t e m s o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , any sys tem whose 
c o m p l e x i t y is c o m p a r a b l e to t h a t o f h u m a n i s t i c s y s t e m s . . . . A n 
a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h . . . is based on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e key 
e lemen ts in human t h i n k i n g are no t n u m b e r s , b u t l a b e l s o f f u z z y 
s e t s , t h a t i s , c l asses o f o b j e c t s in w h i c h t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m 
membersh ip to non -membersh ip is g radua l r a the r than ab rup t . 
H e s e e m s t o t a k e the v iew here t h a t human reasoning is too c o m p l e x to be 
h a n d l e d by c o n v e n t i o n a l m a t h e m a t i c s . T h i s m a y be t r u e . C e r t a i n l y , 
c o n v e n t i o n a l m a t h e m a t i c s is no t a good language in wh ich to embody human 
reason ing, bu t I wou ld guess t ha t the r e a s o n is n o t j u s t t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f 
t h e s u b j e c t , b u t i t s n a t u r e as a language-based a c t i v i t y . I f one does t r y 
to d e s c r i b e h u m a n r e a s o n i n g u s i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l m a t h e m a t i c s , t h e n t h e 
p r o b l e m d o e s b e c o m e c o m p l e x . Perfcraps i t is ,pn ly c o m p l e x b e c a u s e 
set A A " . 
•pr  i t i  ,,o  
LibrarY 
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m a t h e m a t i c s makes i t so. For comp lex , non-human systems, fuzzy set 
theory does provide a new insight. 
T H E P R O B L E M OF V A G U E N E S S AND F U Z Z Y S E T T H E O R Y 
One of the inheren t d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h human reasoning is i ts vagueness, 
wh ich has long been recognised by philosophers as a problem (Black, 1937; 
Russell, 1923). With s ta tements i nvo l v ing vague p ropos i t i ons , i t is ve ry 
d i f f i c u l t to decide whether they are t rue or fa l se . One of the more 
recent studies on this subject is t h a t of Haack (1974). She d is t ingu ishes 
be tween u n c e r t a i n t y about the appl icab i l i ty of a predicate and imprecision 
thus: 
(1) The quali f ications for being F are imprecise. 
(2 ) The quali f ications for being F are precise, but 
there is d i f f i cu l ty in determining whether certain 
subjects satisfy them. 
She proceeds to spec i fy some of the ways in which the quali f ications for 
being F may be imprecise: 
(a) The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are complex ( in the f o r m of an open 
c o n j u n c t i o n , or c o n j u n c t i o n o f d i s j u n c t i o n s ) and i t is 
i n d e t e r m i n a t e how many of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s must be 
sat isf ied, and how the qual i f icat ions are to be weighted. 
(b) The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are c o m p l e x , and in c e r t a i n cases 
conf l ic t ing. 
(c) The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are s imple ( in the f o r m of a s ingle 
c o n d i t i o n , or of a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d con junc t i on of a l l o f 
whose con junc ts must be sa t i s f i ed ) , but in certa in cases i t 
is i n d e t e r m i n a t e whether the c o n d i t i o n , or one o f t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s , is s a t i s f i e d . To a v o i d c o n f u s i o n w i t h 
uncertaint ies of t ype (2) , i t is necessary to add t ha t the 
i nde te rm inacy about whether the quali f ications are satisfied 
should not be due to any lack of i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e 
object, in question. 
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Haack is concerned w i t h the impl ica t ions of vague sentences upon the use 
of classical logic. She argues that vague sentences do not require the step 
of rep lac ing classical, bivalent logic w i th a logic of some other type. Her 
argument proceeds roughly as fol lows. For every vague p red i ca te , there is 
a s c i e n t i f i c p red ica te wh ich may be substi tuted for i t . Instead of stat ing 
that an apple is red, we may state the precise wave leng ths of the l i gh t i t 
r e f l e c t s . However , in making this statement, we give ourselves the means 
of tes t ing whether the s ta temen t is t rue or no t . In most cases , t h e 
i ns t rumen ts w i l l not be avai lb le to test the val id i ty of the statements, but 
in principle they are testable, and hence may be shown to be t rue or f a l se . 
This rep laces the uncer ta in ty which had been of type (1) wi th another type 
of uncertainty, type (2), while preserving the b iva lence of the l og i c . Her 
pos i t i on is presented much more clearly than I have space to permi t , and is 
beauti ful ly argued. 
Whi le accep t ing the arguments she presents , I quest ion the usefulness of 
such a procedure. Haack states that 
I admi t t ha t a l e g i t i m a t e a im of the cons t ruc t ion of a formal 
ca lcu lus is to f o r m a l i s e arguments w h i c h o c c u r in o r d i n a r y 
n o n - m a t h e m a t i c a l d iscourse. I only suggest t ha t i t may be 
necessary, and desirable, for the logic ian to t i dy up - or , to 
'regiment' - this discourse. 
Fuzzy set t heo ry prov ides a logic which can cope wi th imprecision wi thout 
requ i r i ng the f o r m a l i s a t i o n of o rd inary d iscourse , wh i le s a c r i f i c i n g t h e 
b iva lence of c lassic l og ic . I t is possible for fuzzy logic to formalise the 
arguments which occur in ordinary, non-mathematical d iscourse, but perhaps 
w i t h o u t causing the regimentation Haack has in mind. Both arguments and 
logics are valid - i t is a matter of choosing the log ic to su i t the purpose. 
I have a l ready argued that the regimentation of human reasoning as part of 
decision-making should be avoided (Chapter 4). 
The pu rpose o f f u z z y set t h e o r y is to handle complex or human is t i c 
sys tems. I t is essent ia l l y p r a c t i c a l , and must t h e r e f o r e r e p r e s e n t a 
deviation from the classical bivalent logic. In 1904, Duhem stated that 
The liiwu of physics cun ucquire this miriutiinfciKi of disLiiil only hy 
s a c r i f i c i n g some- u f the f i x e d and .- ibsnluto c u r t o i n t y of 
common-sense laws. The re is a s o r t o f b a l a n c e b e t w e e n 
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prec i s i on and uncerta inty: one cannot be increased except to the 
detr iment of the other. 
Compare this w i th a remark by Zadeh (1973): 
The essence of this pr inc ip le (of i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y ) is t h a t as the 
c o m p l e x i t y of the sys tem increases, our abi l i ty to make precise 
and yet signif icant statements about i ts behaviour diminishes u n t i l 
a t h resho ld is reached beyond which precision and signif icance (or 
relevance) become almost mutual ly exclusive character ist ics. 
The i m p r e c i s i o n w i t h wh ich fuzzy set t heo ry deals must be cons idered . 
Haack divided uncertainty into two types, due to imprecise q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , or 
p rec ise q u a l i f i c a t i o n s which are d i f f i cu l t to determine if they are sat isf ied. 
E a r l i e r (see Chap te r 3) I d i s t i ngu ished be tween u n c e r t a i n t y due to t h e 
i n t e r n a l env i r onmen t of the dec i s i on -make r and t h a t due to the external 
environment and our incomplete knowledge of i t . These two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
of u n c e r t a i n t y are roughly simi lar, except that Haack's type (2) uncertainty 
should also inc lude u n c e r t a i n t y due to the f u t u r e , wh ich she does n o t 
m e n t i o n , a l though i t seems consistent w i th her earlier remarks. Fuzzy set 
t h e o r y is mean t to cope w i t h t h e f i r s t t y p e o f u n c e r t a i n t y , due t o 
imprecis ion, rather than lack of knowledge. 
F u z z y set theory has been a p p l i e d to h u m a n r e a s o n i n g , w h i c h is an 
i m p r e c i s e process. The concepts w i th which humans reason are fuzzy sets 
in many cases, as Zadeh sugges ts . V a g u e s t a t e m e n t s m a y be o n l y 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y t r u e , but they can be man ipu la ted to yield premises which 
are of value although their t ru th may s t i l l be only a p p r o x i m a t e . One of 
the resu l t s o f f uzzy set theory application has been to show how imprecise 
human s ta temen ts can be used to regu la te m a c h i n e r y . These v a g u e 
s t a t e m e n t s were t r ans la ted onto n u m e r i c a l scales, using fuzzy set theory, 
and then bui l t into a control ler and success fu l l y used. (See re fe rences in 
C h a p t e r 6 . ) In t h i s way f u z z y se t t h e o r y can be used to c o n v e r t 
pragmatic rules s ta ted in language i n to a mach ine - readab le f o r m . The 
ru les may be learned or acqu i red through experience by a human operator, 
and would otherwise be very d i f f i cu l t to implement in a precise fashion. 
C r i t i c s of f uzzy set t heo ry regard i t as unnecessary that a special method 
should be devised to cope wi th th i s t ype o f u n c e r t a i n t y , s ince p r o b a b i l i t y 
t h e o r y cou ld be used. The s tochas t i c t ype of uncertainty is covered by 
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p r o b a b i l i t y and some a t t e m p t s have been made to extend i t to cover lack 
of certainty about mental phenomena, notably by Savage (1954). One cou ld 
say tha t fuzzy set theory is preferable because it allows the use of words, 
but Savage requires people to use numbers in their est imation of p r o b a b i l i t y . 
Howeve r , fuzzy sets even tua l l y requ i re convers ion to numbers too, which 
may involve arbi t rary decisions, a l though th is p rob lem may be avoided in 
the case of fuzzy l og i c . Fuzzy sets have been appl ied in th is way to 
fuzzy c o n t r o l l e r s (see Chap te r 6) , r equ i r i ng convers ion o f t h e se ts o f 
n u m b e r s , but the fuzzy set convers ions may be tuned to g ive a b e t t e r 
pe r f o rmance if they do not seem to work w e l l at f i r s t . Th i s t u n i n g 
procedure is most obviously app l i cab le to complex systems, but should be 
useful in human applications as we l l . The answers a f uzzy model p r e d i c t s 
may not ma tch up to those the decision-maker expects, and the reason may 
be e i t h e r i n c o n s i s t e n c y on t h e b e h a l f o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r o r 
misrepresentation by the model of his feelings. 
One of the defendants of fuzzy set theory as opposed to p r o b a b i l i t y t heo ry 
is Goguen (1969) who makes the dist inct ion clearly as fol lows: "We are not 
concerned wi th the likelihood tha t a man is sho r t , a f t e r many t r i a l s ; we 
are concerned wi th the shortness of one observation". 
I t is st i l l not certain that the problems which fuzzy set theory a t t e m p t s to 
solve could not have been t a c k l e d by a modif icat ion of probabil i ty theory, 
but perhaps the most va luable c o n t r i b u t i o n of fuzzy set theory to such 
prob lems is the novelty of its approach. Proponents of probabil i ty too can 
become embroiled in the precisiat ion of a vague and subjective phenomenon, 
and the fuzzy approach challenges this much at least. 
In this section I have tr ied to show that imprecision is inescapable. I f we 
want a p r a c t i c a l logic, classical bivalent logic wi l l not suf f ice, and so fuzzy 
logic may be adopted instead. Fuzzy logic was intended by i t s p r o g e n i t o r , 
Zadeh, to cha l lenge the p rec is ia t ion of human and complex systems, which 
he fe l t was reaching a threshold of relevance as the p r e c i s i a t i o n inc reased . 
He proposes tha t human reasoning is a vague process, using the labels of 
fuzzy sets as the mater ial of reason. This at t i tude has been cha l lenged by 
p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y and others (e .g . Watanabe, 1978) who point to the 
eventual conversion f rom words to numbers, wi th its associated a rb i t ra r iness , 
as a f l aw in the approach. However , I propose that these objections may 
indeed be val id, but because of the pragmatic spir i t of fuzzy logic, they are 
not insurmountable. 
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F U Z Z Y S E T T H E O R Y AND L A N G U A G E 
Zadeh set up fuzzy set theory to deal w i t h complex systems and human 
reason ing . We shal l consider the app l i ca t i on of fuzzy set theory to the 
study of language, since we require a method which uses language, but in a 
way wh ich is both prec ise and natural, as far as these divergent aims may 
be reconciled. 
Any language is cons t ruc ted of words and a g rammar wh ich defines the 
rules which the words must obey in relation to one another. In Eng l i sh , at 
l eas t , :he words wh ich we use make up some well defined classes, such as 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, p repos i t i ons , e t c . Acco rd i ng to Zadeh 
" the key e lements in human thinking are ... labels of fuzzy sets". In this 
way a chai r is the labe l of a whole range of ob jec ts rang ing f r o m the 
l e a t h e r - b o u n d , winged a rmcha i r to the modern s tee l and p las t i c kitchen 
chai r to the most r u d i m e n t a r y of seats . 'Cha i r ' is t h e r e f o r e a f u z z y 
concep t , and is a subset of the set of "Furniture 1, which in turn is a subset 
of 'Household art icles'. There is a sort of inf in i te regression, each set is a 
subset of another, back to who knows what fundamental quant i ty. Because 
of this regression, in pract ical use, a universe of discourse is set up, wh i ch 
l imi ts the extent of the regression. 
V e r b s are a d i f f e r e n t case, and I have not seen them t r e a t e d in any 
discussion of fuzzy set theory, except in how they def ine re la t i ons be tween 
o ther fuzzy sets . For examp le , we may discuss the t ru th of a statement 
such as 'Pete l ives near Palo A l t o 1 w i t h o u t saying a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e 
un iverse of discourse of wh ich ' l ives' is a subset. The statement may be 
subject to a truth-value, but the verb i tself is no t . We cannot m o d i f y the 
meaning of the sentence by ope ra t i ng on the verb, but only on the other 
parts of the sentence. Thus, we may say 'Pete l ives very near Palo A l t o ' 
or 'Pete does not l i ve near Palo A l t o ' . Since verbs are only modif ied 
direct ly by the word 'no t ' we could argue tha t verbs are non- fuzzy sets . 
However, this is only a suggestion. 
A d j e c t i v e s and adverbs are b e t t e r examples of fuzzy sets . ' T a l l ' and 
'quickly' are subjectively defined upon the universe of d iscourse of 'me te r s ' 
and 'me te rs / sec ' r e s p e c t i v e l y , say. One person's not ion of tallness may 
d i f fer f rom another 's , and along the range f r o m 1.5m to 2.5m the t r u t h 
value of a person of that height being described as tal l w i l l increase f rom 0 
to 1 roughly. The meaning of adjectives and adverbs may be mod i f ied using 
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hedges, such as 'very', ' fa i r ly ' , 'somewhat', ' terr ib ly ' , and many more. For a 
fa i r ly comprehensive l is t of hedges in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n usage, see 
L a k o f f (1973). These modif iers or hedges are supposed to operate upon the 
original adjectives or adverbs in some way. The set of 'very t a l l men ' w i l l 
be a f u z z y subset o f the se t o f ' t a l l men ' . I t is supposed tha t by 
operating upon the grades of membership of the set ' taJl men ' , one wou ld 
a r r i v e at a set wh ich is at least a good a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the grades of 
membership of the set of 'very tal l men'. 
A n o t h e r t ype of word is p repos i t i ons , e .g . c lose t o , bes ide, on top o f . 
These prepos i t ions are sub jec t i ve l y de f ined too . There is a r a n g e o f 
d is tance along which one ob jec t may be more or less close to another. 
Many prepositions are imp rec i se . Even such wh ich are apparen t l y w e l l 
de f ined as 'beneath ' can be shown to be vague and ci rcumstant ia l . If an 
e lephant had a sma l l b i rd perched on i t s back, wou ld the e l e p h a n t be 
descr ibed as being beneath the bird? The relat ive sizes of the two objects 
a f fec t our descr ip t ion of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to one another beyond the usual 
d e f i n i t i o n o f r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n . As the size of the upper i tem changes 
f r o m much smal le r to much la rger than the l o w e r , so the a p p r o p r i a t e 
p r e p o s i t i o n w o u l d r a n g e f r o m 'on top o f to 'beneath ' as a means o f 
describing the positioning of the two animals. 
The nex t class of word wh ich I wish to discuss is hedges and connectives. 
Because th is is an i m p o r t a n t and re levan t t o p i c , I sha l l d e v o t e a new 
section to them. 
Hedges 
Hedges are usual ly taken as opera to rs upon the fuzzy sets to which they 
refer. The type of operation depends upon the type of hedge and the use 
to wh ich i t is pu t , as we l l as depending to some ex ten t upon the group 
using i t . This is because a hedge can have d i f f e r e n t meanings depending 
upon who is using i t . This a l l demonst ra tes t ha t to lay down rigorous 
rules for the application of hedges is dangerous, because their meaning is so 
very imprecise. 
Zadeh (1972) divides hedges into two categories: 
Typo J Hedges in this category can be represented ns operators on a f uzzy 
s e t . ' t yp i ca l l icdijcr. in th is cu tngory s in: : vt ; ry , morn or less, much , 
s l ight ly, highly. 
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Type I I Hedges in th is ca tego ry require a description of how they act on 
the components of the operand. T y p i c a l hedges in th is ca tegory a r e ; 
essen t i a l l y , t e c h n i c a l l y , a c t u a l l y , s t r i c t l y , in a sense, pract ical ly , v i r tua l ly , 
regular, etc. 
The sort of opera t ion which can be used to produce Type I hedges depends 
upon the context. Zadeh suggests the use of: 
1) direct operation on the grades of membeship 
2) support fuzzi f icat ion 
3) grade fuzzi f icat ion 
To this list we may also add 
4) shi f t operations 
The s imples t method is probably the f i r s t , and usual ly involves a power 
operation on the grades of membership, 
Since LL is in the range 0 to 1, 
Be fo re look ing at the other Type I hedges, let us compare 'very' as a Type 
I hedge wi th 'essentially', the Type II hedge. In gene ra l , Type II hedges 
i n v o l v e a fuzzy a l g o r i t h m i c d e f i n i t i o n , using Type I hedges. Zadeh's 
example is that 'decent' is a weighted combination of the components ' k i n d , 
'honest ' , ' p o l i t e ' and ' a t t r a c t i v e ' . The hedge 'essentially' has the e f fec t of 
increasing the weights of the most important a t t r i b u t e s and decreas ing the 
w e i g h t s o f the l e a s t i m p o r t a n t . I f a p e r s o n has a high grade of 
membership in the hevily weighted components, t he i r grade of membersh ip 
w i t h i n 'essent ia l l y decent ' wi l l be higher than wi th in 'decent'. This means 
l.hnl. Vssnnliully i lucent' is not ti itubsiuL of MUCIMI I . ' in t lu ; wny t hn t 'very 
Lull" is ii liiihscl ill ' I.; 111'. 
- 109 -
This sor t of Type II p rocedure does not seem to have been widely used, 
possibly because it involves h igh ly q u a n t i t a t i v e comb ina t i on of sub jec t i ve 
va lues , requ i r i ng accuracy of the grades of membership and weights of the 
components of 'decent'. The non - fuzzy opera t ions on fuzzy quan t i t i es is 
undesirable, and a fuzzy algori thmic approach seems more promising. 
To explain the meaning of support and grade f u z z i f i c a t i o n , see F igu re 5 . 1 . 
Zadeh does not suggest any hedges which migh t be examples of grade 
f uzz i f i ca t i on hedges, but he suggests 'more or less' as an example of a 
support f u z z i f i c a t i o n hedge. This type of hedge is seldom seen in the 
l i terature, possibly because i t too involves many a rb i t ra ry pa rame te rs . As 
can been seen f rom Figure 5.2, the choice of kernel set has to be made to 
match the hedge, otherwise unexpected ef fects are obtained. 
Hersh and Caramazza (1976) ca r r i ed out some psychological studies of the 
use of hedges, using a fuzzy approach . They p e r f o r m e d a number o f 
c a r e f u l l y con t ro l l ed experiments on undergraduate students to test their use 
of the words 'large' and 'smal l ' , t oge ther w i t h the hedges ' ve ry ' and ' no t ' . 
The s t i m u l i used w e r e s l i d e s d e p i c t i n g a b l a c k squa re on a w h i t e 
background. There were 12 d i f f e r e n t s izes, rang ing f r o m 4 to 48 inches 
along one s ide. The subjects were presented w i th answer sheets wi th a 
list of phrases in a random order . They had to decide whe ther a g iven 
phrase appl ied to the square tha t they had seen. The proportions of yes 
and no answers provided the grades of membersh ip of the resu l t i ng f uzzy 
sets . Thei r main resul ts were tha t the hedge ' ve ry ' "served to simply 
translate the function along the abscissa", i.e. wus a s h i f t ope ra to r . They 
found tha t the slope of the f unc t i on did not increase after operation by 
' ve ry ' , as Zadeh's power model should p r e d i c t . They p r e s e n t g r a p h s 
compar ing the e x p e r i m e n t a l results of 'very large (y)' w i th 'large (y+2)' and 
the agreement is most conv inc ing. The root mean square er ro rs o v e r a l l 
were 0.074, 0.214 and 0.061 for the best f i t t i ng power, exponential and shi f t 
functions, r espec t i ve l y . MacV ica r -Whee lan (1978) also found t ha t s h i f t 
operators were a better model of hedges than Zadeh's power operators. 
In one exper iment , designed to tes t the cons is tency of the i nd i v i dua l as 
opposed to averaging the pe r fo rmance of a g roup, Hersh and Caramazza 
found that one subject gave resu l ts wh ich were d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h o s e 
ubLained f rum nil the o thers , although this person st i l l gave logical results. 
Whereas the other subjects perceived the operution of ' ve ry ' on the concep t 
' s m a l l ' as tie t in in i j successively smaller subsets, this subject interpreted the 
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F i g u r e 5.1(a) Support F u z z i f i c a t i o n Hedges 
K(0.5) 
The s e t A i s to be support f u z z i f i e d . The k e r n e l s e t 
K(0.5) i s shown. Each k e r n e l s e t has the same shape and 
i s normal. Each k e r n e l s e t (K(x) i s m u l t i p l i e d by J^^M 
T h i s produces a s e r i e s of c u r v e s , and t h e i r envelope 
i s SF(A,K). 
SI;-(A;K) = ( x ) K ( x ) 
I 
F i g u r e 5.1(b) Grade F u z z i f i c a t i o n Hedges 
The s e t A i s to be grade f u z z i f i e d . O r d i n a r i l y , the grade 
of membership i s c r i s p , i . e . non-fuzzy. However, the grade 
of membership may be f u z z i f i e d , usinR k e r n e l s e t s such as 
K(.6) = 1/.6 + .8/.5 + .8/.7. T h i s i s d epicted above i n 
three dimensions 
GF (A ;K) = J y i £ A 0 0 / 2 where ^ ( x ) = UjJL^x)) 
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F i g u r e 5.2 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
Example 1 
More or l e s s r e c e n t = jJL (1975)K(1975) + .. (1978)K(1978) 
K(197n) 
r more or 




197n-2 I97n-1 197n J97n+1 197n+2 x 
A: (x) more or 
l e s s 
r e c e n t 
1 1 r 1 r r 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
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phrases as f u z z y , over lapping categories. A square that is judged to have 
a maximum grade of membership in the set 'very very s m a l l 1 is cons idered 
to be a marg ina l ( f=0.56) member of the set ' s m a l l ' . The concept of 
entai lment was not functioning for that subject. 
Hersh and Caramazza also discuss the con tex t dependent na ture of the 
operator 'very'. They state: 
I t wou ld have been nicer if Zadeh's hypothesis of 'very' operating 
as a power function of the grade of membersh ip was app l i cab le . 
A l t hough such a f ind ing would have supported the generality of 
the operation of 'very', the form of the operation is an e m p i r i c a l 
ques t ion . 'Very ' de f ined as a translation operation is obviously 
class dependent: it can certainly be generalised to other r e l a t i v e 
ad jec t i ves (e.g. good, short, hot). How such an intensif ier would 
opera te on the class of absolute ad jec t i ves ( e . g . he is v e r y 
B r i t i s h , th is is very red) remains to be determined. Intu i t ive ly, 
i t a p p e a r s t h a t t he m e a n i n g o f ' v e r y ' in ' v e r y l a r g e ' i s 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t f r om 'very' in 'very Bri t ish' . The former 
implies an extreme of a continuum; the lat ter imp l ies a g rea te r 
emphasis on characterist ic features. 
This is a very interesting p rob lem. L a k o f f (1973) has considered i t also 
and ob jec ts to the f a c t tha t the Zadeh d e f i n i t i o n of 'very' as a squaring 
operation would mean t ha t the sets "very t a l l 1 , 'very very t a l l ' and 'very 
very very t a l l ' , etc. all hi t the value 1 at the same place as ' ta l l ' . Lakof f 
suggests a shi f t of ' ta l l ' fol lowed by a concent ra t ion or power ope ra t i on to 
produce the e f fec t which he desires. 
L a k o f f also discusses the ef fects of 'very' when combined wi th other words. 
He considers cases such as 'very s i m i l a r ' and 'sor t of s im i l a r ' . Because 
th ings are s imi lar wi th respect to many di f ferent attr ibutes and to d i f ferent 
degrees, then the assessment of s i m i l a r i t y is very s u b j e c t i v e . He s ta tes 
tha t there are two possible ways of dec id ing i f a pair of ideas are 'very 
similar'. The f i rst way is that the values assigned to the var ious c r i t e r i a 
are c l o s e r , and in the second case the number of cr i ter ia is greater. 'Sort 
o f has the opposite e f fec t when applied to 'similar'. He goes on to argue 
L h a l when i ippliei l to ' s t r i c t l y npeuk imi ' , ' vu ry ' i locrensott t l iR number of 
criLurin which uro to hi; taken into a c c o u n t . Ho :iny:i l.lwil. I.ho behav iour 
ol 'very' may : 
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be v iewed as changing the weights assigned to various cr i ter ia at 
the upper end of the spectrum. 
This is the sor t of t r e a t m e n t wh ich Zadeh proposed for the Type II hedge 
'essentially'. Hersh and Caramazza had the same prob lems in m ind when 
they po in ted out the emphasis of characterist ics in the phrase 'very Br i t ish ' . 
To descr ibe someth ing w i t h an a b s o l u t e a d j e c t i v e , such as ' B r i t i s h ' , 
' p regnant ' , 'dead' , e t c . means that we can decide wi th a yes-no precision in 
most cases whether that ad jec t i ve is app rop r i a te or no t . If someone is 
descr ibed as ' very p regnan t ' , th is takes into account other character ist ics, 
such as g i r th and at t i tude. Lakof f says: 
T h e r e may n o t be a s t r i c t d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n p r i m a r y and 
secondary c r i te r ia ; rather there may be a continuum of we igh ted 
c r i t e r i a , w i t h d i f ferent hedges picking out d i f ferent cu t -o f f points 
in d i f ferent situations. 
I f we consider the app l i ca t i on of the hedge ' ve ry ' to common adjectives, 
there seem to be three classes of adjective in this context. These are: 
1) absolute e.g. Br i t ish, pregnant, dead 
2) objective e.g. ta l l , quick, hot 
2) subjective e.g. good, k ind, happy 
The f i rst case has already been discussed a l i t t l e . These are ad jec t i ves 
wh i ch may be appl ied i f the subject f i ts the conditions laid down by some 
def in i t ion. The word ing of the d e f i n i t i o n may change or be sub jec t to 
d e b a t e , as w i t h both 'dead' and ' B r i t i s h ' . Since these cond i t i ons are 
precise, there should be no meaning associated w i t h the phrase 'very dead ' , 
yet i t does have a meaning in common usage. This is because there are 
certain secondary characterist ics displayed by any ind iv idua l wh ich sa t i s f i es 
the d e f i n i t i o n , and when the w o r d ' ve ry ' is app l ied , these secondary 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s rece ive a t t e n t i o n . The assoc ia t ion of these secondary 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is only possible when the word is in common usage, and the 
characterist ics are f i rmly recognised. If we look at an adjective wh i ch has 
a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y prec ise d e f i n i t i o n , such as ' nuc lea r ' , i t has no secondary 
characterist ics. We may ta l k about 'nuc lear p a r t i c l e s ' , ' nuc lear f o r ces ' , 
'nuc lear phys ics ' , e t c . P lace the word 'very' before any of these phrases 
and they immediate ly become meaning less. The only groups who cou ld 
a s c r i b e m e a n i n g to such s t a t e m e n t s w o u l d be p e r h a p s en thus ias t i c 
undergraduates , or people wo rk i ng in t he f i e l d , f o r w h o m s e c o n d a r y 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ex i s t . Thus, ' ve ry ' can be applied to absolute adjectives, 
but only when they have acqu i red secondary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h a re 
modified or weighted by the word 'very'. 
The second class of adjectives is those I have labe l led o b j e c t i v e , such as 
' t a l l ' , ' qu ick ' and 'hot'. The reason for this is that these adjectives may be 
replaced by s c i e n t i f i c , measurable s t a t e m e n t s . 'This man is t a l l ' cou ld 
become 'This man is 6 f t . h igh ' . This is the 3ort of replacement which 
Haack advocated in her defence of classical logic. If we were to de f ine a 
fuzzy set on a universe of discourse to describe ' ta l l ' , the obvious choice 
would be the range of heights f rom, say, Oft. to 9 f t . ' T a l l ' is measurab le 
w i t h one a t t r i b u t e on ly . The range of he ights wh ich is taken as the 
universe of discourse is divided up into fuzzy regions wh ich represent ' t a l l ' , 
' sho r t ' , ' average ' , ' very t a l l ' , e t c . Since these adjectives are measurable, 
there are not usually secondary a t t r i b u t e s associated w i t h t h e m . A ' b ig ' 
man is both ' t a l l ' and ' fa t ' , but tallness on its own is not usually associated 
wi th other characterist ics, I would guess. I t is true that all the s tudies of 
the psycho log ica l meaning of fuzzy a d j e c t i v e s , such as ' ta l l ' , ' large', e tc . 
have tended to use a d j e c t i v e s f r o m t h i s c l a s s . W h e t h e r t h i s is a 
c o i n c i d e n c e s i n c e such a d j e c t i v e s are the only ones which prov ide a 
reasonable horizontal axis, or in recognition of the anomalous resul ts wh i ch 
wou ld have been ob ta ined f r o m other non -ob jec t i ve a d j e c t i v e s , I do not 
know. Zadeh, t oo , usual ly concen t ra tes on ob jec t i ve ad jec t i ves , whose 
un iverse of d iscourse is known and measurable. For such adjectives, the 
app l i ca t i on of the hedge ' v e r y ' is m u c h s i m p l e r , s i nce t h e r e a re no 
s e c o n d a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s . The choice of a 
translation operator or a power opera tor seems to be a m a t t e r of cho i ce . 
Given the undeniable imprec is ion of the top i c , the pract ical di f ference is 
almost negligible. 
The t h i r d class of ad jec t i ves is the sub jec t i ve ad jec t i ves . These are 
adjectives such as 'good', 'kind', and 'happy'. Such adject ives are s imple to 
app ly , but upon i nspec t i on , ex t remely complex. To be 'good' requires the 
fu l f i lment of such conditions as ' k i nd ' , ' p a t i e n t ' , ' l o y a l ' , 'honest ' and many 
m o r e . ' The choice of at tr ibutes is unique to each individual, together w i th 
the weighting allocated to ouch. This emphasis wh ich ' ve ry ' council inunnn 
tha t some a t t r i b u t e s are we igh ted more l imn others, but which at t r ibutes 
are af fected, and in which way, is impossible to te l l . It m igh t be possible 
to ask a person to descr ibe what features cause a person to be 'good' and 
what must be the addit ional features or change in weighting for a person to 
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be 'very good' . If such a test were possible, i t would be of doubtful value 
in a pract ical sense. That def ini t ion of 'good' would only be t rue fo r t h a t 
one i nd i v i dua l , and perhaps for qu i te a shor t l eng th of t ime . It would 
seem that 'very' requires a fuzzy-algor i thmic def ini t ion when i t is app l ied to 
subjective adjectives. 
Zadeh (1972) de f ined two types of hedges, those which act as operators on 
a fuzzy set and those which require a description of how they act upon the 
components of the operand. It would seem from the above discussion that 
'very' is a hedge of the f i rst type when it is applied to objective ad jec t i ves , 
and a hedge of the second type when it is applied to absolute or subjective 
adjectives. 
In Haack's defence of c lass ica l l og i c , she argued for the replacement of 
vague s ta temen ts w i t h those wh ich had a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h a b l e 
p r e c i s i o n . We can see t ha t th is would be possib le, when dea l ing w i th 
statements involving absolute or object ive ad jec t i ves . 'F red is B r i t i s h ' is 
n o t a vague s t a t e m e n t . ' T h i s t ea is h o t ' may be rep laced w i t h a 
statement of the tempera tu re of the t ea . Whether I consider t h a t th i s 
t e m p e r a t u r e j u s t i f i e s ca l l i ng the tea hot is debatable, but the statement 
may be brought back wi th in the realm of c lass ica l l og i c . 'John is happy' 
cannot be rep laced w i t h a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y measurable statement, and cannot 
be resolved to a yes-no answer, to everybody's sat isfact ion. I t w i l l not be 
abso lu te ly t rue or false tha t 'John is happy' and op in ion would disagree. 
The t ruth of such remarks is not absolutely determinable, i .e . t rue or fa lse 
in every case, and independent of the observer . However, i t should be 
possible fo r one person to decide on balance whether a group o f such 
s t a t e m e n t s were each t rue or fa l se . These s ta temen ts could then be 
handled using classical logic. We must then ask if the answers wh ich were 
deduced using b iva len t log ic were t r u e . In other words, would classical 
logic produce false conclusions f rom ' true' premises? If the answer is 'No ' , 
then c lassical logic remains adequate. This argument brings us back to the 
Sorites paradox - the d e f i n i t i o n of a heap is vague, and when the log ic 
cons t ra ins s ta temen ts to yes-no t r u t h va lues, then false or unacceptable 
conclusions may be obtained from true premises. 
We may a r g u e t h e n f o r a dev ian t log ic for two reasons, f i r s t l y t ha t 
classical logic is i m p r a c t i c a b l e when i t means rep lac ing s ta temen ts w i t h 
s c i e n t i f i c s ta temen ts wh ich are not immediately ver i f iable. And secondly, 
tha t s u b j e c t - r e f e r e n c e d s ta temen ts are not r e p l n c c u b l o by s c i e n t i f i c , 
- 1 1 7 -
o b j e c t - r e f e r e n c e d statements, and are therefore beyond classical logic. To 
constrain such statements to belong to the absolute class of ad jec t i ves can 
cause classical logic to produce false or unacceptable conclusions. 
Hedges must be t r ea ted w i t h great ca re . For absolute and sub jec t i ve 
a d j e c t i v e s , ' v e r y ' can i n t r o d u c e changes in the a t t r i b u t e s wh ich are 
considered. For o b j e c t i v e ad jec t i ves , the s i t u a t i o n is probab ly s imp le r , 
a l though the assumption of ever decreasing subsets on further application of 
'very' may not be true for everyone. There seems to be l i t t l e to choose in 
p rac t i ce between power opera tors for 'very' and shif t operators. Although 
the discussion referred to adjectives and 'very', the conclus ions would seem 
to be true for adverbs also and other common classes of hedge. 
There is another i m p o r t a n t hedge whose spec ia l s tatus requ i res c a r e f u l 
s tudy . This is the word 'no t ' . In c lass ica l l og i c , th is is taken as the 
negation of its subject, but the common usage of th is word is not so r i g i d 
as th i s . Nega t ion is the c e n t r a l use of 'not' but in use its e f fec t is not 
a lways as s t rong as the nega t ion . Haack is d i s c u s s i n g the o r d i n a r y 
language usage of 'and', 'not', ' i f , etc. when she says 
The sense of the sentential connectives of c lass ica l p ropos i t i ona l 
c a l c u l u s f a i l s to c o i n c i d e e x a c t l y w i t h t ha t of the i r usual 
ordinary-language readings. 
For examp le , in a recent report f rom the Stock Exchange, their opinions of 
the prospects of industry for the future were 'not unp romis ing ' . The law 
of the excluded middle would state that this is equivalent to 'promising', but 
that is not what these cautious gentlemen meant. 
Hersh and Caramazza (1976) examined the use of 'not' in their psychological 
studies. They plot graphs comparing the fol lowing pairs of phrases: 




Very Very Small 
Very Very Large 
Not Large 
Not Very Small 
Not Very Large 
Not Very Very Small 
Not Very Very Large 
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They conclude that 
The fact that the graphs indicate a reasonably good f i t , and the 
f a c t tha t the average root mean square e r r o r over a l l 
positive-negative pairs was less than Q.07 supports the fuzzy set 
notion of negation as being the complement of the positive set. 
There are two definitions of 'not' which appear in the literature, sometimes. 
The more common is the complement de f in i t ion , and the other is the 
reverse definition: 
complement: U, (%) — / ~ Lt* £ x ) 
/ A/Ot A / 
reverse: 
Zadeh prefers the complement definition, but the reverse definition is more 
in the spirit of the shift operators, although i t can only be applied when 
the universe of discourse is limited to the range 
The law of the excluded middle implies that 'not true' is identical wi th 
'false' . We may see how 'not true' and 'false' can have different meanings 
in the fuzzy logic. The def in i t ion of 'not 1 , l ike many of the o ther 
d e f i n i t i o n s of f u z z y set theory , is probably best l e f t open to the 
circumstances of its intended use. 
Connectives 
Connectives have been omit ted f rom the discussion so far , but they are 
very important in the linguistic description of things. The most commonly 
ci ted connectives are 'and' and 'or'. They are usually represented in fuzzy 
set calculations by the operators 'min ' and 'max' respectively, although 
Zadeh (1977) proposed alternative formulations, called the interactive 'and' 
and 'or'. These are supposed to be less harsh than the min and max 
versions, and involve multiplication of the grades of membership instead of 
strict comparison. 
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p *. or* b & * M + to) -^U)*^ (x) 
* denotes the interactive version. 
Connectives do not seem to have received much attention in the literature, 
which is a pity because of their undeniable importance. Zadeh sets up a 
simple grammar to show how the connectives may be combined with the 
terminal adjectives and the hedges to produce sensible statements. These 
English statements may then be given a fuzzy set representation. 
One objection to the min operator is that the fuzzy sets i t produces are 
not always normal, i.e. the grade of membership never reaches the level 
unity. This seems counter-intuitive, because when an i tem is described in 
some manner, there must be some level where the description is true and 
should attain the level of unity. This problem is overcome by normalising 
the fuzzy sets af ter the min operation. Although this gives fuzzy sets 
more close to intuition, these sets are not so useful for calculations. The 
min and max operations cause a loss of information from the original sets, 
and normalisation increases this information loss still further. 
The connective 'and' has some uses in fuzzy logic that would be excluded 
under classical logic. The law of the excluded middle states that i t is 
impossible to state both P and not P whereas such a statement can be 
given a f u z z y meaning. L a k o f f considers th is p rob lem f o r both 
connectives. He says that 
Incidentally, I consider it a virtue of this system that ' i P y P ' is 
not a tautology. Suppose 'P' is 'This wall is red 1. Suppose the 
wall is pret ty red, say, to degree 0.6. Then 'This wall is red or 
not red' w i l l be true to degree 0.6 accord ing to the given 
semant ics . This seems to rne to be wi th in the range of 
plausibi l i ty . Certainly one would not wont to :uiy Unit Lho 
sentence; w;m true in such n :iil.unl:ioii. Similarly, V A ~ I P' i:i not 
a contradiction in the above uystem. And s i m i l a r l y , the 
- 120 -
sentence 'This wall is red and not red' in the situation given 
where the wall is red to some extent seems to me not to be 
false, but rather to have a degree of truth. 
It seems to be the case that the connectives which are used in natural 
language are not the same as the logical connective. This was noted by 
Haack (1974, p.119). Just as a fuzzy set represents something of our 
understanding of a word, so the logical connectives represent a core use of 
the linguistic connectives. Each operation upon the original fuzzy set 
produces another error. What is remarkable then is that the fuzzy sets of 
complex statements bear any resemblance to the meaning which the speaker 
wishes to express. 
The interactive versions of the connectives represent one extreme, and the 
non-interactive are the other. The real meaning of the connective w i l l 
depend on the context, and w i l l probably lie somewhere between the two. 
An attempt to fuzzify the connectives has been made by Baldwin (1978). 
Throughout this work, the min and max versions have been used. 
Truth Functional Modification 
The statements which we have been considering so far have involved truth. 
Instead of adopting the bivalent t ruth values of classical logic, we have 
adopted the range of values between 0 and 1 to describe the imprecision 
associated with the subjective evaluation of t ru th . This is a practice not 
confined to fuzzy logic alone, but adopted too by multiple valued logic. 
The advance which fuzzy logic makes is in the use of verbal rather than 
numerical descriptions of t ru th . The t ru th values are linguistic, such as 
' t rue' , 'not true', 'very true' , 'more or less true', etc. If we make a 
statement such as 
John is very tall (1) 
we would like to know how equivalent this is to 
John is tall is very true (2) 
A linguistic truth value has been placed on the statement 'John is t a l l ' . A 
method has been proposed to convert f rom statements of Type (2) to 
statements such as (1). This is commonly known as Truth Functional 
Modification. 
Zaduh (1977,1976b, 1973) dofinu.'i t ruth I'unctiomil modifici i l . ion, or t ru th 
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qualification as follows: 
If 
then 
X is F is X 
X is f + 
where 
r 
See Figure 5.3 for an explanation. 
Semantic Entailment 
This is a technique which has been employed in argument for a long time, 
but which has been given a new perspective by fuzzy set theory. It is 
generally assumed that statements such as 
John is very tall 
could not be made without it also being true that 
John is tali . 
I t is said that the first statement semantically entails the second. We can 
see that the power law definitions of 'very' would be consistent wi th this 
remark, because 'very t a l l ' is a subset of ' t a l l ' . This is known as strong 
semantic entailment. 
Weak semantic entailment occurs when statements such as 
This box is not large 
is said to semantically entail 
This box is small. 
In this case, the semantic entailment depends upon the definitions of the 
words 'large' and 'small'. 
Semantic entailment might seem a fairly intuitively reasonable concept, but 
it is open to dispute (Gaines, 1976). One experimental study which showed 
that i t does not always hold for every individual was that of Hersh and 
Carramazza. One of their subjects gave answers which deviated f rom the 
others'. For this person, semantic entailment, did not hold. "Thu fuel, 
thai, a square is judged to h«j 'very, vury I urge' domi I I I J L cut nil Unit it. in 
also Maryi;'." 
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From diag.JULF(d0) = ytt' 
Note that 'very tr u e 1 i s drawn with the horizontal 
axis running from 1 to 0. 
Figure 5.3 Truth Functional Modification 
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Truth Functional Modification, Semantic Entailment and Hedges 
Let us return to the concept of hedges and see how they w i l l be a f fec ted 
by t ru th funct ional modif ica t ion and semantic entailment. We mentioned 
earlier that Zadeh proposed a simple grammar to describe how statements 
involving hedges may be generated, without demonstrating i t . The grammar 




young and not very young 
young and not old 
But, we can also form less meaningful phrases: 
young and very young 
very young and not young 
young and not young 
very young and very very young 
Phrases l ike these seem u n n a t u r a l , because they invo lve semant ic 
entailment, in the usual sense of defining successively smaller subsets of the 
original phrase. The statement 
John is very young and young 
provides no more information from a fuzzy set point of view than 
John is very young. 
The fuzzy set would be 
F £ F A Cr 
where 
^ = [ a ) , x ] | xelO.too] 
We would need to exclude from the grammar such statements os 
young and very young 
but retain 
young and not very young. 
But do we include 
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T > A 
T > A or T 
A > B 
A > A and B 
B > C 
B > not C 
C > (T) 
C > D 
C > E 
D > very D 
E > very E 
D > old 
E > very E 
ure 5.4 Zadeh's Grammar 
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s — > B 
s — > B or S 
B — > C 
B — > D 
B — > C and D 
B — > D and C 
D — > F 
D — > not F 
C — > E 
C — > not E 
E — > Y E — > Y 
E — > (S) E — > (S) 
F — > 0 E — > Y but not Y 
F — > (S) F — > 0 
Y — > very Y F — > (S) 
Y — > young '•. F — > 0 but not 0 
0 — > very 0 
0 — > old 
;ure 5.5 Extended Version of Zadeh's Grammar 
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very young but not young 
young but not young ? 
The last two statements can be given fuzzy set representations but their 
meaning is debatable. Lakof f accepts 'red and not red' as a plausible 
statement. The phrase 'very young and not young' is more interesting. It 
denies the semantic entailment impl ic i t in 'very young 1, but s t i l l has an 
i n t u i t i v e f e e l about i t , probably due to the introduction of secondary 
characteristics. Zadeh's grammar may be modified so that 
1) we can say 'young but not young' or 'old but not old', 
2) avoid 'young and very young', 
3) allow 'very young and not young' and 'young and not young*. 
See Figure 5.5. 
Let us consider again the power of semantic entailment. If we say 
John is very young 
we may also state that 
John is young is true. 
In fuzzy set terms, 'Young' O 'Very Young' 
Now, it is also true that "Fairly Young' ZD 'Young' 
where M fairly youngM = M iyoungM 
But can we reasonably deduce that 
John is fairly young 
from the statement 
John is young ? 
Is i t reasonable to deduce 'John is fairly young' from the statement 'John is 
very young'? It me, this does not seem correct , and there are two 
possible reasons. Either by ' f a i r l y young' I mean something other than 1 
young', e.g. 
x)  iyoung 
H- fairly young M" young ^ *) ^ ^~ young 
in which case 
fairly young young 
- 1 2 7 -
Or, i t could be that one can only semantically entail from very nx onto x, 
but not from x onto lower powers of x. 
To represent this diagrammatically, given the statement 
John is very, very young 
we may 3ay that every statement along the continuum from 
is also true. 
See Figure 5.6. Note that 'fairly young' is to 'young' as 'young' is to 'very 
young'. 
In "A Theory of Approximate Reasoning" (1977), Zadeh extends the notion of 
semantic entailment to incorporate something of his ideas of T r u t h 
Valuation. He says that there are two types of semantic entailment,strong 
and approximate, as mentioned earlier. He states that 
very very young young 
very(X is F) 
very(X is F is x ) 
X is F is T 
X is very F 
X is F is very t 






Now, substituting X for 'true' in equ.(5.2) gives 
X is F is very true *—* very(X is F is true) 
Now, assuming 
X is F is true X is F 
we obtain 
X is F is very true <—> very(X is F) 
and from equ.(5.1) this gives 
X is F is very true <•- » X is very F 
Truth functional modification also demonstrates this deduction but is only 
v a l i d for a particular def ini t ion of ' true' , which may demonstrate that 









f a i r l y 
true 
— r ~ 









Figure 5.6 Semantic Entailment 
Given point A, t h i s e n t a i l s the range up to point B. 
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When F and F + in Figure 5.3 are the same, we find a value of X where 
t must be 'true'. The only solution for 'true' which holds for a l l cases 
of F and F + is 
This is the unitary definition of 'true' and is the only definition of 'true 1 for 
which both semantic entailment and truth functional modification hold. 
Using this definition of 'true', we may start with the statement 
(John is very very young) is true 
and deduce 
See Figure 5.7 for the graphic presentation. 
The process of t ru th funct ional modif ica t ion produces more and more 
restrictive truth values on the statement 
where m is some modif ier , as m becomes less and less restrictive. Not 
only does truth functional modification allow extrapolation backwards to less 
res t r ic t ive values of John's age, i t also permits extrapolation forwards, 
which is not allowed under semantic entailment. 
Semantic entailment represents the most modest deductions which can be 
made about the truth of one statement, given that another statement is 
t rue. It only allows statements about whether a proposition is true or 
undetermined. Zadeh extends semantic entailment, allowing the use of 
modified t ru th values, other than 'true' and 'unrestricted'. However, this 
sort of semantic entailment does not seem so strong. If one approaches 
the same statements f rom a t ru th funct ional modification point of view;, 
only one definition of ' true' w i l l permit Zadeh's deductions, which would 
otherwise appear to be valid. 
Truth functional modification allows the calculation of F + , given F and X : 
( * ? ) 1 
(John is very young) is very true 
(John is young) is very very true 
(John is fairly young) is very very very true. 
John is m young 









f a i r l y 
true 
f a i r l y young very very 
young young very 
young 
Figure 5.7 Semantic Entailment and 
Truth Functional Modification 
Given point A, t r u t h functional modification implies 
a l l points along BC extended. 
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The inverse process is to calculate f , given F and F + : 
r = v(X is F I X is F+) 
where v denotes 'truth value1. 
Baldwin (1978) suggests: 
[ / V M ] tie a 
This formula works well in most cases, yielding the following results: 
These results fol low naturally f r o m the definitions of 'very' and 'fairly' as 
power operators. 
This formula relies upon there being an overlap of the fuzzy sets F and F + . 
Had the 'very' operator involved a shift so that successive operations upon 
convex sets eventually produce non-overlapping sets, then 
The formula tends to give anomalous results in some cases when the 
leftwards premise provides l i t t le restriction on truth values. For example, 
v(X is F | X is very F) = very true 
v(X is very F | X is F) = fairly true 
v(X is very F j X is fairly F) = fairly fairly true 
v(John is very very F j john is F) = impossible 
where j^- impossible^) = 0 , V / « c [o,i] 
v(X is uknknown J X is F + ) = absolutely true 
where M unknown'*) 
1 if y = 1 
and absolutely t r u e ^ ) = 
0 otherwise 
The opposite result is more reasonable: 
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v(X is F | X is unknown) = unrestricted 
where ^ - unrestr icted^ = 1, V-/^6 £o,l J 
However, inverse t ru th funct ional modif ica t ion in this fo rm is generally 
useful, so long as the premises are informat ive and do not involve sh i f t 
operators. It is also subject to the same restrictions on applicability as 
truth functional modification. 
Pairs of Statements 
So fa r , we have been considering the validity of deductions which may be 
made given one statement. However, when we have more than one 
statement about a particular linguistic variable, different conclusions may be 
drawn. We shall consider the one adjective case at present, and discuss 
the two adjective case later. 
One adjective case 
When we obtain pairs of statements which describe the same item, there 
may be some incons is tency between t h e m , in the t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l 
modification sense. For example, 
John is fairly young is true 
John is young is very true 
People may not pe rce ive the t r u t h of statements in a way which is 
consistent with truth functional modification and semantic equivalence. We 
shall consider the possible reasons for such inconsistency, and how it may 
be handled in practice. 
The f i r s t and most obvious reason for lack of consistency is that the 
respondent has not properly understood what is required of him. Explaining 
the p rob l em as carefu l ly as possible to the respondents and t ry ing to 
understand their d i f f i c u l t i e s is the only fa i r way to avoid this problem. 
One must be carefu l to avoid instructing the respondent so precisely that 
the answers they give are what they think the questioner wants, and not 
what the respondent actually thinks. 
Assuming the respondent understands what he is supposed to do and 
produces statements which he feels to be correct, inconsistency may still 
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appear. There are three possible reasons for this which I shall call doubt, 
ambivalence and uncertainty. 
Doubt is an internal, mental phenomenon. One may not be clear about 
one's own exact contextual meaning of 'good' or ' t rue ' when applied to the 
particular example in hand. To describe the library service as 'good' and 
one's mother's cooking as 'good' implies different things in either case. In 
both cases the library and one's mother produce a degree of contentment as 
a result of their actions and one's own consumption of the products. So, 
w i t h an arbi t rary , well-used word, one is t ry ing to use i t to be f a i r l y 
precise about degrees of satisfaction. 
We could suggest defining a new vocabulary, making up a new word to use, 
but the same prolems of reference exist as before. 
The concept of what is good is only vaguely defined in one's mind at any 
time. When asked "What is good?", one can answer by either describing i t 
as something which evokes a certain set of internal emotions or by pointing 
to examples of things which are good. By asking "Is X good?" and 
replying "Yes", the notion of what is good may have been extended from its 
previous meaning. The concept of good is capable of being stretched as a 
result of asking questions about whether something is good, when it might 
have never before been thought of in that light. 
I would argue that when people give answers which might appear to be 
inconsistent, one reason could be that their concepts are being stretched. 
This inconsistency might disappear wi th practice as the vocabulary being 
used "firms up". 
This is what I call doubt. The respondent is unsure of himself and trying 
to become accustomed to a more careful definition of his concepts. 
The second reason, ambivalence, is related to the previous one of doubt. 
But this time, instead of the concepts behind the vocabulary being vague, 
the actual concept which is to be described is "spread out" because of the 
respondent's ambivalence towards i t . To describe A as good may not be 
t rue, because of certain aspects of A which are not good. They may be 
only fairly good, or even very good. A single t ru th value may not seem 
descriptive enough, and rather than producing a composite truth value to 
describe his overall feelings, the respondent may be happier to produce 
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apparently inconsistent statements. If we plot a respondent's replies, we 
find something like Figure 5.8. This depicts the spread of feeling about a 
concept which is only imprecisely or fuzzily formulated in the mind. 
The third reason, uncertainty, is different from the previous two and 
recognises that the respondent may lack information on the subject about 
which he is being asked questions. In most cases, this cannot be avoided. 
The respondent may be asked to make forecasts or he may lack information 
about a present system. This means that he would not be able to make 
accurate statements which place tight restrictions on truth values.We could 
test for the three types of inconsistency as follows: 
doubt is caused by concept stretching and lack of practice. It ought to 
disappear with practice, but if the vocabulary appears to be inadequate, i t 
may be altered to use words which match the respondent's feelings better. 
ambivalence is caused by mixed feelings about the questions and is indicated 
by answers which are inconsistent with truth functional modification. This 
is to be expected when asking questions about multiple aspect problems. 
However, if ambivalence appears when asking questions about what are 
meant to be single aspects, the presence of ambivalence could indicate 
either the wrong vocabulary or that two or more aspects are being 
considered by the respondent. 
uncertainty When uncertainty occurs, the respondents usually say so. 
The information available is inadequate and so the answers they give are so 
unrestictive as to be meaningless. Before proceeding with the analysis, try 
to f i l l in any knowledge gaps. This may be a good way of distinguishing 
between spurious information hunts and those which are really necessary. 
Two Adjective Case 
When two or more adjectives are used to describe a linguistic variable, we 




t r u e 
v e r y — 
t r u e 
t r u e -
f a i r l y — 
t r u e 











Figure 5.8 Ambivalence 
The respondent's r e p l i e s may appear i n c o n s i s t e n t ! 
according t o semantic entailment and t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l 
m o d i f i c a t i o n . 
- 136 -
Example 1 u is reas is not true 
u is dear is very true 
u is not reas 
u is very dear 
: ) not reas =5 very dear 
i> not not reas S not very dear 
: } reas == not very dear 
For this simple example, the result is intuitively correct. The assumptions 
made were that the two statements provide the same information content 
on u. 
With compound truth statements, involving connectives such as 'and' and 'or', 
we may not be able to make this assumption. 
Example 2 u is nons is not true 
u is sci is true but not very true 
where nons stands for nonscientific 
sci stands for scientific NB nons jf not sci 
'but' is used in the same way as 'and' 
u is not nons 
u is sci but not very sci 
= > not nons = sci but not very sci 
= • > nons = not sci or very sci 
This result is counterintuitive, and arises because of the assumption of equal 
information in the two statements. It would appear, by inspection of the 
statements, that the item in question could be better described by the word 
'sci' rather than 'nous', so that the phrase 'not nons' places only a fairly 
loose constraint on the value of u. 
Let us deduce as follows: 
u is not nons 
u is sci but not very sci 
u is not nons and sci but not very sci 
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or from Example 1 
u is not re as and very dear 
The connective 'and' is the min,/\ , operator. 
So, from Example 1, with the assumption on both statements having the 
same meaning, 
u is not re as and very dear 
= u is not reas 
E u is very dear 
However, under the 'and' operation, if the statement 'not nons' is more 
unrestricted than the other, we obtain 
| not nonsJand|sci but not very sci J 
= sci but not very sci 
So, we may say of the fuzzy sets, 
J*" not nonsM 
^ not nonsM 
nonsM 
or 'nons' C 'not sci' U 'very sci' 
Compare with the previous result: 
'nons' S 'not sci' U 'very sci' 
The equality sign only holds when both statements impose equal truth value 
restrictions on u. See Figure 5.9. 
To place a greater restriction on the meaning of nons requires a further 
statement. This could be another description of a different item, or it 
could be a definition of one adjective in terms of the other. For example, 
we could take as a definition: 
// j*- sci but not very s c i ^ 
^ sciM ^ not very s c i ^ 




Figure 5.9 Possible Meanings f o r 'Nons' 
Some are more i n t u i t i v e than others 
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Example 3 
sci = not nons and not very not nons 
and see if this is consistent with 
nons £ not sci or very sci. 
From definition 
not sci or very sci 
= not £ not nons f\ not very not nons J 
U very £ not nons H not very not nons j 
= | nons U very not nons J 
\J £ very not nons t\ very not very not nons J 
= | (nons U very not nons) U very not nons J 
0 ^ (nons U very not nons) U very not very not nons J 
by the Distributive Law 
= ^ (nons U very not nons) J 0 
^(nons U very not nons) 
U very not very not nons J 
= ^ nons U very not nons ^ by the Absorption Law 
which is consistent with 
nons C not sci or very sci. 
This sort of logical argument isn't one that could be easily demonstrated to 
naive users. 
Alternatively, suppose we take a description of another alternative. This 
alternative is less scientific than the previous one and is described by: 
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Example 4 v is fairly nons 
v is not sci 
Let us say that 'fairly nons' is the more informative (truer) or accurate 
description, so that 
fairly nons C not sci equ.(5.3) 
As a result of the first alternative we could say 
nons £ not sci or very sci 
and we can see that equ.(5.3) is consistent with this statement, given the 
usual definitions of 'fairly1, etc. 
Example 5 Let us also consider the case 
not sci Q, fairly nons 
n : > very not sci £ nons 
and we recall that 
nons £ not sci or very sci 
and since very not sci £ not sci or very sci, 
this constraint on 'nons1 is consistent also. 
Hence we could reasonably say that: 
fairly nons = not sci 
nons =• very not sci 
And we now have a definition of 'nons' in terms of 'sci'. 
This work suggests that when two or more adjectives are used to describe 
the same linguistic variables, then we may test for consistency within the 
meanings of the adjectives. This is done by taking two or more of the 
respondent's statements and determining, from the respondent, which is the 
better description. This wil l place constraints on the meaning of one 
adjective with respect to another, and this may be tested in other pairs of 
statements for other alternatives. Or, the respondent may define one 
adjective in terms of another and again we may test for consistency. 
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Applicability of Truth Functional Modification 
Let us consider Figure 5.8. The internal distribution of truth values does 
not obey that of either semantic entailment or t ru th funct ional 
modification. The reason why this may be so has already been suggested 
in the discussion on ambivalence. When the respondent is discussing a 
multiple-aspect problem, his ambivalence towards the many aspects wi l l 
produce a spread in the truth values. It would be anover-simplification, 
therefore, to apply truth functional modification or semantic entailment to 
statements on multiple aspect problems. 
Hence, it might be reasonable to state 
(John is tall) is very true 
(John is very tall) is true 
but not 
(John is good) is very true 
(John is very good) is true 
The personal quality of being good is a function of many traits, e.g. 
generosity, kindness, honesty, etc. It is not reasonable to deduce truth 
values for 'John is very good' given that 'John is good' is true, because the 
truth of 'John is good' is determined by John's character along the many 
other dimensions. But, when we are discussing simple quantities, such as 
height or age, which could be measured objectively, t ru th funct ional 
modification may apply. Note that this argument is very similar to that 
applied earlier in the chapter. 
In order to handle multiple-aspect adjectives, we require a greater 
information input. This may be achieved by using two or more adjectives 
to assess a particular item, and testing for consistency between them in the 
manner outlined in the chapter. This method relies upon the existence of 
some abiguity in the respondent's statements to provide different amounts of 
information in the statements. 
Therefore, we may conclude that truth functional modification can only be 
applied to statements about variabes which could be measured objectively, 
but where some sort of subjective aggregation of many aspects is involved, 
be they measurable or not, then truth functional modification in its simplest 
form does not apply, and pairs of statements are necessary to provide a 
workable method. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This section opened with a brief explanation of the ideas of fuzzy set 
theory. The purpose of fuzzy set theory was discussed and its relation to 
the problems of vagueness. Haack's defence of classical logic was 
reviewed and its impracticability demonstrated. The importance and 
necessity of vagueness and uncertainty, together with its inevitability, were 
taken as justification of a deviant logic. 
Since we are interested in applying fuzzy set theory to verbal statements, 
the role of fuzzy set theory in their representation was considered, and the 
use of hedges and connectives. Three classes of adjectives were proposed 
to explain the anomalous behaviour and meaning of adjectival phrases. 
The tools for handling such statements were discussed next, i.e. semantic 
entailment and truth functional modification. It was argued that with 
subjective or multiple-aspect adjectives, truth functional modification did 
not strictly hold. However, such adjectives wi l l be encountered in any 
practical problem, so i t was suggested that pairs of statements could be 




ATTEMPTS TO APPLY FUZZY THEORY TO MULTI-ATTRIBUTE 
DECISION-MAKING 
In the past some workers have recognised the obvious usefulness of fuzzy 
set theory in the field of decision-making. Indeed, one of Zadeh's seminal 
works on the subject (1973) was entitled "Outline of a New Approach to the 
Analysis of Complex Systems and Decision Processes". There are many 
types of decision-making activity of which multi-attribute decision-making is 
only one. An important class is the class of decisions which must be 
repeated with time, as in the control of machinery or plant. The theory 
of such decisions has been considered by Bellman and Zadeh (1970) and 
others. Practical applications have also emerged, such as the control of 
t r a f f i c lights (Pappis and Mamdani, 1977), a hot water plant (Kickert and 
Lemke, 1976) and the celebtrated steam engine (Mamdani and Assilian, 1975; 
Mamdani, 1974). See Mamdani and Gaines (1976) for further examples. 
The control of these machines has been fuzzified by adapting the pragmatic 
rules of the human controller and expressing them as rules upon fuzzy sets, 
giving a rule-based control process. With a few variables which may be 
observed, the human controller can derive a practical set of rules to adjust 
the input of the process so as to maintain as near a steady state of the 
output as possible. 
This type of control process has many similarities to the approach proposed 
herein. The emphasis on rules supplied by the human link is the most 
obvious similarity. The main difference is that the decision in a control 
plant is repeated many times and the rules may be tuned to give the 
optimum response. With a once-made decision, there is no opportunity for 
improvement if it does not go well the first time. But the idea of setting 
up a rule-based procedure, taking measurements and passing them through 
the rules to arrive at a decision is strikingly similar. Real differences are 
hard to pin down but I can suggest four. 
The first is that control decisions are repeated in time, and the output of 
one c o n t r o l decis ion w i l l act as the input to the next. With 
multi-attribute decisions of the type considered herein, usually one decision 
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only is made and is final and may be irreversible. This leads to the 
second difference. Because control decisions are repeated with time, the 
rules may be tuned as a result of experiment. Trial decisions may be 
made using multi-attribute techniques and may be inspected and compared 
wi th the intuitive decisions, but the rules may only be tuned through 
introspection. This in turn reflects the third difference, i.e. that although 
the rules in both cases are human-derived, the control rules apply to 
machines and the multi-attribute rules apply to the mind. This brings out 
the fourth difference, which is one of purpose. The purpose of control is 
to produce better control through better decisions. With multi-attribute, 
one-off decisions, the purpose is to produce better decisions through 
self-learning. 
It is d i f f i cu l t to point to these applications of fuzzy set theory to decision 
processes and point to some definite difference between the two. The 
reason is probably because they are both applications of fuzzy set theory 
and it has left its mark of a similarity of approach upon them. Rather 
than being remarkable for their similarity, it would have been remarkable 
had they been different. 
In this review of techniques, I shall confine myelf to those techniques which 
lay claim to model the goal- or objective-seeking behaviour of humans and 
organisations, although noting the relevance of fuzzy controllers to much of 
what is to follow. 
MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING AND FUZZY SET THEORY 
The traditional approach to this type of decision-making (see Chapter 2) 
involves setting the various goals and assigning to each 8 numerical weight, 
reflecting their relative importance to the decision-maker. If there are m 
goals, this list of weights may be viewed as a 1 x m matrix. Each 
alternative is then measured according to its ability to satisfy separately 
each of the m goals. These measurements or scores are taken along 
normalised scales, so that each alternative is described by m scores. If 
there are n alternatives, the table of scores constitutes a m x n matrix. 
The next step is to multiply the scores by the corresponding weight for that 
goal and then add up the products of weight x score to obtain an overall 
rating for each alternative. Different permutations of this basic procedure 
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have been suggested - novel methods of weighting, assorted scoring scales 
and a multitude of ways of aggregating the products. However, they have 
little to offer over the simplest method. 
Expressed in matrix notation, this is: 
Let there be m goals and n alternatives 
Let W = matrix of weights, 1 x m 
S = matrix of scores, m x n 
R = matrix of final ratings, 1 x n 
Then, W . S = R 
The best alternative is taken to be the one with the highest final rating, 
and the decision is made. Under the matrix formalism, the desired 
alternative is that which has the highest entry in the matrix R. We shall 
use this technique as the starting point for this discussion. 
In "Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex Systems and 
Decision Processes" (1973), Zadeh describes the compositional rule of 
inference and gives examples with fuzzy sets and relational matrices, 
similar in form to W, S and R. The matrices are combined according to 
the max-min rule, which is exactly similar to matrix multiplication, but 
with the V operation replaced by 'min' and the '+' operation replaced by 
'max'. 
I t is a simple step, then, to proceed from the matrices W and S with 
matrix multiplication and to call them fuzzy sets to be combined by the 
max-min rule. The idea of selecting the best alternative, i.e. that with 
the maximum overall rating, also tends to suggest fuzzy set' theory, since 
the 'max' operator is so well-established therein. 
In his Ph.D. thesis (1976), Pappis does just this . He considers n 
alternatives described by m attributes, and sets up an m x n matrix "R = 
rj j , where rjj is a number in the interval 0,1 indicating the extent to 
which alternative vj is ascribed attribute uj." With a fuzzy subset A of U, 
where U is the set of attributes, 
A = ^ (uj, aj) / i = l,...,m 
and a, characterises the importance assigned to attribute u j , he forms the 
fuzzy set B, such that 
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B = A o R 
i.e. bj = max(aj A rjp 
i 
He proceeds "Under this interpretation, alternative V|< wil l be chosen, 
corresponding to b^ such that 
bfc = max(max(ai A rjj)) " 
j i 
He extends the idea a l i t t le further by introducing a set S of 1 objectives 
and the 1 x m matrix P = p n j defined on S x U, i .e. the objective -
attributes space, so that p n j describes how well attribute Uj fulfils objective 
S n . This second relat ional m a t r i x does not seem to advance 
multi-attribute decision-making very far and I fear that in practice he may 
have difficulty distinguishing clearly between how well an attribute satisfies 
an objective and how well an alternative is ascribed a certain attribute. 
Given an existing, well-known theory, fuzzy sets have been applied in an 
attempt to rejuvenate i t without giving any serious consideration to the 
validity of use a 'min' rule in comparing weights and scores. The same 
problems would remain were this method put into practice, e.g. assigning 
accurate, realistic numerical weights and scores, but the language in which 
it is expressed is a little more elegant. To obtain a satisfactory model of 
decision-making, it is better to start off with "fuzzy thinking" and build 
your model from a few basic premises, rather than tacking fuzzy set theory 
onto an existing method. 
One of the first attempts to do this was in 1970 by Bellman and Zadeh. 
They set up X = £ x j to be a "set of alternatives", and identify a goal G 
to be a fuzzy set on X. The use of the word 'alternatives' is perhaps 
misleading here, because they seem to be referring to what one would refer 
to as the complete decision space, and not just a subset of points within 
that space. Constraints are similarly defined, and a decision is the fuzzy 
set resulting from the intersection of G and C 
D = G A C 
or, for n goals and m constraints, 
D = Gi r\ G 2 f\ ... f\ G n A Ci A C 2 A ... A C m 
In order to obtain a single x from the set X, the x with the maximum 
yrudo of membership in D is selected. 
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the decision, not only that with the smallest degree 
of attainment. 
They propose two alternative 
and 
f o ft) = 
Since all the weights are in the interval|_0,lj some of the less important 
goals have values of yWtf /^i greater than 1, but this "unaesthetic" 
effect is not present in the second method. 
Nurminen and PBasic's techniques are to select the alternative x 0pt such that 
1) ALD ( x o p t ) = "10.1 mi*, f^i M 
This is the maximin decision rule modified to include weights. Nurminen 
and Paasio do not provide any criteria for choosing between the two 
methods, and say that i t may not be relevant to use the same weight 
parameters in both methods! With these rules an alternative is chosen 
according to its worst performance on any goal. There is no means of 
trading off between goals, simply that less important goals may be made to 
play a smaller role in the decision-making process. 
Another piece of work which is derived from the Bellman and Zadeh paper, 
although borrowing from it much more heavily than Nurminen and Paasio, is 
that by Yager and Basson (1975). They too define goals and constraints as 
fuzzy sets on the space of alternatives, and a decision as the intersection 
of goals and constraints. They propose a weighting scheme the same as 
Nurminen and Paasio's exponential use of weights, with the same maximin 
rule. They also discuss the problems of constraints over different spaces 
and of constraints which are conditional upon each other, taking their 







illustrate the discusssion seem to indicate a lack of appreciation of the 
meaning of fuzzy sets and the purpose of decision-making. Their 
"conditioned" sets could be expressed more easily using a fuzzy relation, and 
when discussing constraints over different spaces, the example fails to make 
the point. They comment on the subjectivity inherent in Bayesian Theory 
and Utility Theory, "two of the most useful tools in decision-making", and 
regret that "the subjectivity in the assignment of membership is one of the 
most important drawbacks of the fuzzy set approach to decision-making". 
(See my comments in Chapters 3 and 4.) 
In more recent papers (1977,1978), Yager pursues his approach to 
decision-making a l i t t le further. He uses Saaty's technique of determining 
weights of goals. Pairs of goals are compared and a number representing 
the strength of one over the other is written down. A matrix is formed 
such that if a:; of the matrix is 
The maximum eigenvalue of the matrix is obtained and the elements of the 
corresponding eigenvector give the weights of the goals. Using the same 
definition of goals, and these weights as exponents, the intersection of the 
goals gives the decision. 
In this paper, Yager mentions Zadeh's interactive and non-interactive 'and', 
with the interactive 'and' requiring that the product of goals and constraints 
should be taken. He fails to mention that in his example the decision 
would have been changed had the interactive been used rather than the 
non-interactive. He does comment on the two forms, that they "may 
represent in the oriental sense the Ying and Yang ... and all other rules lie 
between them". He leaves the choice of method to the decision-maker. 
For a more mathematical treatment of this type of interpretation one may 
refer to Negoita and Ralescu (1974). They consider 
1) the fuzzy decision 
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This emphasis of the similarity between goals and constraints is very neat, 
since in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between them. When 
does a goal become a constraint? Does the goal "Achieve a higher profit 
than last year" act as the constraint "Profit must not be lower than last 
year"? In this interpretation goals are defined as a fuzzy subset of the 
set of alternatives. In defining the grades of membership of Gj 
««• { /V*>/*] c ' c X 
we have to score each alternative according to its ability to f u l f i l a 
particular objective, and the list of scores is given the name 'goal'. 
In the case of equal weights, Bellman and Zadeh's intersection rule of goals 
and constraints is really the 'maximin 1 decision rule, i .e. select the 
alternative which has the highest minimum score on any attribute. See 
Chapter 3. 
Since all the goals and constraints may not be of equal importance, some 
method of weighting the goals or constraints is needed. Bellman and Zadeh 
propose a convex combination: 
We see that in order to tackle the problem of weighting goals and 
constraints, Bellman and Zadeh have had to fa l l back on the traditional 
weighted-sum rule. 
Nurminen and Paasio (1976) start off with the same interpretations of the 
meaning of goals and decision and say they cannot agree with Bellman and 
Zadeh's use of the convex combination in the case of unequal weights 
because 
1) the fuzzy measure is not additive, 
2) in the case of equal weights the two methods are in 
contradiction, 
3) in the convex combination all goals have an effect on 
I 
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2) the product fuzzy decision 
J - ' 
3) the convex fuzzy decision 
> /?. 6 fx) 
and point out that 
D a , to > 0 00 <>/ J?Pr 6) 
contradicting Yager's interpretation of D(x) and Dp r(x) as Ying and Yang. 
The papers which have been mentioned so far have been based on the 
t radi t ional weighted-sum method of decision-making. Fuzzy sets have been 
added on, wi th greater or lesser success, but apart f rom the occasional 
insight, l i t t le really has been gained. 
A rather more original approach comes from Jain (1976a,1976b,1977). He 
considers a system wi th n states, governed by some parameter set t ing. 
There are m available alternatives f r o m which one must be selected and 
each alternative-state pair has a u t i l i t y associated wi th i t . For a given 
state of the system, the problem is to select the one giving the highest 
uti l i ty in combination with that state. However, i f either the knowledge 
about the system state is fuzzy, or the utilities associated with alternatives 
are fuzzy, or both, the problem is not so simple. The decision maker is 
faced wi th the problem of ranking the fuzzy sets which describe the utili ty 
of each alternative. He says (1976b) 
One may be tempted to make a decision either on the basis of 
the maximum utility associated with alternatives or on the basis 
of the u t i l i t i es having the maximum grade of membership in the 
sets. However, both of these may lead to the selection of the 
improper alternative as the optimal alternative.... The balanced 
approach for the selection of the opt imal a l ternat ive should 
consider both the maximum u t i l i t y associated wi th various 
alternatives and the grade of membership of the utilities. 
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The problem is reduced to that of ranking fuzzy sets. Note that Jain has 
not attempted to obtain the u t i l i t i e s of the states, but assumes them as 
given. Hence, the emphasis is not on multi-attribute decision-making, but 
on one aspect, the ranking of fuzzy u t i l i t i e s . Jain's method is based on 
the notion of the 'maximising set' and the method is explained in Figure 
6.1 , using the example he uses in his paper, "Decision Making in the 
Presence of Fuzzy Variables" (1976b). 
A more recent development of mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision-making is that of 
Baldwin and Guild (1978b). They make good use of fuzzy set theory and 
set up a new approach to decision-making. They state that in this approach 
The rationale for making a choice is expressed in the fo rm of an 
argument in fuzzy logic, consisting of a number of statements 
which connect propositions. This fo rma l i ses the way t h a t 
"goodness" in a choice is characterised. Any informat ion 
available about the propositions is c o d i f i e d as t r u t h value 
res t r ic t ions and then used to evaluate a fuzzy impression of 
"goodness". 
A set of n independent statements are made, to correspond with n criteria 
of the decision. These statements are of the form 
"IF (the alternative is an Effective choice) 
THEN (the alternative satisfies Criterion 1)" 
which is written as 
E => Ci , i eV>*> •••**] 
To account f o r d i f f e r e n t weightings of the c r i t e r i a , t ru th funct ional 
modification is applied: 
In the example which they provide, the propositions are such as 
(E (Space required is small)) is true 
(E (Response time is short)) is f true 
(E (Coordination is easy)) is v true 
For each al ternative, the c r i t e r ia are measured and, using Inverse Truth 
Functional Modification, a fuzzy truth value is obtained for (Space required 
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The fuzzy sets are: 
U j f = {(.88,2),(1.0,3),(0.7,1),(0.3,7) ] 
U ? f = [(.82,7),(0.8,8),(1.0,l),(0.3,6)j 
U 3 f = ((0.4,3),(0.8,4),(1.0,5),(0.7,6),(0.3,8)j 
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Select the maximising set U lm 
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- u. A U. U i o lm 
Select the maximum grade of membership of each U.. This gives 
.the grade of membership of each alternative i n A 1, the fuzzy set 
of optimal alternatives. ° 
A Q =[(.375,a,),(.82,a 2),(.7,a 3)j 
Hence, implement a. with the highest grade of membership i n A . 
Figure 6.1 
Jain's method f o r ranking fuzzy sets 
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is small/Space required for Option A). Max-min composition of this value 
with the relation for Implication(true) results in v(E/Space required for 
Option A) . By sequentially rejecting the alternatives with the most false 
truth value restr ict ions, one alternative is l e f t . Where the d i f ference 
between the truth value restrictions of alternatives is small, another method 
of choosing is used, although this relies quite heavily on the accuracy of 
the fuzzy set memberships. 
There are two main objections which I suggest, although the method 
proposed is quite ingenious. F i r s t ly , for the modus tollena argument to 
work sa t i s fac tor i ly , there must be no interaction between the c r i t e r i a . 
This prevents any trade-offs between c r i t e r i a and produces a f a i r l y 
unrealistic model of human reasoning. For the criteria to be independent, 
the same condi t ions would have to be f u l f i l l e d as w i t h n u m e r i c a l 
mul t i -a t t r ibu te u t i l i t y . There may be some cases when this might be so, 
but i t w i l l not in general be so. The second objection is tha t t r u t h 
funct ional modif icat ion and inverse truth functional modification have been 
applied to non-objective c r i t e r i a . I have discussed objections to th i s 
practice elsewhere (Chapter 5). There is also the problem of accuracy. 
The method relies upon accurate estimates of the impor tance of the 
c r i t e r i a , the measurements for each option and the standards required for 
the criterion to satisfy the effectiveness criterion of "goodness". 
Thus, a l though this method represents an advance in the approach to 
decision-making, i t does not solve any of the problems. The c r i t e r i a must 
s t i l l be objectively measurable and they must also be independent in their 
contribution to the overall effectiveness of the option. 
Baas and Kwakernaak (1977) claim that "Fuzzy sets theory may be used to 
solve multiple-attribute decision problems under unertainty". They make 
two main assumptions, and compute a rank ordering of the alternatives 
according to a method of their own devising. While we do not wish to 
comment upon the ma themat i c s of the ranking method , t h e i r two 
assumptions may be challenged. The assumptions are 
that all alternatives in the choice set can be characterised by a 
number of aspects, and that informat ion is available to assign 
weights to these aspects and to construct a rating scheme for 
the various aspects of each alternative. 
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and 
The uncertainty that is assumed to be inherent in the assessment 
of the ratings and weights is accounted for by considering each 
o f these var iab les as f u z z y quan t i t i e s cha rac te r i sed by 
appropriate membership functions. 
The unce r t a in ty in decision-making comes f rom two sources - lack of 
knowledge about the f u t u r e and the i n t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y o f the 
dec i s ion -maker . These two sources of uncertainty may be labelled 
probabilistic and imprecise. Whereas most decision techniques concentrate 
upon a probabilistic treatment of uncertainty, ignoring imprecision, Baas and 
Kwake'rnaak have moved to the other extreme, favouring imprecision over 
probabi l i ty . To claim that multiple-attribute problems can be solved under 
uncertainty, both these aspects must be accommodated. 
Their assumption of constant (fuzzy) weights has been challenged in Chapter 
4, and the criticisms mentioned therein apply to most of the other methods 
discussed in this chapter. 
In more recent papers, Zadeh (1977) has adopted a different stance on the 
defining of p re fe rence r e l a t ions over many a l t e r n a t i v e s . He has 
emphasised the use of linguistic statements of preference, such as 
The preference of 1^  for 85 over 83 is strong. 
The preference of l\ for 85 over a$ is much 
stronger than the preference of I j for 85 over 83. 
If the preference of I j for 35 is strong, then 
the preference of I2 for 85 over 83 is very 
strong. 
where Ij is an individual. 
His paper, "Linguistic Characterisation of Preference Relations as a Basis 
for Choice in Social Systems" (1976a) describes the various forms of the 
statements of preference, but does not explore the idea much fu r the r , 
concentrating instead on the linguistic rules. 
In a separate paper (1976b), he develops the idea of m u l t i - c r i t e r i a l 
decision-making: 
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when more than one cr i te r ion of performance is involved the 
trade-offs between the cr i ter ia are usually poorly defined. In 
such cases, the l inguis t ic characterisations of t rade-offs or 
preference r e l a t ions provide a more r e a l i s t i c concep tua l 
framework for decision analysis than the conventional methods 
employing binary-valued preference relations. 
He gives a small example to explain the idea. With only two decision 
variables, it is easy to obtain the set of points which are preferred to each 
point . I f the constraint set is C, then a point in C is undominated if its 
intersection with the set of dominating points is that point only i.e. is the 
singleton. This w i l l be the Pareto-optimal set. Had the preference 
relat ion been fuzzy, the Pareto-optimal set would also be fuzzy . "In 
general, the extent to which the size of the Pareto-optimal set is reduced 
in this fashion depends on the linguistic i n f o r m a t i o n provided by the 
trade-offs." 
Zadeh points out the difficulties of this sort of approach: 
translation of l inguistic propositions ... is a fuzzy set of type 2 
(i.e. has a fuzzy-set-valued membership function), which makes i t 
more d i f f i c u l t to f ind the intersection of D(u 0 ) (sic) with the 
constraint set as well as to compute the grade of membership of 
u° in the fuzzy set of Pareto-optimal solutions. Secondly, the 
preference relation represented by ^0 may not be transi t ive, . . . 
in which case i t may be necessary to construct the transitive 
closure ofyO . And finally, i t may not be a simple matter to 
apply linguistic approximation to U. p(u°) 
where jx p(u°) is the membership of the point u° in the Pareto-optimal set 
and u° is a point in the decision space. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this section, we have considered some approaches to the problem of 
mul t i - a t t r ibu te decision-making which have been inspired by f u z z y set 
theory, in some part . Some of the approaches failed to solve any of the 
problems and only used fuzzy set theory in an ad hoc >fnanner, f a i l ing to 
In the first place, the preference relation which results f r o m 
r 
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take advantage of its power. More serious attempts have used fuzzy set 
theory in an imaginative and consistent manner, but still failed to overcome 
the f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e decision-making, i.e. 
non-constant, interactive weights, subjective at tr ibutes and the importance 
of uncertainty. 
More modern methods have accepted that multi-attribute decision-making is 
a diff icul t problem, and that i t cannot be solved fac i l e ly . Zadeh's most 
recent work on the subject, as well as the idea propounded herein, are 
adopting a different approach, looking at the preference i t se l f , rather than 
the atomic c r i t e r i a . Although fuzzy set theory may provide a better tool 
for the subject, the problem of multi-attribute decision-making w i l l not be 
easy to solve. The pendulum swings from strictly numerical approaches to 
strictly fuzzy approaches, without much improvement, and is now swinging 
towards a more loose, fuzzy approach. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A NEW APPROACH TO MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING 
In this chapter we shall summarise the arguments for a new approach to 
multi-attribute decision-making, explain how we intend to use fuzzy set 
theory, explain and discuss the new approach and illustrate i t with examples. 
WHY IS A NEW APPROACH NECESSARY? 
Previous approaches to mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision-making have had some 
success but the general lack of application displays a mistrust of existing 
methods and the need f o r change. Existing methods, relying upon 
multi-attribute u t i l i t y theory, place an emphasis upon measurement and 
precision, which has a number of identifiable effects. 
The first effect is the removal of control over the decision-making process 
f rom the people involved, transferring it to the consultant or analyst, who 
may or may not be a member of the o rgan i sa t ion . I f a h i g h l y 
mathematical technique is being used, non-technical groups are automatically 
excluded and the analyst may have control over the inputs to the technique. 
For participative decision-making to work effectively, the decision technique 
should be simple to use and understand so that the participants can retain 
control. 
The second e f f e c t of the numerical techniques is an emphasis on the 
objective aspects, which can be measured. Subjec t ive aspects are 
nonetheless important too in determining the success or fa i lure of an 
implemented decision. If the attributes are required to be measurable this 
can exclude the subjective attributes f rom the central decision-making 
process relegating them to a secondary role. 
The third e f f e c t is concerned with the assessment of utilities for separate 
attributes. Ignoring for a moment the justification for dealing wi th single 
a t t r ibutes , the assessment of u t i l i t y o f ten involves preferences between 
lotteries and the f u l f i l m e n t of other inappropriate axioms of ra t iona l i ty . 
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When u t i l i t i e s are being assessed the conditions of the util i ty assessment 
may be unlike the problem in hand to such an extent that there may be 
ac tua l d i s t o r t i o n involved. This may be the case, par t icular ly when 
Archimedean probability is compared to conditions of genuine uncertainty. 
Fourthly, where uncertainty is involved, most methods tend to treat it using 
subjective probability and use methods involving mathematical expectation, 
for example. This fai ls to distinguish between the sources of uncertainty 
whether subjective or stochastic and may not fo l low the true method of 
assessing uncertainty which the decision-maker may employ. 
Fifthly, where the measurement of an attribute is imprecise, fo r whatever 
reason, most methods tend to ignore or lose the imprecision of the 
measurement. When an index of merit is calculated for each al ternat ive, 
the imprecision in this figure must be determined through a sensitivity 
analysis. The e f f e c t is sometimes to give a spurious impress ion of 
accuracy to the final answers, ignoring the imprecision of inputs. 
Apart from relying upon a numerical approach, multi-attribute u t i l i t y theory 
is d i f f i c u l t to apply because of the strict conditions which must be met to 
allow the convenient weighted sum methods to be used. The violat ion of 
the conditions (e.g. mutual preference indifference) is met in pracrtice, so 
the multi-attribute theory can only be used as a guide or approximation to 
decision-making. However, when this is compounded with the distorting 
effects mentioned earlier, real difficulties can arise. 
However , apply ing a m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y approach does have some 
advantages which arise mainly f rom the r igourous s t r u c t u r i n g of the 
dec i s i o n - m a k i n g process w h i c h is necessary fo r any n u m e r i c a l 
decision-making method to be applied at all. 
An ideal decision-making aid should aim to contain the advantages of 
multi-attribute util i ty theory but avoid the disadvantages which numerical 
methods involve. 
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THE NEW TOOLS 
In this new approach to decision-making we propose to use fuzzy set theory 
and fuzzy logic. The reason for this choice is that we believe the use of 
f u z z y sets can avoid some of the problems connected wi th precise 
measurement already discussed and can encourage a more pragmatic and 
realistic approach to the complicated problems of balancing many attributes. 
We wish to use fuzzy set theory in two ways. The f i r s t is in the 
measurement of a t t r i b u t e s . Where these are subjective, appropriate 
adjectives or adverbs may be used. Where the at t r ibute is object ively 
measurable, e.g. p r i c e , s ize, etc., numbers may be used if required, 
otherwise adjectives may be substituted to take account of the "graininess" 
in the human perception of such variables, (see also Lakof f , 1973). In 
order to structure the use of such adjectives, we suggest the use of two or 
three basic adjectives, together with a simple grammar. This is to ensure 
that members of the same group attach roughly the similar meanings to 
words and enable the terms to be used in an orderly manner. 
The second use of fuzzy set theory is in the assessment of overall u t i l i t y . 
This too is described verba l ly where desired. The u t i l i t y surface is 
described using heuristics or rules. Given any al ternative, we may then 
determine its ut i l i ty . 
THE MODEL 
We propose tha t the u t i l i t y of a mul t i -a t t r ibu te alternative may be 
described as a f u z z y set on a one-dimensional u t i l i t y space. An 
alternative may be represented as a fuzzy region of a multi-dimensional 
decision space, where the dimensions are the relevant performance variables. 
The decision space maps onto the u t i l i t y space under a relation which 
describes the decision-maker's algorithm for decision-making. The fuzzy 
set utilities may be compared for preference and indifference. 
Each performance variable, D j , is described using a set, 
D 1 di € D l 
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The decision space «Q is the Cartesian product of the Dj 
<Q = D\ x D2 x D3 x . . . x D n 
where n is the number of performance variables. A point in the decision 
space may be described as an n-tuple (d i ,d2 ,d3 , . . . ,d n ) . If a point can be 
measured along every performance variable, it can be represented as a point 
in the space ^ ) . Generally values of the performance variables are 
imprecisely measured so that an alternative A is a fuzzy region of <Q, and 
may be presented as the Cartesian product of fuzzy subsets on the Dj . 
A = 3 r A ( D i ) x £ A ( D 2 ) x ... x J : A ( D n ) 
where O^A^i) is a fuzzy measurement of al ternative A along D j . Every 
point in can be given a grade of membership in alternative A. 
The total or aggregate util i ty of apoint in the performance space <Q can 
be represented as a single scalar value or as a fuzzy set of values. Under 
the fuzzy representation the grades of membership at a part icular point 
express the compat ib i l i ty between that point and each utility value. The 
util i ty dimension may also be a set of adjectives (a universe of discourse), 
and may be chosen by the decision-m,aker himself. The mapping from the 
multi-dimensional space onto the uti l i ty surface, U, is called $ , and is a 
fuzzy set of ,£) x U, the Cartesian product of and U. 
The relation <fc is obtained from the heuristic information provided by the 
decision-maker. I t may be encoded in a table of values of u t i l i ty for 
some of the n-tuples in . The missing points may be obtained by 
interpolation and checked by the decision-maker. 
Once the has been obtained i t may be used to predict a u t i l i t y for the 
given alternatives. Each alternative, A, is a fuzzy subset of 1 $ , and its 
corresponding u t i l i t y U A , may be calculated. I f the al ternat ives are 
represented by Type I fuzzy sets, then the max-min relation may be used: 
uA = A ° § 
^ ( a ) - max [ mi* j ^ u) t juA U ' - ) J j 
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Thi3 approach to determining a 'u t i l i ty function omits the usual intermediary 
step of assessing the partial ut i l i ty of each performance variable separately. 
The reasons f o r the undesirabil i ty of this practice have already been 
discussed. By trying to assess the 'ut i l i ty ' of separate dimensions, we lose 
in format ion on the aggregation of these dimensions and so must impose 
some method, e.g. weighted addition. Thse subjective aggregation methods 
may be very complex and, at best, partial utilities can only supply a cross 
section through the overall u t i l i t y surface. We suppose that fo r many 
cases,partial u t i l i t i e s cannot be cor rec t ly and operationally aggregated by 
general mathematical functions because the aggregation methods actually 
used are unique for each individiual and too complex to be satisfactorily 
described by an arbitrary nomination rule . See Efstathiou and Rajkovic 
(1979). 
EXAMPLE 
In the f o l l o w i n g example , we shall consider the problem of buying s 
domestic toaster. Two methods of handling the fuzzy set calculations w i l l 
be presented, although much of the preliminary analysis is common to both. 
The first method U3es ordinary fuzzy sets with a max-min re la t ion mapping 
them onto u t i l i t y spae. The second uses Type-2 fuzzy set3 and a crude 
interpolation. The relative merits of the two methods wil l be discussed at 
the end. See Efstathiou and Rajkovic (1900). 
Preliminary Analysis 
The problem is to choose a toaster, for own use, f rom a list of possible 
alternatives as found in Which? The attributes which we shall consider are: 
1) price 
2) depth of slo'. - should be able to take a slice from a standard loaf 
3) evenness - nr,L burnt in the middle and white round the edges 
4) consistency - same result between batches at the same setting 
The ideal toaster would be cheap, toast evenly and consistently and have a 
deep slot. 
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Each attribute is described using an appropriate vocabulary: 
Price - dear, cheap 
Depth - deep, not deep enough 
Evenness - good, medium, bad 
Consistency - good, medium, bad 
We may write down statements to describe our opinions on the attributes: 
1) Price is not very important. Since the item is intended for own 
use, it is worthwhile to pay for something to suit one's needs. 
2) Consistency is less important than evenness, but they must both 
be at least medium. 
3) The depth of the s lot is i m p o r t a n t . There is no point in 
producing evenly done toast if 30mm of the bread stick out at the 
top. 
The vocabularies are chosen to be as close as possible to the language 
which one would normally use to describe the at t r ibutes . Although some 
could have been measured along objective scales, such as mm or £, the way 
in which we perceive these at tr ibutes is not so f inely graduated. The 
di f ference between 120 and 121mm is imperceptible in everyday usage, but 
the difference between 'deep' and 'not deep enough1 is realistic and pertinent 
to the choice. 
Other attributes which could have been considered are safety and durability, 
but since there seems to be nothing to choose amongst these alternatives on 
these a t t r ibutes , they w i l l not be considered. Appearance too could be a 
deciding factor, but wil l not be considered at this stage. 
To help us draw up a complete table defining uti l i ty, we will look in more 
detail at the interaction between evenness and consistency. 
price depth evenness consistency util i ty 
cheap deep good good vv high 
" " good med. high 
" " med. good med. and low 
" " med. med. low 
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The vocabulary to describe utili ty is: 
U - (high, medium, low) 
toge ther w i t h the hedges ' f a i r l y ' and 'very', abbreviated to ' f and V 
respectively, where 
The connective 'and', denoted by &, is used. On the fuzzy set calculations, 
i.e. the sets are normalised after the 'min' operation. 
A complete table may be drawn up to map from attribute space to utili ty 
space. Each of the sixteen n-tuples is assigned a u t i l i t y value, consistent 
with the statements given earlier. See Table 7.1. 
Alternat ives 
F rom the seventeen alternatives available, we select f ive for fur ther 
investigation. The other twelve are removed because either the slot was 
too small, or the toaster performed poorly on either consistency or evenness 
or both. 
The alternatives are presented in Table 7.2. The information on the 
alternatives has been presented using objective measurements, i .e. £ and 
mm. This is to show the common basis of the two methods, which require 
different types of fuzzy set. 
Method 1 
We shall define the fuzzy subsets 'dear' and 'cheap' an the £ scale and 
'deep' and 'not deep enough' on the mm scale, as shown in Figure 7 . 1 . 
Using these definitions, the alternatives are described in Table 7.3. 
M fairly a M x r a 
j" very (x) x r a 
mm 











114 118 122 126 
m m 
Figure 7.1 D e f i n i t i o n of fuzzy set vocabularies 
on £ and mm'scales 
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Price Depth Evenness Consistency U t i l i t y 
cheap deep good good v v high 
good med v high 
med good high 
med med med & high 
cheap not deep good good jned 
enough good med med & f low 
med good low 
med med v low 
dear deep good good v high 
good med high 
med good f high 
med med med 
dear not deep good good med & low 
enough , , , . , 
good med med & low 
med good v low 
med med v v low 
Table 7.1 
U t i l i t y of n-tuples 
Alternative Price Depth Evenness Consistency 
£ mm 
1 14 125 good good 
2 9 121 med good 
3 12 112 good med 
4 13 120 med good 
5 12 120 med med 
Table 7.2 
Assessment of the alternatives 
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A l t e r n a t i v e s 
dear , deep, good, good 
cheap, .6 /deep, . 3 / n d e , med, good 
.33 /dea r , .25/cheap, t ide, good, med 
.67 /dear , .4 /deep , . 5 / n d e , med, good 
.33 /dea r , .25/cheap, .A/deep, . 5 /nde , med, good 
Table 7.3 
Type- I Fuzzy Set d e s c r i p t i o n s of a l t e r n a t i v e s 
A l t e r n a t i v e P r i c e Depth Evenness Consistency 
1 very t r ue /dea r t rue /deep t rue /good t rue /good 
2 very t rue/cheap t rue /deep true/med t rue /good 
3 f a i r l y t r ue /dea r t rue /nde t rue /good true/med 
4 t r ue /dea r t rue /deep true/med t rue /good 







Type-2 Fuzzy Set d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a l t e r n a t i v e s 
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Uslng a max-mln relation, the ut i l i t ies would be: 
U(A l t 1) = 1 / v high 
U(A l t 2) = .6 / high + .3 / low 
U(Ai t 3) = .33/ med & low + .25/ med & f low 
U(A l t 4) = .4 / f high + .5/ v low 
U(A l t 5) = .33/med + .25/ med & low + .33/ v v low + .25/ v low 
where + denotes the union. 
W i t h ' h igh 1 , 'med 1 and ' l ow ' de f ined on the interval [0,1 \ as in Figure 7.2, 
we may represent these ut i l i t ies as in Figure 7.3. 
Rank ing these sets presents a p r o b l e m . Methods have been proposed to 
rank fuzzy sets, but are not so satisfactory wi th bi-modal sets, or sets w i t h 
plateau maxima (Baldwin & Guild, 1978a). 
A n o t h e r p o i n t w i t h p r e - d e t e r m i n e d r a n k i n g m e t h o d s is i n t h e 
dec is ion -maker ' s a t t i t u d e towards r isk. These fuzzy sets indicate that in 
many cases there may be some ' d i s u t i l i t y ' i n v o l v e d w i t h some o f t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and i t should be up to the decision-maker himself to state how 
he wishes to t rade-of f u t i l i t y and d isut i l i ty . We may also remember t h a t 
because of the inheren t fuzz iness , to t r y to rank the sets too accurately 
would be a mistake. Some sort of visual p resenta t ion , or a s e m i - o r d e r i n g 
is as much as we can reasonably produce, at a f i rs t a t tempt . 
I n t h i s case we use Type-2 fuzzy sets ( M i z u m o t o & Tanaka, 1976) to 
describe the alternatives. A Type-2 fuzzy set is one fo r wh i ch the grades 
o f membersh ip o f the e lements are in t u rn fuzzy subsets of another set. 
Instead of saying 
Method 2 
The grade of membership of a in F is 0.9 
one would say 
The grade of membership of a in F is very high 
where 'very high' is defined on the range [ t ) , l ] . We e f f ec t i ve l y rep lace the 




F igu re 7.2 D e f i n i t i o n o f u t i l i t y vocabulary on [ 0 , 1 ] 
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u ( A l t 1)1 
u ( A l t 3) 
u ( A l t 2) 
Alt 4 




F igure 7.3 U t i l i t i e s obta ined us ing method t 
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now be presented as in Table 7.4. 
No te t ha t for Al ternat ive 1 the grade of membership of 'dear' is 'very t rue' . 
Table 1 only provides values of ' true' for 'cheap' and 'dear'. 
true/cheap v v high 
true/dear v high 
very true/dear ? 
Some means of extrapolat ing f rom the points given to those we wish to use 
is necessary. Truth funct ional modif icat ion (Zadeh, 1977) by i tself may not 
be adequate because the relationship between p r i ce and u t i l i t y may not be 
qu i te l inear , as t ru th funct ional modi f icat ion supposes. The only reasonable 
solution is to fo l low the spir i t of the statements in the p r e l i m i n a r y analys is 
and adopt an ad hoc answer. This is probably as good as one can expect. 
I t would seem fa i r to substi tute 'h igh ' f o r the quest ion mark in the tab le 
above. Similar ly, for Al ternat ive 2, the answer would be 'v high'. 
For Al ternat ives 3 and 5 the t ruth values are ' f a i r l y t r ue ' f o r 'dear ' . In 
t h i s c a s e , t h i s mus t l i e b e t w e e n ' t r u e / c h e a p ' and ' t r u e / d e a r ' , so for 
A l ternat ive 3 we could say 
true/dear med & low 
true/cheap med & f low 
fa i r ly true/dear med & low & not(med & f low) 
Hence we obtain ut i l i t ies as fol lows: 
U A l t 1) = high • 
U(A l t 2) = v high 
U (A l t 3) = med & f low and not(med & low) 
U A l t 4) = f high 
U(A l t 5) = med and not(med & high) 
This method o f f e r s the advantage of express ing the answer d i r e c t l y as 
Eng l ish statements, but using f i gu re 7.2 we may also produce the fuzzy sets 
to compare w i th Method 1 , see Figure 7.4. 
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Alt 1 Alt 2 
u ( A l t 1) u ( A l t 2fl 
u* u* 
Alt 3 A t 4 
u ( A l t 4) u ( A l t 3) 
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Discussion of Methods 
A l though the se lec t ion of a toaster may seem a t r iv ia l ly simple problem, i t 
i l lustrates this technique quite we l l , as wel l as showing up the p rob lems of 
any mul t i -a t t r ibu te decision technique, which are: 
1) handling the at t r ibute interactions 
2) ranking the outcomes 
The at t r ibute in terac t ions may be expressed using a fuzzy r e l a t i o n as in 
Table 7 . 1 . Any a l t e r n a t i v e is a more or less fuzzy region of the space 
described by the table. 
We have seen t w o ways of obtaining the u t i l i t y of any region of that table. 
The f i rs t method tends to give pessimitttic answers. I f an a l t e r n a t i v e has 
g r a d e o f m e m b e r s h i p 0.33 a t one n - t u p l e , 0.5 a t an ad jacen t and 0 
everywhere else, one would suppose t h a t , at some po in t in b e t w e e n , the 
a l t e r n a t i v e would have grade of membership 1.0. Unfortunately, the simple 
m a x - m i n r e l a t i o n does not take th is in to a c c o u n t , and we o b t a i n t h e 
f l a t - t o p p e d , mu l t i -moda l sets, which miss the point. The max-min relat ion 
f a i l s to i n t e r p o l a t e be tween the n - tup les . H o w e v e r , t h i s m e t h o d is 
c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y s imple and where the vocabularies are reasonably discrete, 
i t can work we l l . 
The second method m igh t seem more appealing to the non-numerate. No 
n u m e r i c a l grades of membersh ip are i n v o l v e d in t h e m e a s u r e m e n t o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e s , jus t s ta temen ts o f b e l i e f . This me thod , though , has the 
disadvantage of being computationally awkward and would be more d i f f i c u l t 
to i nco rpo ra te in to a compu te r p r o g r a m . Because of the i n t e r a c t i o n s 
between the a t t r i b u t e s , t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l m o d i f i c a t i o n cannot be p rope r l y 
applied and some sort of ad hoc method substi tuted. 
T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F T H E M O D E L 
H o w can we k n o w i f such a m o d e l is a ' t r u e ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a 
dscision-maker's feelings? The answer is probably that we can never know. 
I t is a f a c t that many dimensions are involved in making decisions, and that 
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people use heu r i s t i c s ta temen ts to exp la in their preferences. Just as an 
orrery can be adjusted and improved unt i l i t produces a reasonably accu ra te 
r ep resen ta t i on o f the solar sys tem, so a fuzzy model of an ind iv idua l 's 
decis ion-making process may be ad jus ted u n t i l i t appears to p r e d i c t h is 
p re fe rences reasonably a c c u r a t e l y . But the rea l solar system does not 
funct ion with rods and cogs, and so the rea l dec i s ion -mak ing process may 
not funct ion w i th a mult i-dimensional space and fuzzy relat ions. 
However, a fuzzy model does seem to have some advantages over prev ious 
models - the inputs and outputs of decision-makers under real - l i fe conditions 
are more l i k e t he i n p u t s and o u t p u t s o f a f u z z y m o d e l t h a n o f a 
m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l u t i l i t y mode l . When making a decision, a human being 
receives vague i n f o r m a t i o n and he s ta tes heur i s t i cs to exp la in how th is 
i n f o r m a t i o n is being processed. Because humans are poor i n f o r m a t i o n 
processors, heuristics such as th is are necessary to ass im i la te and use as 
m u c h i n f o r m a t i o n as possib le. A fuzzy u t i l i t y model can use vague 
informat ion and heuristics, whereas a m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y model requ i res 
prec ise i n f o r m a t i o n and can only process th is i n f o r m a t i o n under l imi ted 
classes of models. In this way, a fuzzy u t i l i t y model seems to be more 
l ike the human decision-maker. 
Bu t should we use a fuzzy model which seems to incorporate what might be 
considered the human weaknesses when mak ing decis ions? I f humans are 
poor i n f o r m a t i o n processors, a model wh ich uses the maximum amount of 
in format ion should make a 'bet ter ' dec is ion than a l i m i t e d , f a l l i b l e human 
c o u l d . A decis ion a id wh ich only reproduces the simplest decision-making 
heuristics would not be useful, since i t does not extend the capac i t y of the 
h u m a n dec i s i on -make rs . To be usefu l the decis ion aid must help the 
decision-maker to explore the decision space in greater deta i l than he cou ld 
una ided , and to examine his own mot ives and inconsistencies. Whereas a 
m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y model requ i res p len ty of i n f o r m a t i o n , i t c a n n o t 
e f f e c t i v e l y use heu r i s t i c i n f o r m a t i o n , part icular ly on aggregation, and does 
not encourage c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t r o s p e c t i o n . Once t h e f l a w s in h i s 
dec i s i on -mak ing procedures have been realised, a decision-maker may adjust 
so as to be , fo r examp le , less r isk averse or more a l t r u i s t i c . Such a 
m o d e l may c o m b i n e d e s c r i p t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h the de l i be ra te 
incorporation of normative standards. This seems to be the best way to 
resolve the conf l ic t between descriptive and normative decision-making. 
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ASSUMPTIONS A B O U T U T I L I T Y 
In the d e r i v a t i o n of a measurable u t i l i t y , the necessary axioms ref lected 
this a im. We ae seeking a fuzzy u t i l i t y , and the assumpt ions w i l l r e f l e c t 
this too, no doubt. 
Assumption 1 
For any two m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e al ternat ives, the decision-maker can state that 
he prefers one to the other or is indi f ferent between them. 
Assumption 2 
Preference of choice is t ransi t ive; indifference of choice is not. 
Assumption 3 
A dec is ion -maker can prov ide a ve rba l measurement of the u t i l i t y of two 
alternat ives, and can provide heuristics w i t h wh ich to exp lo re the dec is ion 
space. 
T H E M O D E L AND T H E ASSUMPTIONS 
The f i rst axiom requires that for the fuzzy sets which represent the u t i l i t y 
o f t w o a l t e r n a t i v e s , we may dec lare them to be equal or t ha t one is 
greater than the other. Ranking fuzzy sets has been a problem J a i n , 1976; 
B a l d w i n & G u i l d , 1 9 7 8 a ; Baas & K w a k e r n a a k , 1977) and no s ingle 
satisfactory method seems to have emerged. Ideally, the ranking a l g o r i t h m 
s h o u l d be der ived f r o m e m p i r i c a l observat ions of the behaviour of the 
subject, but for such a model the many var iables i nvo lved wou ld make the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n t i m e - c o n s u m i n g and cou ld add 
considerably to the t i m e requ i red to p e r f o r m the ana lys is . Hence , we 
must build in some form of ordering re lat ion. 
The simplest ordering relation which could be used might be of the fo rm: 
A ) / p B i f f rep(A) ) p rep(B) 
where A,8 are fuzzy sets and rep(A) is the rep resen ta t i ve e lemen t of A , 
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i .e. the e lement w i t h the m a x i m u m grade of membership in A. Such an 
ordering re lat ion appl ies when the sets are s imple and an obvious ' s h i f t ' 
r e l a t i o n e x i s t s , so t h a t 'h igh ' >p 'med ium ' , as in F igure 7.2. For a 
comparison of 'very high 1 and 'high', this type of ordering re l a t i on wou ld no t 
be able to d is t ingu ish between them if the usual power operator def ini t ion 
of 'very' is used. However, if a shi f t operator def in i t ion is used: 
where c is some context-dependent constant, and x>p x - c if the sets have 
' p l a t eau ' m a x i m a , i.e. more than one element attains the maximum grade of 
membership, then the representative element is not uniquely d e f i n e d . Such 
sets would be ob ta ined f r o m 'no t ' or 'or ' opera t ions on the original sets. 
We could take as the rep resen ta t i ve e l e m e n t t h e a v e r a g e o f a l l t h e 
e l e m e n t s wh ich reach the m a x i m u m grade of membersh ip , and use the 
ordering definit ion above. 
Howeve r , we could also in t roduce a threshold below which the sets cannot 
be distinguished: 
Th i s is on l y a s u g g e s t i o n and t h e c h o i c e o f c and € is e n t i r e l y 
context-dependent. 
W i t h i n this p r o b l e m , the class of opera t ions wh ich are performed on the 
fuzzy sets is quite l im i ted , 'and', 'or', ' no t ' and a few m o d i f i e r s , say ' ve ry ' 
and perhaps ' f a i r l y ' . This means t h a t the fuzzy sets which are obtained 
f rom these operations w i l l be simple, so long as the o r i g ina l d e f i n i t i o n s are 
s imp le , as is usual ly the case. Hence, the sort of ordering relat ion which 
has been proposed would be adequate for most problems. 
We re fe r b r i e f l y to the rank ing method of Baas and Kwakernaak (1977). 
They defined the 'p re ferab i l i t y ' of one a l t e r n a t i v e over ano ther , based on 
fuzzy a r i t h m e t i c , but i t does not seem to be any more powerful as a means 
of d is t ingu ish ing be tween a l t e r n a t i v e s than the s imple o rder ing r e l a t i o n 
proposed herein. 
very A W = ^ A < x - c) 
If | rep(A) - rep(B) | < € , then A = n B 
where is some constant, which might be chosen as a f ract ion of c, e.g 
i c 
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We have a l ready discussed the p rob lem of knowing whether the model 
accurately ref lects the decision-maker's own ideas, and the same is t rue o f 
the o rde r ing r e l a t i o n . There w i l l be a p rob lem of knowing whether the 
ordering is as sensitive or more sens i t i ve to ' u t i l i t y ' d i f f e r e n c e s than the 
dec is ion-maker . The threshold value may not be true and can lead to error. 
The table below i l lustrates the type of error which is l ikely to occur. 
Model's State of Af fa i rs 
A > p B A "P B A < p B 
Real A > p B b X 
State of A * p B a a 
Af fa i re A < p B X b 
I f the o rder ing relation predicts that A >p B, when the real state of af fa i rs 
is that B >p A, then a serious error occurs, denoted by a cross in the Table 
above. I f a l l the i n f o rma t i on is correct and consistent, then the ordering 
relation must be at fau l t . 
As the o rder ing relat ion is made t ighter and t ighter , so we would expect to 
f ind more Type a errors occurr ing, i .e. a p re fe rence is p red i c t ed be tween 
a l t e r n a t i v e s when they are judged to be i n d i f f e r e n t . As the relat ion is 
loosened, Type b errors w i l l become more c o m m o n ; a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l be 
p r e d i c t e d to be i n d i f f e r e n t when a p re fe rence o rde r ing ex is ts . These 
errors are more d i f f i cu l t to cure than those of the previous paragraph, s ince 
to f i x the t igh tness of the r e l a t i o n at a part icular level assumes that the 
human judge has the same th resho ld of j udgement wha teve r the l eve l of 
u t i l i t y . The t igh tness of the ordering relat ion may also be a funct ion of 
the level of u t i l i t y of the alternatives being compared. As models become 
more and more r e f i n e d , so fau l t s in the o rde r ing r e l a t i o n are l i k e l y to 
become impo r t an t . However , we would suppose t h a t in most p r a c t i c a l 
cases these prob lems would not arise because of the high level of accuracy 
which is required on the decision-maker's part . 
The second axiom imposes a vagueness upon the ordering relation because of 
the n o n - t r a n s i t i v i t y of i n d i f f e r e n c e . A usefu l o rder ing r e l a t i o n m u s t 
p r e d i c t t rans i t iv i ty of preference, but as the chain of indifference lengthens, 
so we would expect the alternatives at e i t he r end to even tua l l y cross the 
threshold of indi f ference. 
I t w o u l d seem tha t the weakness of a fuzzy model o f u t i l i t i e s in the 
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o rde r ing r e l a t i o n . W i th prec ise n u m e r i c a l measurements of u t i l i t y , this 
problem does not arise. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of i m p r e c i s i o n , whe ther v ia a 
s e n s i t i v i t y analysis of numer ica l estimates or the introduction of fuzzy set 
theory, makes the ranking of alternatives more d i f f i cu l t . 
In pract ice, we may avoid this problem by: 
1) imposing constraints on the measurement of a l t e r n a t i v e s so 
as to ensure that they can alwaya be definitelydist inguished; 
2) keeping the problems so simple that the o rder ing r e l a t i o n is 
clear; 
3) leaving the ordering relat ion to the decision-maker. 
The f i r s t method m igh t be to d iv ide each pe r f o rmance var iab le i n t o a 
number of c lasses, thereby d iv id ing the dec is ion space into cells. Each 
alternative can be designated as f i t t ing into a p a r t i c u l a r c e l l , and d e f i n i t e 
p re fe rences exist between cells. This method is undesirable because of the 
constraints i t imposes on the dec i s ion -maker , requ i r i ng a p rec is ion of a 
d i f f e r e n t so r t . The second method is also undesirable for similar reasons, 
since i t only permits simple problems to be used, rendering the dec is ion a id 
less useful. 
The t h i r d method wou ld seem to be the easiest in t imes of con fus ion . 
Where the u t i l i t i e s of two a l t e r n a t i v e s are a lmost equa l , t h e y can be 
presented to the dec is ion -maker for h im to d i s c r i m i n a t e be tween them. 
However, if these u t i l i t i e s have been ca l cu l a ted using fuzzy uets, t h e i r 
t r ans la t i on back in to words may cause another element of arbitrariness to 
enter the analysis. An alternative method of presenting the fuzzy u t i l i t i e s 
is by using graphs, to convey the balance be tween good and bad and the 
spread of values. If the decision-maker's method of choosing be tween t w o 
a l t e r n a t i v e s depends on the poss ib i l i t y of untoward ef fects , then he must 
choose between L . ; u rna t i ves in his own way, t ak ing account of th is r i s k . 
W i th th^s me thod , there would be no need for the decision aid to do the 
ranking automatical ly, since that could be le f t to the decision-maker himself. 
To ob ta i n these u t i l i t i e s , we must consider the range of values over which 
these ut i l i t ies may vary. With Archimedean u t i l i t i es , t w o quan t i t i es cou ld 
be chosen to def ine 0 and 10 ut i les, say, and all other quantit ies measured 
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using th is sca le . We must also f i x our 3cnle, but ask the decision-maker 
himself to provide the values. So, we describe two po in ts in the dec is ion 
space and a t t a c h va lues o f u t i l i t y to t h e m . For convenience, these are 
taken as the present posit ion and the ideal posi t ion, but the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r 
must apply his own descr ipt ion, e.g. 'poor' and 'very, very good' respect ively. 
If heuristic i n f o rma t i on is p r o v i d e d , the meanings a t t a c h e d to the words 
'poor ' and 'good ' should r e m a i n cons is tent . The u t i l i t y of any al ternat ive 
may then be calculated. See Efs ta th iou, Hawgood and 'Ra jkov ic (1979). 
R U L E BASED D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G A N D C O M P U T A T I O N A L E F F I C I E N C Y 
As the number of p e r f o r m a n c e var iab les i n c r e a s e s , so t h e n u m b e r o f 
n - tup les w i l l increase very r a p i d l y . I f the process of assessing u t i l i t y is 
automated, we must consider how we may improve computat ional e f f i c i e n c y . 
The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s wh ich we have discussed 30 fa r may be 
represented by Figure 7.5(a). The process might seem more e f f i c i e n t i f we 
used ins tead the p a r a d i g m of Figure 7.5(b). The other methods require the 
assessment of $ f rom these rules, so we might consider the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
c a l c u l a t i n g the u t i l i t y o f each a l ternat ive by operating upon the heurist ics 
d i rec t l y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , such an approach does not p rov ide 0 s o l u t i o n 
because o f the need to express interact ions and the lack of tools to handle 
such statements. 
Cons ider a s imp le e x a m p l e . Suppose a decision-maker wishes to purchase 
an a rmcha i r and the only r e l e v a n t p e r f o r m a n c e va r iab les are P r i c e and 
Comfor t . The vocabularies could be: 
Price = cheap, reas, dear 
Comfor t = good, medium, poor 
and U t i l i t y •- low, medium, high 
Simple heuristics might be: 
I f the price is cheap then the u t i l i t y is medium ( 7 . 1 ) 
I f the price is deer then the u t i l i t y is low ( 7 . 2 ) 
I f the price is reas then the u t i l i t y is high ( 7 . 3 ) 
I f the comfor t is good then the u t i l i t y is high 












Figure 7 .5(b) 
Rule-based decision-making and 
These heur ist ics provide no information on the interaction between price and 
comfort of the armchair, but we can see where inconsistencies a r i se . For 
examp le , is a dear a rmcha i r w i t h good c o m f o r t of high or low u t i l i t y ? 
Unless a s imple i n t e r p o l a t i o n ru le is used, assuming no i n t e r a c t i o n , the 
dec is ion-maker w i l l have to be quer ied at those points of inconsistency. 
Thus, we have returned to the ident i f icat ion of Lne u t i l i t y of each n - t up le . 
The s ta temen t of u t i l i t y at each of these poi . . - , is in fact a more detailed 
rule than the simple, prel iminary heur ist ics, and '.i .c necessary to con ta in 
information on the interact ion of performance variables. 
The other reason for being u n c o m f o r t a b l e in the use of such ru les is the 
l a c k o f a d e q u a t e too ls to handle t h e m . We may have the f o l l o w i n g 
s i t u a t i o n : 
The price is very cheap. 
I f the price is cheap then the u t i l i t y is medium 
The u t i l i t y is ? 
Zadeh (1975) suggests two possible ways of solving such syllogisms: 
x is P 
If x is Q then y is S 
x is P • (Q 1 6 S) Lukasiewicz 
or y is P o (Q x S + Q') Max min 
where Q' is the cyl indrical extension of Q' 
© is the bounded sum yU.^ © jJ^ = min ( 1 , ^ 1 + 
Given the three rules above relating price and u t i l i t y , equs.(7.1) to (7 .3) , the 
d e f i n i t i o n s o f p r i ce and u t i l i t y in F igures 7.6(a) and (b) , and the two 
composition methods above, together wi th a th i rd , we ob ta in the fuzzy sets 
of F igures 7.7(a,b,c) . The third composition method has been chosen f rom 
many presented in Ba ldw in and P i l s w o r t h (1978 ) as t h a t w h i c h m o s t 
accu ra te l y produces the answers f r o m such sy l log isms. It may be seen 
that th3 max mir. method provides very l i t t le information and would not ac t 
as an e f f e c t i v e way of using rules to a r r i ve at decisions. However, the 
Lukasiewicz ana Divisive rules are more useful. 
Ano ther method wou ld be to employ t ru th funct ional modif icat ion in some 
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F i g u r e 7.7 A comparison of deductions from 
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x is P 
If x is Q then y is 5 
v(x is Q x is P) = X 
v(y is S) = X 
Inverse Truth Functional 
Modification 
y is S % Truth Functional Modification 
The min of the results from all the rules can then provide an estimate of 
utility. The three rules relating price to utility have been treated in this 
way, for the statements 
See Figure 7.8 for the results. 
It would seem that in cases where the utilities of the performance variables 
are non-interacting, we could use these rules to obtain a value for utility, 
given the measurement of an alternative. This is similar to the method 
used by Baldwin & Guild (1978b) except that they use only one rule and one 
adjective for each performance variable, assuming utility varies evenly with 
the level of the performance variable. 
The above method provides a satisfactory output from a number of rules for 
one performance variable. When many performance variables are involved, 
the min rule can amalgamate the many performance variables, but again 
only if the variables do not interact utility-wise, and we assume that the 
utility of a particular n-tuple is the lowest utility of the combining values 
(conjunctive). 
It would appear that to improve the speed of computation, we would need 
to ignore the interactions between attributes, defeating the object of the 
process. However, in such applications, speed of computation is not so 
important as in others, e.g. controllers. • The decision-maker must be 
encouraged to learn and this will not be adversely affected so long as the 
computation of utility takes of the order of one or two minutes. A 
program has been written by a group at the "Jozef Stefan" Institut 
(Rajkovic & Bohanic, unpublished) and they find that with 5 or 6 
performance variables and 300 n-tuples, the calculation of utility for a 
particular al ternat ive takes about 1 or 2 minutes. With 3 to 5 
The price is cheap 
and 
The price is very cheap. 
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Figure 7.8 Inverse t r u t h functional modification 
operating on decision rules 
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performance variables and 30 n-tuples, the response time is only a few 
seconds. 
Their program uses the max-min relation to calculate the utility of each 
al ternat ive, which takes account of every n-tuple in the s p a c e . 
Computation time increases very rapidly, therefore, with the number of 
n-tuples. They are hoping to decrease computation time during the 
interactive process of setting up by only taking account of neighbouring 
n-tuples in the computer's calculation of ut i l i t ies against which the 
decision-maker may compare his own ideas. The evaluation of real 
alternatives is non-interactive, in the learning sense, and should be more 
accurate. This is done using the complete $ , because response time is 
not important and accuracy is. 
We would conclude by saying that within a practical context, speed of 
computation is not important because the decision-maker must be 
encouraged to learn. The time lapse between issuing the instruction and 
receiving the result of the calculation of utility should not be much longer 
than about a minute in the worst case, and preferably less. Also, since 
any method of improving speed of calculation would require sacrificing some 
of the generality of the paradigm, we would consider it unwise. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter opened with a review of the fundamental disadvantages of 
traditional multi-attribute decision-making techniques, and explained how 
fuzzy set theory may be useful in overcoming them. A new approach to 
multi-attribute decision-making was explained and i l lustrated with an 
example. The three assumptions about utility which are required for such 
a model were presented and discussed. Rule-based decision-making and 
computational efficiency were considered, and the computer program of 
Rajkovic and Bohanic cited. 
I conclude that it is possible to revise the approach to multi-attribute 
decision-making to produce a technique based on fuzzy set theory which Is 
more personal in its approach and less prone to arbitrary distortion. 
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CHAPTER 8 
A P R A C T I C A L TECHNIQUE FOR MAKING COMPLEX DECISIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a practical recipe, which may be 
used by a decision-maker who is about to make a complex multi-attribute 
decision, such as the selection of a portfolio or design. This recipe 
emphasises throughout the importance of user participation in the design of 
complex systems and the recognition of the subjective value of uncertainty, 
objective-setting, etc. This recipe is also simple, and does not require the 
assistance of a special computer program. Some of the ideas developed in 
earlier chapters have had to be omitted, therefore. The chapter will finish 
with an expanded discussion on the topic of participation and the role of 
the analyst. 
HOW TO PERFORM THE ANALYSIS 
The design team 
Many complex decisions have identifiable effects on the life of many 
people. These effects may be near at hand and immediate or less 
important and without major impact. For example, the construction of a 
new motorway will have a profound effect upon the lives of those living 
nearby, both during and after building, whilst the weekend driver may 
experience a fairly marginal improvement to his life. 
According to the way in which they are likely to be affected and their 
objectives connected with the decision, the people may be roughly classified 
into various interest groups. Some groups may exercise considerable 
control over the success or failure of the decision, so their co-operation is 
important because 
1) their goodwill may be necessary for a successful 
implementation, and 
2) their knowledge and experience of the practical 
system will provide valuable information. 
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Thus, the design team should contain one member of each group. These 
members may be appointed through either 
selection by the high-level decision-makers in 
charge of the task, or 
election by other members of the group. 
The method of appointment depends on the nature of the group, e .g . 
whether it is loosely organised or well bound together and easily 
identifiable, and the style of management adopted. Whichever method is 
used, the other members of the group who are not in the desugn team 
should be kept well informed of the progress of the analysis, and their 
opinions and comments fed back to the team. 
The level of consultation with the interest groups will depend on how easily 
they can be contacted by the design team. If a group consists of a large 
section of the general publ ic, then that group cannot be kept as 
well- informed as the group of people in the office next door. When 
dealing with interest groups which are easily identified snd conveniently 
located, e.g. office staff, a consensus approach may be adopted. This 
attempts to involve all the group members continuously throughout the 
design process. With more diffuse groups, representative participation will 
be required, when representatives of the groups involved meet together to 
put the case for their groups. This will probably lead to the setting up of 
a team of representatives from the present group who are consulted and 
informed regularly by the design team. 
Another important member of the team is the consultant. His role is to 
assist in the process of analysis and change. He i3 not there to control 
the process, as an expert who knows best, but as a guide, encouraging and 
assisting the people themselves to take the decisions. 
The decision-making process which proceeds under the control of such a 
team will be PARTICIPATIVE. The users and affected groups will have 
some say in the decision, and their knowledge is part of the information 
required to take the decision. The consultant's status is diminished, 
therefore, since control over the process is no ionger entirely in his hands. 
He will act as a bridge between groups, an organiser and a guide along the 
path. See Mumford et al (1978). 
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Analysing the problem 
Within the participative framework, communication is very important. 
Members of the design team represent different groups and so they must be 
able to report back to their groups. Also, within the team, everyone must 
understand what the problem is, so that they can communicate effectively. 
Thus, the analysis of the problem is very important. 
The process of analysing the problem follows several steps which may be 
distinguished. However, these steps are not followed in a strict sequence, 
because ideas from later steps often relate back to the earlier steps, which 
may then require revision. The process finishes when the final step has 
been completed, and there appear to be no more changes to be made to the 
earlier steps. 
The steps involved in problem analysis are roughly as follows: 
Problem Recognition 
Perception of Environment 
Listing Objectives 
Let us consider each of these steps in turn. 
Problem Recognition 
Before the design team was set up, the existence of a problem had been 
recognised. The team must now acquaint themselves with the problem. 
This will require an overall understanding of the environment and how the 
problem has arisen. The flow of information and goods within the system 
may have to be explained, so as to initiate new-comers, and fill gaps in the 
knowledge of others. It is important not to become too engrossed in 
measuring precisely the operations of the system because the purpose of 
this stage is to understand and recognise the problem. To assist this, the 
team may undertake such tasks as: 
1) listing the basic operations of the organisation 
2) mapping the flow of information and goods 
3) considering when the roots of the problem lie, 
e.g. when variances (i.e. deviations from ideal 
behaviour) in the existing By stem occur. 
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Perception of the environment 
The purpose of this stage is to understand how the environment determines 
the kinds of solutions of the problem which may be offered. These 
solutions are governed by the constraints which the environment imposes and 
by the solutions' effects upon people. 
Constraints The constraints upon the solutions come from many sources, 
which may be inside or outside the organisation. Internal constraints may 
be limits on the amount of time spent planning and implementing the 
solution and might be considered as objectives. External constraints may 
be legal or government policy restrictions or the influence of public opinion. 
As a generalisation, internal constraints are set by the organisation and are 
within its control and may be more flexible, whereas external constraints 
are set outside the organisation and are beyond its control. This is not a 
hard and fast classification, and it would be wasting effort to decide 
whether a part icular constraint arose from within or beyond the 
organisation. This classification of inside or outside the organisation, 
within or beyond control is intended to assist the design team in 
understanding and generating ideas about the environment in which the 
problem is set. 
People The second aspect of understanding the environment of the 
problem is in its effects upon people. Many different people are involved 
in the day-to-day operation of an organisation, and may be affected by the 
decisions which are made. The employees, shareholders and directors of a 
commercial organisation will have an interest, as will the people who buy 
its product or services. Public organisations must also consider politicians, 
and the public at large may also be affected. Within these broad groups 
are smaller subgroups. These subgroups may be distinguished from one 
another by two things, the impact of the decision upon them and their 
objectives (see below) with respect to the organisation. Thus, two groups 
with the same objectives and who suffer the same impact need not be 
considered separately and may be treated together as one group. 
Particular individuals may find that they belong to more than one group; 
for example, an employee might also use the service his organisation 
provides. Mis objectives may be, in this case, a mixture of the objectives 
of both groups. 
The design team, because it is participative and requires information, should 
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have contacts with as many of these groups as possible, and certainly those 
who are most likely to be affected by a decision. Where possible, a 
member of these high impact groups should be part of the actual team. 
However, there are limits to the workable size of a design team, and some 
team members may feel qualified to play the role of a member of more 
than one group, because of the reasons outlined above. However, 
role-playing of group members should only be undertaken when the number 
of groups is large, and the group concerned is a "low impact" group. 
Where possible, the role-players' judgments should be presented to members 
of the group for ratification and comment. 
To summarise, the stage entitled "Perception of the Environment" requires 
the decision-making team to examine constraints which the environment 
places upon them, and to consider the groups of people who will be 
affected by the decision and how to obtain their involvement and 
co-operation. 
Listing Objectives 
In the previous section, different groups were distinguished by the different 
impacts they suffered and by their different sets of objectives. We will 
consider these objectives next. 
The purpose of listing objectives is to clarify the needs of the groups. 
When we come to the step of evaluating solutions to the problem, we will 
need some means of assessing the benefits of its implementation. 
Estimating its effect upon these objectives gives us the means of 
comparing alternatives. 
How are these lists of objectives generated? Once the previous two steps 
have been considered, many objectives may have come to mind. Studying 
the problem will show up faults in the system, and groups may see the 
correction or improvement of these faults as some of their objectives. 
Looking at the interest groups and their attitudes towards how things 
should be changed will suggest more objectives. 
At this stage it will become apparent that there are different levels within 
the organisation's objectives, so that they form themselves into a 
hierarchy. For example, the objective 
"Provide opportunity for cultural development" 
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may be broken down into objectives at a lower level such as 
"Preserve historic sites and areas of natural beauty" 
"Provide adequate public libraries, museums and 
cultural activities" 
"Protect meaningful local tradition and encourage 
civic pride" 
Similarly, it may be clear that a group of objectives may be grouped 
together under a single, broader objective. 
Generally though, it will be found that the hierarchy is developed from the 
top downwards. Starting off with a broad objective, such as "Improve the 
quality of life", which is so vague to be unworkable, we can list the 
objectives which contribute towards this, and decompose each of these 
objectives in turn. 
The outcome of this step should be a list or a hierarchy of objectives for 
each group. There are no restrictions upon the type of objectives which 
are stated, simply that they are relevant to that group. The objectives 
may be quantitative or qualitative in nature, e.g. 
"Reduce queuing time by half" 
or 
"Preserve attitude of trust between managers and 
secretaries" 
Some groups may tend to state their objectives as vague, higher-level aims, 
and some groups' objectives will be very much concerned with changes in 
specific day-to-day activities. 
The tree-structuring of objectives is not essential, some groups may prefer 
a simple list. The choice between tree or list will depend upon the 
complexity of the problem and the feelings of the group concerned. 
How do we know when the list of objectives is complete? At this stage 
in the analysis that is difficult to answer. We have already seen how past 
steps can influence the present step and how it, in turn, feeds back new 
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ideas to previous steps. It may be that a set of objectives which appears 
to be complete may tum out later to have some serious omissions. It is 
easy, at this stage, to "err on the side of caution" and include more 
objectives than are necessary. To avoid this fault, ask if the decision is 
likely to be altered if this objective were not included in this list. In 
other words, how significant is this objective in comparison with the most 
important of the other objectives? If it seems completely insignificant and 
unlikely to have an effect on the final decision, then it may be safely 
excluded. As a rough guide, lists of objectives should contain no more 
than about a dozen, and each branch of a tree should branch in turn to no 
more than about five or seven sub-objectives. 
Comment 
So far, the analysis of the problem has concentrated on studying the issues 
in some depth. We may emphasise two points: 
1) the iterative nature of the analysis. Each stage leads on 
from the previous stage so smoothly that the beginning of 
one stage becomes blurred into the end of the previous 
stage. Each stage may feed back or feed forward into 
other stages. To avoid spending too much time on this 
process, some "indicators of adequacy" have been built in. 
2) the learning process involved. Since the decision-making 
team are acquiring information for their own use and not 
for passing on to outside analysts, they must become 
engaged in a process of learning and understanding. The 
mixture of groups is intended to encourage a pooling of 
knowledge and i n s i g h t , and the members of the 
decision-making team should learn from one another. 
Uncertainty 
At this beginning of this paper, we identified three components of the 
complex decision. Two of these, many objectives and many groups, have 
already been introduced during the phase labelled "Analysis of the Problem". 
We must now consider how to cope with uncertainty. 
When a decision-maker has to forecast future events, he is bound to meet 
uncertainty. He may have a greater or lesser amount of confidence in 
which state of nature will prevail. His attitude towards implementing a 
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particular act will often depend upon its riskiness, i.e. the amount of money 
he stands to lose-or the disruption which may occur. Willingness to take a 
risk will depend as well upon the decision-maker's present position. 
Not all uncertainty is due to an inability to predict the future. Some 
uncertainty also arises from a lack of knowledge about the present position. 
In the case of objectively mesurable quantities, this uncertainty could be 
eliminated by measurement, but if the quantity is subjective, then there is 
bound to be imprecision. Just as a decision-maker may be more or less 
confident in his judgements on probability, so he may be uncertain too in 
his judgment on the quality of subjective attributes. 
Discussions on subjective attributes are possible using words, whereas 
attempting numerical measurements may be time-wasting and misleading. 
It is well-understood to say that "John is good", but it soon becomes 
fruitless to argue what measurement John's behaviour deserves on a 10 point 
sca le , whether he should be given 7, 8 or 9 points, and to how many 
significant figures the statement is accurate. 
When such numerical assessments of subjective qualities are obtained, it is 
an easy step into the trap of according a spurious, scientific objectivity to 
them, and attempting to apply to them the common arithmetic operations. 
However, such numbers are only a crude representation of subjective ideas, 
and it would be misleading to mix them with genuinely objective 
measurements. 
To avoid this confusion, we may take the unusual step of recommending two 
ways of representing decision-makers' feelings about quantities. Where the 
quantities are objective, they may be measured numerically, and where we 
are considering subjective "quantities", they may be assessed verbally. The 
natural method of expressing uncertainty about the future, where objectively 
measurable, is by using probability theory, and where uncertainty is only 
intuitive or internal to the decision-maker, it may be expressed using words. 
For example, we may draw up a probability distribution to show the 
probabilities of different numbers of people being out of work in six months 
or a year's time. However, if the prediction was for 10 years from now, 
the probability distribution would be much harder to draw, because of the 
unknown effects of many possible events in the meantime. Hence, the 
uncertainty about the probability distribution will grow, until it may become 
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difficult or impossible to convey information this way. Probability is no 
longer objectively measurable, but relies upon a succession of subjective 
impressions of the likelihood of events. It might be more informative, and 
a better admission of the uncertainty involved, to say instead: 
"It is very likely that unemployment will double in 
the next ten years" 
whereas it might be quite reasonable to say: 
"There is a 50% chance that unemployment will 
increase by 5% in the next 6 months" 
Uncertainty is a very special attribute of any design strategy. We have 
discussed the problems involved with treating it objectively, and how the 
decision-maker's attitude is very important. We shall propose a special 
means of handling it later, but at this stage uncertainty must be recognised 
as inevitable. Further investigations and analyses may reduce it, but it 
may not always be worthwhile to spend money to reduce uncertainty. 
These problems will be considered later. 
Assess the Status Quo 
This is the next stage in the decision analysis, after the Analysis of the 
Problem. Again, this stage consists of a number of substages, which will 
be discussed separately. These are: 
Define vocabularies 
Measure the status quo 
State the ideal solution(s) 
Define vocabularies 
This stage is necessary because we have removed the assumption that 
everything must be expressed in numbers. The language of numbers had 
been always used, but, having recognised its inadequacy for many purposes, 
we must devise some more suitable vocabularies. 
The purpose of numbers was to assiBt in the process of measurement -
measuring the importance of objectives, measuring progress towards them 
and measuring the resulting "utility". These new vocabularies must fulfil 
similar purposes and should be chosen with this in mind. 
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For example, if the problem is to choose which camera to buy, the 
decision-maker may be concerned with such objectives as: 
1) the camera should be small and light 
2) the camera should use the cheaper types of film 
3) the camera's reliability should be high 
Each of these three objectives refers to one or more "performance 
variables" of the camera. The performance variables are attributes of the 
desired solution. The objectives place a desired value upon the level of 
the performance variable, and each alternative solution will fulfil the 
objective, i.e. measure against the performance variable more or less well. 
In this example the performance variables might be: 
la size 
lb weight 
2 price of film type required 
3 reliability 
In some cases, e.g. 3, the objective may actually mention the attribute or 
performance variable directly, but in other cases, e.g. 1, a measurement or 
desired level may be stated, and so the underlying performance variable 
may be deduced. 
Now,a vocabulary must be chosen which will assess performance along the 
attribute. For "size" the vocabulary might be: 
Via (tiny, small, medium, large) 
or, for weight, the vocabulary could be: 
Vlb (light, comfortable, heavy) 
Since the size and weight of a camera are closely connected, as the 
objective suggests, the chosen vocabulary for Objective 1 might be: 
VI (good, fair, inadequate) 
The performance variable would now bo something like "handlness", to 
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embrace the connected concepts of "smallness" and "lightness". It is true 
that a large camera tends to be heavier and small cameras are light, so we 
may refer to the camera's overall handiness. 
The size and weight of a camera could have also been assessed using 
numerical values of the performance variables. Size may be measured 
using all three dimensions of the camera, length, width and depth, and the 
weight could have been measured in grams. These methods are equally 
valid, particularly when assessing amounts of money, and are particularly 
useful when communicating between groups, where the meaning of terms 
such as "small" may be different. However, we are concerned primarily 
with the decision-makers' perception of the alternatives, and they may not 
perceive a great d ist inct ion between 250g and 270g. A g a i n , 
over-precisiation can distract from the learning process. The vocabulary 
should reflect those variations along the performance variables which are 
perceptible and sufficient to cause a change in the desirability of that item. 
It will often be the case that the l ist of adjectives set up as the 
vocabulary will not be sufficiently fine to express all the perceived 
distinctions. For example, two items may both be described as "small" yet 
one is obviously smaller than the other, although not small enough to be 
described as tiny. We can extend the basic vocabulary, and structure its 
use, by introducing additional words such as "very", "not", "and", "or", "but", 
etc. Other words may be substituted for those suggested above, but I 
would not recommend using a greater number because their use tends to 
become disorganised and confusion may arise within the group as to the 
meaning of these "modifying" words. 
So, we may describe one alternative as "small" and another as "very small" 
or "very small but not tiny", or, if we wish to express more uncertainty 
about its measurement, "small or very small" where "or" denotes that it 
could be either "small" or "very small" but we are uncertain which. 
The purpose of this stage has been twofold. Firstly to show how to select 
a vocabulary to match each objective, by considering which performance 
variable is involved, and secondly to demonstrate how the use of words may 
be organised, by setting up vocabularies and using a few extra modifying 
words, so as to express feelings carefully and precisely in convincing natural 
English yet avoiding the use of numbers, with its associated pitfalls. 
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Measure the Status Quo 
The purpose of this stage is to consolidate much of the study done during 
the Analysis of the Problem. The existing situation was carefully studied 
and objectives set up. Each objective has a vocabulary associated with it, 
and we may now use these vocabularies to assess the status quo, by 
estimating verbally how well it fulfils each objective. This stage will 
clarify the status quo and may feed back to earlier stages of the Problem 
Analysis. It will also test the suitability of the vocabularies and how easy 
they are to use. 
In some decisions, no status quo may exist, e.g. a decision-maker may wish 
to buy a car, camera or calculator, or select a school for a child, but he 
does not own one of these items, or has never sent a child to school 
before. In this case, the stage of measuring the status quo is inapplicable, 
and the decision-maker should proceed to the next stage. 
State the Ideal Solution 
Tt will have become apparent, during the analysis, that the ideal solution of 
the problem will remain exactly that - ideal and unrealisable. This may 
be for two main reasons. Firstly, what one group perceives as ideal may 
be quite unacceptable to another. The groups have different objectives 
and standards of performance, so that if the ideal solution was to give 
everyone their ideal solution it could never be done. The second reason 
for unrealisable ideals is that the ideal solution is not available. For 
example, a car which is safe, reliable, has a low petrol consumption and 
costs less than £2,000 is not available on the market, and may be 
impossible to produce. The choice wil l have to be made amongst 
alternatives which satisfy the ideal conditions to a greater or less degree. 
The statement of the ideal, together with the measurement of the status 
quo, provides standards for comparing alternatives. 
All that this stage requires is the conception of an ideal alternative and the 
standards of the performance variables it should attain. Having listed the 
objectives, this stage should be straightforward and ensure that the 
vocabularies are adequate and the objectives thorough. 
What about the Analyst? 
During an earlier section, we mentioned that the presence of an analyst was 
necessary as a helper and guide. Although his function has not been 
specified in the last sections, it should be clear that his presence would be 
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h e l p f u l . Each group may have d i f f e r e n t objec t ives , vocabularies, 
measurements of the status quo and ideals. The analyst's job is to assist 
and encourage the groups in their task, ensure their work fol lows the 
guidelines herein and to reassure when the requests seem unusual or too 
d i f f i c u l t or easy. His role is to answer questions on how to apply this 
technique, rather than to control the acquisition and use of information. 
The earlier stage of the Analysis of the Problem would be performed as a 
team of d i f f e ren t group members. During this stage, the groups may 
perceive common areas of agreement, and may choose to proceed with the 
analysis as a team, although agreeing to d i f f e r on the importance of some 
objectives or on their nature. This will have extra advantages later, but 
at present i t w i l l encourage cohesion between the groups, towards a 
common purpose. 
Should the groups decide to set objectives and assess the status quo apart 
from other groups, the analyst must ensure that communication between the 
groups is maintained. This may be done by meetings to compare progress 
and share ideas on alternative solutions, discussions on ob jec t ives and 
at t r ibutes , and any new ideas on the problem or environment, including the 
role of the constraints. 
Preference Rules and the Assessment of Alternatives 
Before considering the mechanics of this next stage, let us review the 
resul ts and work ing m a t e r i a l which is ava i l ab l e . Each group has 
determined what its ideal solution is, and has established vocabularies for 
assessing performance towards each objective. To describe any alternative 
solution f u l l y , its measurement along each of these objectives must be 
supplied. 
The next steps which we shall consider are: 
Rank order the importance of objectives 
Consider hypothetical alternatives 
Devise and describe possible alternatives 
Negotiate between groups 
This last stage is probably the most demanding of a l l , because the 
i n f o r m a t i o n can no longer be obtained f rom the environment and is 
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c o m p l e t e l y dependent upon the judgments and introspections of the 
decision-makers themselves. 
Rank order the importance of objectives 
When considering the status quo, the decision-making group w i l l realise that 
to improve upon i t , it is more important that some objectives be satisfied 
than others. The group should attempt to rank-order the objectives in 
decreasing order of importance. They should consider the present position, 
as it has already been explained, and sort out the pr ior i t ies . We do not 
requi re the o rde r ing of the p r i o r i t i e s , given some future t ime when 
achievements may have been made elsewhere, but the present, existing 
priorities of improvement. 
I f the objectives have been arranged in a list, the rank-ordering process is 
straightforward, and operates upon this l i s t . However, if the objectives 
have been s t r u c t u r e d as a tree, the rank-ordering process is sl ightly 
different. Consider Figure 8.1. The highest-order objective is at Level 
1, and several lower-order objectives are at Level 2. Each of these has 
some sub-objectives at Level 3. To rank-order these objectives, consider, 
f i r s t l y , only those objectives at Level 2, and order them, as if they were a 
simple list. When that is done, consider a group of objectives at Level 3 
which branches f rom one Level 2 objective, and rank-order these. Now, 
take another group of Level 3 objectives, all proceeding f r o m Level 2, and 
order these. Proceed in this way through and down the Levels until all 
the objectives have been considered. 
I t is i m p o r t a n t to real ise tha t the hierarchical arrangement of the 
objectives is to assist the decision-maker in structuring his ideas, and for no 
other reason. The level at which an objective occurs within the hierarchy 
does not necessarily determine its importance. For example, in Figure 1 
"Decrease number of deaths" may be seen as a more important objective 
than "Improve standards of road surfaces". This is not apparent f r o m the 
rank ordering, as displayed, but should emerge during the verbal assessment 
of importance. 
Now, i t is not only more or less important to improve upon the standards 
of achievement of the performance variables, but it is also important that 
theso standards do not deteriorate below their present levels to a less 
satisfactory position. For example, a contented s taf f may consider the 






































The numbers in brackets refer to the rank order within that branch 
Figure 8.1 
A Hierarchy of Objectives 
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that i t is very important that their job satisfaction does not fall below its 
existing level. To obtain a more complete picture of the group's at t i tudes, 
they should rank-order the importance of "NOT DECREASING" the present 
levels, as well as the importance of "INCREASING" those levels. 
We should now have two lists of rank-ordered objectives. Rank-ordering on 
its own provides no information on the separation or distance between the 
impor tance of the objec t ives . Some may be very closely spaced in 
importance and others well apart. This may be represented again using 
verbal assessments. A vocabulary such as: 
(crucial, important, desirable) 
could be used, together with the modifying words "and", "or", "but", "very", 
"not" listed earlier. 
Two ef fec ts may be observed in practice if the group has to be polled 
rather than consulted directly. The f i r s t is that there is a tendency for 
people to exaggerate the importance of objectives, stating most of them as 
"crucial" or "very, very important". The second, which may be a result of 
the f irst , is that the distribution of responses may be bi-modal. 
The first effect, exaggeration as opposed to genuine strength of convict ion, 
may be checked carrying out a fur ther study. The f i r s t study, a pilot 
survey showing these results, should now be presented as a histogram of 
responses, and fur ther group members polled to see if they agree with that 
finding. It wil l usually be the case that a few individuals are prone to 
exaggeration, and this may show up in their other responses. 
If the distribution of responses is bi-modal, and the effect is not the result 
of exaggeration, then the group may have to be split into two subgroups. 
For example, schoolchildren were asked how important they thought i t was 
tha t t h e i r l oca l pub l ic l i b r a r y should provide study f a c i l i t i e s . Not 
unexpectedly, the result emerged that some thought i t very important and 
some were unconcerned. The group had split into two subgroups, one of 
which liked studying and one which did not. It may be that in iden t i fy ing 
the in te res t groups, the design team unwit t ingly fa i led to distinguish 
between two or more separate groups. The group's perception of the 















Identification of Interest Groups 
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To ensure consistency between the lists, the importance of an objective 
which has been rated on the Improve list as "very important" should be 
compared wi th the importance of the "very important" objectives on the 
Maintain or Not Decrease list. This exercise may prove taxing and need 
not be attempted for more than one or two cases. 
The process will help to structure the design team's thinking and w i l l be 
useful in carrying out the next phase. 
Consider hypothetical alternatives 
By this stage, the design team w i l l have bui l t up a considerable store of 
knowledge and should be ready to consider some hypothetical alternatives. 
Given the measurements of the status quo 'and the ideal alternative, the 
rank-ordered lists of the objectives and some practice, the process of 
determining the quality of each alternative should be fairly straightforward. 
The generation of the hypothetical alternatives may be done in two ways. 
The f i r s t way is to think up a design strategy or select an i tem and 
measure it along each of the performance variables. The second way is to 
vary the leve l of performance of one or two attributes at a t ime to 
produce an alternative which we may not know how to imp lemen t or 
whether it exists. 
For each al ternat ive, the design team should compare i t with the status 
quo, the ideal and any other alternative and state the quality of t ha t 
al ternative under favourable circumstances or its "preferability" as compared 
to the others. 
I t is this part of the process which is different from most other decision 
aids. We have emphasised throughout the impor tance of acqu i r ing 
information and educating the design team or decision-maker to understand 
the issues involved. The problem of multi-objective decision-making is in 
handling the information required to make a reasonable decision. Man's 
information processing capacty is limited, and the burden may be removed 
f rom him by converting much of the information into numbers and using 
m a t h e m a t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s t o p r o c e s s i t . We r e s t o r e t h e 
information-processing burden to the decision-maker because this is the only 
way to overcome the problems which mathematical methods introduce. 
However, to assist the decision-maker in handling the informat ion , the 
process has been organised so tha t the burden is eased and the 
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decision-maker has become more educated and better informed. 
The outcome of this stage should be a "table" of alternatives, each of 
which is measured along each performance variable and has an assessment 
of its quality under optimistic, favourable conditions. This stage is highly 
i t e r a t i v e because the decision-maker may wish to revise earlier t r i a l 
estimates and consider how the rank-ordering of the objectives changes as 
progress is made. 
This "table" may be considered as a list of rules for determining the quality 
of any alternative (as we shall see later) but there is a more fundamental 
and insightful type of rule which may emerge during the consideration of 
hypothetical alternatives. These are known as heuristics. Heuristics are 
usually rules-of-thumb or inexact problem-solving methods, and the word 
"heuristic" is of ten applied to these rules which express an insight into 
human decision-making. Examples of heuristics are: 
If the price is very dear then regardless of 
the other performance variables, that 
alternative wil l never be better than good. 
If the reliability is poor, then that car is 
unacceptable. 
I value accuracy over appearance in every case, 
i.e. if the accuracy of two items is the same, 
then appearance can resolve the preference 
difference between them. 
When i t comes to considering the hypothetical alternatives, the table of 
rules or the heuristics may be buil t up by a number of methods. These 
are outlined below: 
1) by the inc lus ion of a new rule not previously 
considered. 
2) by the removal, replacement or correction of an 
existing rule, which no longer seems correct. 
3) by the addition of an extra performance variable, 
- 206 -
whose performance is important , although hitherto 
overlooked. 
A) by the grouping together of objectives wi th in a 
hierarchy. 
This stage is complete when the table has been f i l l e d to such an extent 
that the preference ordering of test alternatives is correctly obtained by 
interpolating between existing rules, and the decision-maker agrees that all 
alternatives which the rules predict are equally preferred agree wi th the 
decision-maker's own perceptions. Once the rules have been determined, 
the decision-makers are able to assess real alternatives, and are aware of 
their genuine needs. We may now proceed to the next stage. 
Devise and describe possible alternatives 
This stage d i f fe r s f rom the previous stage in that the alternatives are no 
longer hypothetical, but that real, feasible alternatives must be devised. I t 
is probable that some ideas for real alternatives have already emerged from 
the previous stage. I f so, these should be careful ly considered and a 
de ta i l ed plan of t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n drawn up, explaining how the 
estimates of the measurements are obtained and the chain of reasoning 
involved. If ideas on possible alternatives are lacking, then the list of 
objectives may prove stimulating. 
There is no set of instructions which can be given here for devising 
alternatives. The process demands imagination and creativity and an abi l i ty 
to see beyond the t r i v i a to the underlying scheme of things. This was 
encouraged in the earlier phases, in the hope of producing ideas to develop 
at this stage. 
The alternatives may be measured along each performance variable and 
rank-ordered p re fe rence -wise e i t h e r i n t u i t i v e l y by the t r a i n e d 
decis ion-makers or , in the case of more complex problems, wi th the 
assistance of a computer and fuzzy logic. 
By this stage, the decision-making group should have a clear idea of the 
sort of alternative it requires, but the participative decision-making process 
is not yet complete. 
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Negotiate between groups 
When many groups are involved in the decision-making process, their 
perceptions of the ideal alternative may d i f f e r to a large degree, so that 
there would appear to be no solution which can be adopted to please all. 
The participative approach tries to prevent such intransigent stalemates 
from occurring by 
1) encouraging communication between different groups 
and between members of the same group. 
2) encouraging the exchange of information and ideas 
throughout the decision-making process. 
3) encouraging groups to recognise and understand the 
objectives of other groups whom they may not have 
previously understood. 
I t is hoped that as the decision-making process proceeds, the similarities 
between groups w i l l emerge, rather than their differences. Personal 
r ivalr ies sometimes exist between groups, so that an alternative which would 
otherwise be deemed acceptable is rejected because another r iva l group 
accepts i t too. I f such attitudes can be brought into the open by such a 
process of analysis , then we may achieve some progress t o w a r d s 
co-operation and mutual benefit. However, if these attitudes are supported 
by stubbornness and obduracy, then no further progress can be made. The 
part ic ipat ive approach to decision-making is founded upon a belief that 
co-operation is possible and to everyone's ul t imate benefi t . I f any group 
does not accept this belief, then the part icipat ive approach fa i l s and 
decision by confrontation and conflict will result. 
The f ina l step of the part icipat ive decision-making approach advocated 
herein is to consolidate communication between groups and agree upon a 
selected al ternat ive. If communication between the groups has been by 
consensus throughout the process, and the design team has remained in tac t , 
then this step w i l l not be necesary. Each group should now have a set of 
objectives and a "table" of rules which describes its attitude towards several 
alternatives. 
During this step, groups may be able to exchange ideas on alternatives 
which other groups had not thought of. Eventually, an alternative should 
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emerge which is acceptable to a l l the groups. The details of the 
alternative may require re-negotiation, but its broader effects and f u l f i l m e n t 
of particular objectives should be identifiable. 
In addition to the decision-making rules to describe their a t t i tude towards 
alternatives, groups may have higher level rules which describe how their 
attitudes towards an alternative may depend upon other groups' opinions. 
For example, a less than perfect alternative may become preferable over an 
apparently better alternative if it is seen to benefit a less fortunate group. 
This "al t ruism" between groups is an important aid towards negotiation, as 
opposed to the attitudes of conflict discussed earlier. 
Thus, the final part of the analysis may require the groups to examine their 
attitude towards one another. 
The output of this stage should be a design plan or strategy which suits all 
groups and fulf i ls the various objectives as well as possible. Equally, the 
ou tpu t should now be an "educated" group of decision-makers who 
understand the organisation, its environment, the objectives and motivat ion 
of other groups, as wel l as the factors which exert a deciding influence 
upon their own behaviour. 
How to handle uncertainty 
A t the end of the previous section, the decision-making team should have a 
list of possible alternatives and an optimist ic estimate of the quality of 
that al ternative. Negotiation with other groups may have reduced this list 
to one alternative only, but if this is not the case, then we must introduce 
uncertainty as an extra decisive attribute of each alternative. 
The decision-making team is required now to estimate the likelihood of each 
alternative achieving the desired result . This may be contingent upon a 
number of factors , such as good s taf f reactions, no sudden, unexpected 
market changes during implementation, etc. It is helpful to write down 
the favourable conditions necessary to achieve the desired result. The 
estimation of likelihood may be, as desired, numerical or verbal, in the 
manner outlined in the section "Define Vocabularies". 
In that section, we examined the nature of uncertainty and saw how it 
arose from two sources. One iu duo to the dociaion-rnuker'a own feelings 
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and may be labelled fuzzy. The other is due to an inevitable lack of 
knowledge about the future and may be labelled stochastic. I t is the 
second type of uncertainty which we shall consider now. 
The stochastic uncertainty may also arise f rom two sources which l i e 
roughly wi th in or beyond the control of the organisation. Those variables 
which are within the organisation's control are more predictable, in the 
sense that the organisation has better knowledge of them. The behaviour 
of those variables beyond its control may be completely unknown and may 
even be treated as random. 
To reduce u n c e r t a i n t y , the organ isa t ion w i l l need to acquire more 
information. The participative design process is one way of doing this, 
because i t supplies more information about and from the people affected by 
the decision, and should make their behaviour more predictable, although i t 
w i l l never be completely certain. Another way of acquiring information, 
particularly about those external variables beyond the organisation's control , 
is to employ external advisers to assess the future possibilities. Since 
these advisers must be paid, i t is important to know how much money 
should be invested to reduce uncertainty in this way. 
In order to decide whether or not to employ ex t r a outside he lp , the 
decision-making team must consider their attitude towards risk, with respect 
to the available alternatives. Do they prefer the less good al ternative 
which w i l l not be af fec ted by external factors, or do they want to try the 
very promising alternative which will only succeed if everything goes well? 
If they decide upon the stable alternative which is very likely to achieve 
fairly good results, then it would not be necessary to employ a consultant. 
If they want to consider the risky alternative the question is now: 
"This alternative w i l l achieve very good results only if cer ta in 
conditions prevail . We are uncertain, but think these conditions 
may exist. An external consultant can reduce our uncertainty by 
supplying extra informat ion . His fee is x $,000. Is the extra 
b e n e f i t which we are l i k e l y to gain i f we implement t h i s 
alternative worth spending x $,000, given that the consultant too 
may recommend the stable alternative?" 













He recommends It works 
poorer strategy — — ~ good 
- x $,000 
Do not hire Implement It works 
consultant 1 poorer strategy good 
Figure 8.3 
Is the Consultant worth it? 
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The problem of whether or not to hire the consultant has reduced t o a 
lottery. Each decision-making team member should try to make the binary 
choice of hire or not hire, given the consultant's fee and reputation. Each 
team member will have his own estimate of the likelihood of the various 
events, and opinions of the value of the alternative strategies. A simple 
ballot amongst the team members may be necessary to decide which course 
of action to pursue. Should this consultant be rejected, the procedure 
could be repeated for another consultant, with, perhaps, a lower fee and a 
less good reputation. 
Th i s so r t of p r o b l e m is u s u a l l y t r e a t e d so as to maximise the 
mathematically expected value. That requires placing a numerical estimate 
of value upon each of the possible outcomes and numerical estimates of the 
probability of each event. However, the values are subjective and the 
probabilit ies uncertain, so the mathematical expectation cannot be used. 
(This is probably true in most cases, if it were admitted.) 
Let us now assume that uncertainty has now been reduced as far as is 
reasonable. The decision-makers must now consider the available uncertain 
alternatives and consider how to trade-off between the possibility of a very 
good result and the certainty of a not very good result. This sort of 
behaviour is, again, likely to be rule-based, except that two attributes only 
are being considered, but very important ones. 
This phase is l ikely to be very dif f icul t if there are many alternatives, but 
should be fairly clear if a small number of carefully studied alternatives are 
being considered. I t is hoped that the previous stages will have reduced 
much of the uncertainty which derives f r o m lack of knowledge and 
unnecessarily unpredictable aspects. But the decision-makers' own attitudes 
towards risk are under the microscope now. 
Implementation 
The purpose of in i t i a t ing any decision-making process is not to educate the 
decision-makers but to make a decision! Once this decision has been 
m a d e , i t must be i m p l e m e n t e d , and the r e spons ib i l i t i e s of the 
decision-makers must carry over to this phase too. There are two main 
reasons for this. 
The f i r s t is that during the implementation, revision of the decision-makers' 
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specif icat ion may be necessary. Swift changes may have to be made, and 
so the groups or their representatives may need to be consulted rapidly. 
The groups' tables of rules may be useful here, but the implementors ought 
not to consult them without the help of group representatives, since they 
may make errors of understanding otherwise. Any change in plans should 
be communicated back to the group, together with the reasons. 
The second reason, connected wi th the first , is to ensure the co-operation 
dur ing i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the groups i n v o l v e d . Thei r ro le in the 
decision-making process should have been apparent and so should the reasons 
for accepting and implementing this alternative. The choice of a part icular 
alternative may have depended upon the favourable reaction of interest 
groups, and for the alternative to be a success, the reactions should be as 
expec ted . The decision-makers have a responsibility to assist during 
implementation in order to justify their choice. 
Implementation is a neglected area of the decision-making process, and by 
maintaining the participation of the interest groups during this phase, we 
would hope for more success. 
PARTICIPATION AND THE R O L E OF THE ANALYST 
In this section we shall consider how some of the problems facing the 
'participative analyst* may be resolved by adopting such an approach to 
decision-making as has been suggested herein. 
But firstly let us define some terms. By 'par t ic ipat ion ' we refer to the 
involvement of users f rom many levels in the design and implementation of 
a system. Their opinions and knowledge, together wi th the impact of the 
system on their day-to-day or working l i fe , must be taken into account. It 
is believed that the extra e f f o r t required for such a design process is 
wor thwhi l e for a number of reasons, some of which have already been 
mentioned (See also Mumford, 1978). 
i 
The 'analyst' in the part icipat ive design process is the person who directs 
the process and who instructs the design group in the use of the tools 
available to them. The role of thu analyst in participative design is very 
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d i f fe ren t f rom that which he usually assumes. Since the knowledge and 
skills of the users are being used, the analyst's own ideas on how the 
organisat ion 'is* or (worse s t i l l ) 'ought to be1 run must be deliberately 
avoided. The analyst's own value system has no place in the process. 
This implies a downgrading of the analyst from the 'expert' to the 'guide1. 
I f design is to become truly p a r t i c i p a t i v e , and be seen to be t r u l y 
par t ic ipat ive , then the control of the design process must be with the users 
involved and not wi th the analyst. So long as control is l e f t wi th the 
ana lys t , there w i l l be fears tha t par t ic ipat ion is nothing more than 
manipulation with a smiling face. To avoid these accusations, we must 
look at ways in which the control over the design or decision-making 
process is retained by the analyst. To do this, we must consider not just 
the meta-problem (Select an al ternative) but also the meta-meta-problem 
(Select a technique). See Chapter 2. Participative problem-solving allows 
the users to suggest alternative methods of solving the problem, but may 
only offer a prescribed method of selecting between the alternatives, i.e. 
solving the meta-problem. We should look at the process of selecting the 
technique to choose between alternatives. The process might appear to 










The decision-making technique is a black box which al lows c e r t a i n 
' p a r t i c i p a t i v e ' inputs in the form of weights and scores, but of fe rs no 
control over the machinery within. Hence, at this level , the part ic ipat ive 
design process is essentially normative. 
The techniques which we advocate are intended to give the participative 
decision-maker more say about the machinery wi th in the black box. He 
should be able to state his own decision-making rules, and set his own 
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standards of behaviour. The decision-makers should be given control over 
the meta-problem solver too, i.e. selecting their own decision-technique. 
One can always take the argument one step further back and point out that 
the decision-maker is still unaware of the method whereby a computer can 
accept these rules and predict decision-making behaviour, and that this is a 
stage that only a small number of highly skilled decision-makers could 
aspire to unders tand. This is t r u e , but we would hope tha t the 
decision-maker would never need to. The computer is not intended to 
replace the decision-maker, but to act as a decision aid, in its truest 
meaning. The computer should enable the decision-maker to discover his 
own decision rules, and train him in their use, so that as the decision-maker 
learns and becomes competent, so the computer is replaced. 
Thus, the analyst must not bring to the part icipat ive design process a 
prescribed meta-problem-solving technique, but only the m e t a - m e t a -
problem-solving technique, since it is, by definition, the participative design 
team who must provide the ideas to solve the problem. The analyst should 
f ind himself in the background, but s t i l l w i th an important role to play. 
No longer should he be the controller, but a guide and educator. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show how complex decisions can be 
made in an ordered manner. The informat ion involved may be handled 
s imply and naturally, without unnecessary recourse to numbers. The 
participation of the interest groups involved is encouraged so as to reduce 
the uncertainty involved in predicting their reaction to change, and to use 
information and experience which would not have otherwise been available 
to the decision-maker or design team. This philosophy has two other 
effects: the reduction in status and control of the consultant to assistant 
and guide rather than ult imate decision-maker, and the education of the 
decision-making team and groups in the operation of the organisation and 
values, objectives and pr ior i t ies of the groups. Rather than the analyst 
providing norms for decision-making, the interest groups are required to 




Some of the ideas which have been presented in earlier chapters have been 
subject to practical trials. These experiments wil l be described separately, 
together with the conclusions which may be drawn. 
THE ICI SECRETARIES 
The secre tar ies at Fulshaw H a l l , ICI's Central Management Services 
Department, operate a word processing system. They were invited by their 
top management to design the system, since it would be their responsibility 
to operate i t , and to decide what the role of the secretary should be in 
this service. Enid Mumford f rom the Manchester Business School was 
called in to help them with their enquiries. They took a detailed look at 
the responsibil i t ies of secretaries and how they distributed their t ime 
between word processing machines and typewriters. They already had two 
word processors but f e l t t ha t the work was not organised round the 
machines as efficiently as it could be, and neither the secretaries nor their 
clients, the managers, were satisfied with the arrangement. 
The design objectives were to increase the secretaries' job satisfaction and 
ef f ic iency while at the same t ime e f f ec t ive ly meeting the needs of the 
managers who were their clients. 
The secretaries had already visited other ICI Departments which had word 
processing systems to see how these were organised. They had prepared a 
questionnaire so as to standardise the information which they obtained from 
all the departments. By this stage, they were fa i r ly sure what they 
wanted in their own system, and what they wanted to avoid. I was kindly 
invited to work with the group for one day, and we proceeded to detai l 
more carefully the secretaries' needs. 
For the purposes of goal setting, the secretaries' needs were divided into 
Job Satisfaction noods und Eff ic iency noods. A careful dist inct ion was 
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made between the impor tance of maintaining the goals' performance 
objectives at their present levels and the importance of improving above the 
present levels. This idea was easily explained to the secretaries, and they 
were very quick to understand and draw up the two l i s t s . (The 
information obtained is presented in an Appendix to this chapter.) The 
next exercise was for the secretaries to guess what the objectives of the 
managers were. These were wr i t t en down and later, when the managers 
were called in, they were told that this had been done. They were asked 
to write down what their objectives were, and at the end of the afternoon, 
the two lists were compared. I t was found that the two l i s t s were 
essentially the same, although the managers expressed their objectives in 
more general terms, whilst the secretaries were more concerned w i t h 
day-to-day matters, wi th which they were directly concerned. This had 
the purpose of ident i fy ing areas of potential con f l i c t , and to everyone's 
satisfaction, there were none. 
From this exercise, the conclusions were firstly, that without the restriction 
of the objectives being measurable, they tended to be very subjective and 
concerned wi th such highly important and subjective aspects of work as 
'trust'. The second main conclusion was that the asymmetry of weights 
was obvious and readily accepted and estimated. The rank ordering was 
expressed verbally, which gave more informat ion than the usual numerical 
rank ordering, because the secretaries were able to cross-check between the 
list of efficiency and job satisfaction lists and between the improve and 
maintain options. 
1 was not able to participate further in this problem, but in the final report 
of the analysis, the list of objectives which we obtained was used. The 
next stage was the setting up of alternatives and comparing them. A 
decision was reached and the analysis is now complete. 
UNDERGRADUATES AND THE LIBRARY 
As part of their degree course, some undergraduates were to undertake a 
systems analysis of the University Library, • system with which thoy were 
already familiar. For three hour-long sessions, I worked wi th u group of 
about eight. 
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We began by l is t ing the unit activities which they da in the library - every 
activity which consumes their time. See Table 9.1. 
The next step was to define the objectives of the library, so as to improve 
the lot of undergraduates. These goals were chosen, again avoiding the 
use of numerical measurements. See Table 9.2. 
We proceeded to examine each goal separately, and defined a vocabulary 
wi th which to describe each goal. The present level of each performance 
variable was written down and the desired fu ture level . A t this point i t 
was clear that the students realised the importance of precision in the 
setting of the vocabularies, and the definition of the words which they used 
in terms of one another. There was a fair degree of consensus within the 
group on the meaning of words, and where disagreement arose, they sett led 
the issue by discussion. See Table 9.3 for this stage. 
Our next exercise was to rank order the goals in terms of their importance. 
This rank ordering was again done verbally. We distinguished between the 
improving and maintaining options once more, see Table 9.4. In order to 
tes t the v a l i d i t y of t r u t h funct ional modif ica t ion , the students were 
presented with a page (see the Appendix) which asked them to be mare 
precise about their present feeling about the overall library service. This 
exercise showed that some people upheld truth funct ional modi f ica t ion , but 
some did not. See Table 9.5. 
The f i n a l stage in the exercise was to study b r i e f l y the available 
alternatives and to try to assess their impact on the goals which had been 
la id down. This stage was hurried and not investigated as fu l ly as it 
ought. However, a few systems were measured verbally, and i t soon 
became apparent which areas of their present knowledge required further 
investigation. See Table 9.6. For example, on the problem of security, 
i t was not known what p r o p o r t i o n of the present losses was due to 
deliberate t h e f t , and what proportion was due to accidental loss. To 
accurately assess the impact of a secure system on overall losses, it is 
necessary to know what the e x i s t i n g reasons f o r loss are, and th is 
information is not provided at present. 
Despi te the short t i m e which could be devoted to this study, a few 
interesting conclusions emerged. It was clear that we were able to think 
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Finding books - i n catalogue 
- on shelves 
F i l l i n g i n forms - Short loan 





S i t t i n g down to work 
Retrieving pinched books 
Climbing s t a i r s 
Table 9.1 
A c t i v i t i e s i n Library 
1) Immediate finding books for essay w r i t i n g 
by subject or 
by author or 
by t i t l e 
2) Improve security 
3) Signing out books less tedious 
4) Good opening hours 
5) Better r e c a l l , i.e. quicker and more certain 
6) More books 
Table 9.2 
Goals of Library 
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Measuring the Goals 
4) Opening hours 
9 a.m. - 1 p.m. 1-5 p.m. 5-7 p.m. 
present desired 
level level 
Term a l l a l l 
Week before a l l 9-5 term starts 
Out of term 9-5 9-5 
7-10 p.m. 
2) Security 







3) Signing out books 
Vocab: tedious = time-consuming 
Present level 
tedious but not not 
very tedious and 
fun 
and boring and involving w r i t i n g 
Desired 
tedious at a l l 
avoid w r i t i n g , 
( d not boring and 
not much r e s t r i c t i o n 
on time-consuming ) 
1) Find a book i n catalogue by subject f a i r l y easy 
t i t l e very d i f f i c u l t 
author easy 
Find a book on shelves i n l i b r a r y easy 
(assuming i t is i n the correct 
position) 
d i f f i c u l t 3 not easy 
- 220 -
5) Recall 
2 c o n f l i c t i n g viewpoints - the person who recalls a book, 
re c a l l e r , and the person from whom the book i s being recalled, 
recallee. 
Only one person i n the group had ever recalled a book, and 
so a measure could not r e a l l y be made. 
6) More books 
2 ways of extending c o l l e c t i o n by greater variety 
or by more duplicate copies 
present 
level i d e a l l y 
variety good very good 
duplication bad very good 
Table 9.3 
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More books (duplicated) 
Less tedious signing out 








5 Better r e c a l l 
Importance of NOT decreasing, i.e. maintaining at present level 
6 More books 
4 Opening hours 
3 Signing out 
1 Finding books 
2 Security 




No. Statements Truth Value Subject's Remarks 
1 good 
f a i r l y good 
2 f a i r l y good 
3 f a i r l y good 
f a i r l y bad 
4 good 
f a i r l y good 
5 f a i r l y good 
6 good 
f a i r l y good 




f a i r l y good 
f a i r l y true 
true 
f a i r l y true 
true 
true 
f a i r l y true 
true 




f a i r l y true 
almost f a i r l y good 
Table 9.5 
Truth Functional Modification Tested 
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ELESSEY 
Telepen system - books are barcoded. 
Information can be stored online or on cassette f o r batch input. 
System only registers withdrawn books, not the whole catalogue. 
No security against t h e f t . 
Library needs r e s t r i c t e d e x i t passage - e.g. t u r n s t i l e . 
Batch system represents no improvement - need online system with 
manual back-up, not using NUMAC. 
Changes to Goals 
(1) No change. 
(2) Accidental loss - no change. 
Deliberate dishonesty - improved to secure. 
(3) Not tedious at a l l . 
(A) No change. 
(5) S l i g h t l y more certain. 
No change i n speed since rate determining factor i s beyond 
librar y ' s control. 
(6) Makes worse. 
TELEPEN 
As Flessey, but enquiries may be made d i r e c t l y to the system. 
Changes to Goals 
(1) S l i g h t l y better. 
(2) Insecure. 
(3) Not tedious at a l l . 
(4) No change. 
(5) S l i g h t l y more certain. 
(6) Worse. 
Need to know more about costs and the proportions of books lost 
from the l i b r a r y by phantom borrowing and straight t h e f t . 
Table 9.6 
Measurement of Alternatives 
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clearly about the library's activities, and were able to identify areas where 
we lacked information, for example on the problem of losses and on the 
e f f ic iency of the recall service, which only one member of the groups had 
had occasion to use. They did describe the existence of interact ions 
between the importances of various attributes, although i t was not possible 
to write them all down at the time. For example, such statements were 
made as " I don't care about the security so long as the books are on the 
shelves when I want them". They took care over the def in i t ion of the 
vocabularies and realied that precision was necessary. They made their 
own efforts to be consistent, without my prompting and although they knew 
nothing of the fuzzy set representation behind what they said. They knew, 
for example, that 'good' was not necessarily equal to 'not bad', and became 
aware of the complexities of meaning. Due to the lack of time available, 
i t was not possible to perform a comple te analysis of the p r o b l e m , 
evaluating the alternatives according to the statements which were made, 
and to properly obtain the interactions which existed. But, we have 
demonstrated, I think, that the method is feasible, this fa r , and that i t 
seems to be enjoyable and sufficiently searching to be useful. 
THE COMPUTER UNIT AND DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTING 
A further project has been carried out by the author to investigate the 
value of a fuzzy approach. At Durham Universi ty, the Department of 
Computing is housed in the same building as the computer service, known as 
the Computer Unit. They are linked formally as well as physically because 
both entities are under the direction of Dr. John Hawgood. Space is at a 
premium and, wi th expanding degree courses in the Department and heavy 
demand on the Unit's services, some changes w i l l have to be made. This 
is the problem which I investigated. Any changes which could be made 
would have to be far-reaching, and require careful negotiation wi th the 
bodies concerned over a long per iod of t ime . For this reason my 
inves t iga t ion was f a i r l y l o w - k e y , as a f i r s t c y c l e , so as to avoid 
antagonis ing any of the parties involved before negotiations could be 
complete. Also, my purpose was to test the fuzzy approach, and this 
could be done without involving many people, prematurely to the main 
negotiations. 
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Analysis of the Problem 
Apart f rom the Department and Unit, two other entities exist which may be 
affected by the problem, i.e. the University Library and the Department of 
Applied Physics and Electronics. I f the link between the Computer Unit 
and Department of Computing were weakened, there could be a consequent 
strengthening of links between the university-wide services, i.e. Library and 
Computer Unit, and the academic departments of Computing and Applied 
Physics and Electronics, who already run a joint degree course. Individuals 
from the Department and Unit were interviewed separately. 
The environment was analysed through these discussions, looking at the 
interactions which already exist between the four enti t ies , and the s t a f f 
involved. 
An important constraint upon the problem and any possible solutions was the 
lack of buildings. As already mentioned, the Department and Unit share 
the same two-storey building. The Department occupies the top floor, the 
Unit the first floor, and the Unit and Department both have rooms on the 
ground f loor . Off ices have been acquired on Chemistry/Geology roof, 
which causes an undesirable physical separation of the s t a f f , whilst o f f i ces 
in the main building are subject to further subdivision. 
The Department of Applied Physics and Electronics is also phys i ca l ly 
divided, wi th some people housed in the Physics Department. The main 
Aplied Physics building is being extended, wi th o f f ices being buil t on the 
roof, but further extension is probable. It is hoped that the whole Applied 
Physics Department may be brought under one roof. The Applied Physics 
and Electronics Department is also wi l l ing to accommodate Computing 
within the building, but only after all its own staff have been united. 
I shall describe separately the investigations performed within each entity, 
since for reasons mentioned earlier, i t would have been p remature to 
embark upon fu l l , joint discussions. 
The Computer Uni t 
A programming adviser in the Computer Unit very kindly agreed to answer 
my questions, and altogether we spent about 6 hours investigating the 
problem. 
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A f t e r an i n i t i a l discussion of the problem, we proceeded to draw up a list 
of objectives. A preliminary tree was draf ted and then m o d i f i e d to 
produce the tree shown in Table 9.7. There were obvious links between 
the objectives, and the respondent drew the d iagram (Figure 9.1) to 
i l lustrate them. The objectives were rank ordered and their importance 
measured verbally. See Table 9.8. Using a verbal scale, he assessed the 
present performance of the Unit towards fulf i l l ing these objectives. 
We devised two possible alternative strategies for the fu tu re , and described 
these in suf f ic ien t detail for them to be assessed using the verbal scales. 
Briefly, A l involved establishing a complete informat ion service, w i th the 
Computer Unit housed in the Library, as it is now. Some Unit staff would 
have to be housed on Chemistry/Geology roof because of the constraints on 
space. The cataloguing and query services would be expanded and possibly 
computerised. The second strategy, A2, involved no change wi th respect 
to the Library , but weakened the link between the Department and the 
Unit. In this case, the Unit took over the whole building, bringing al l its 
s t a f f together, and instigating other simultaneous policy changes. The 
preference ordering of the three possibilities 
(A2, A l , present) was obtained by evaluating, for each al ternative, the 
fulfilment of the subobjectives, and then combining these to produce an 
overall assessment. The verbal assessments are present in Table 9.9. 
During this analysis, a number of points emerged. Firstly, in producing the 
assessments of future possibilities, the respondent found i t easier to give 
comparisons, e.g. "a bi t better", "a lo t , lot better", rather than stating 
" w e l l " and "very w e l l " . Both sets of responses have been recorded. 
Secondly, where uncertainty of prediction occurred, i t ws easy to state the 
conditions under which one or the other circumstance would prevail. For 
example: 
" I f the r i g h t l i v i n g space is p rov ided , and if the work is 
organised better, then Objective 5 would be f u l f i l l e d very we l l . 
Otherwise, poor working relationships and poor communication so 
that you don't know what you're doing could lead to disaster." 
This seems to me a more constructive way of approaching the evaluation of 
such qualities than using probability estimates of either set of circumstances 
occurring. 
- 227 -
Objectives of Computer Unit 
Broad Objective: 
To provide for a l l the needs of an expanding community of computer 
users as seen now and as can be predicted. To maximise the amount 
of information r e l a t i n g to computing reaching a l l sectors of 
academic pursuits with concern to providing the r i g h t information 
to the various branches of academia. 
Sub-Objectives: 
1. Educate computer users. 
2. Inform the educated users. 
3. Extend the network of computers. 
4. Liaise with other departments, providing information. 
5. Maintain and improve job sati s f a c t i o n . 
Goals: 
la. Review courses to naive users regularly so that they don't 
stagnate. 
lb. Take account of feedback from users i n assessment of courses. 
1c. Branch i n t o undergraduate and M.Sc. teaching and relate 
teaching to specialist areas. 
2a. Inform users of changes i n general software provision, e.g. 
editors, f i l e systems. 
2b. Inform specific user groups of changes which are pertinent 
to them. (Involves keeping records of what particular people 
do.) 
2c. Inform users of new f a c i l i t i e s and new software which may 
replace existing services. 
2d. Maintain standard of day--to-day programming advice. 
2e. Improve standard and amount of documentation. 
2f. Improve cataloguing of documentation with respect to general 
topic books held i n l i b r a r y . 
3a. Provide easy access to computer databases. 
3b. Provide easy access to computers at any university i n country 
and elsewhere. 
4a. Advertise services w i t h i n other departments. 
4b. Advise on problem solving at a level where Unit could recommend 
purchase of departmental systems. 
5a. Maintain f r i e n d l y , relaxed working relationships. 
5b. Improve in-house communication. 
5c. Improve delegation of responsibility and duties to avoid 
areas of neglect. 
5d. Improve feedback from management on assessment of own 
performance. 
5e. Improve feedback from users on individual performance. 
Table 9.7 
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Rank Ordered Goals 
1 Sc Crucial 
2 la Very Very Important 
3 lc lb 4a 5a Very Important 
4 2a 2b 2e 2d Important but not Very Important 
5 5b 4b Important 
6 5b 5e Very Very Desirable 
7 3a 2e Very Desirable 
8 3b Desirable 
9 2f Sort of Desirable 
Table 9.8 
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Sort of Well 
V V Badly 
Alternative 1 
Well (Same) 




Sort of Well (Same) 
V V Badly (Same) 
2a Badly 
2b V Badly 
2c Not Well but 
Not Badly 
2d V Well 
2e Well 
2f V V Badly 
Badly (Same) 
Well (A l o t l o t better) 
Reasonably Well 
(A Small Amount) 
V Well (Same) 
V Well (Really improved) 
V V Well (Tremendous 
improvement) 
Badly (Same) 
V Badly (Same) 
Not Well but 
Not Badly (Same) 
V V Well (Better) 
Well (Same) 
V V Badly (Same) 
3a V V Badly 
3b V V V Badly 
V Badly (Improved) 
V V V Badly to Well * 
V V Badly (Same) 
V V V Badly (Same) 
4a Not Well but 
Not Badly 
4b Not Sure 
Well but Not V Well 
(Improved) 
Not Sure (Same) 
Not Well but Not 
Badly (Same) 
Not Sure (Same) 
5a Well 
5b Not Well but 
Not Badly 
5c Badly 
5d V V V Badly 
5e V Badly 
Bad to Well (Better 
or Worse) 








V Badly (Same) 
* The uncertainty i n this response depends on the improvement of 
delegation to ensure the appropriate e f f o r t to achieve good results. 
The other uncertain responses also depend upon the achievement of 
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The respondent's comments at the end of the analysis were illuminating too. 
He considers himself a wholistic judge of such alternatives, but said he 
might have ended up breaking things down in such a way if he had had to 
make such a decision on his 6wn. The rei terat ive process was useful as 
one thought about the problem. 
On the quest ion of s e t t i n g ob jec t ives and numer i ca l versus verbal 
measurement, he said that it is easy to make measurements of objectives, 
but that linear programming techniques of combining this information are 
not necessarily good guides to making decisions. Such techniques also 
encounter the prob lem of the vagueness of the constraints, and the 
difficulty of evaluating what w i l l happen in the fu tu re . A program to 
process such information would be interesting just to see what emerges, 
rather than as a decision-maker, but a program to handle verbal informat ion 
would be equally interesting. In using the verbal scale, he said that he 
tended to reduce the statements to a sort of numeric code, and in this way 
i t was only another variation on the O(unimportant) - 10(very important) 
type of scale. He did think that the ways in which verbal and numerical 
scales were used are d i f f e r en t . With a numerical scale, each alternative 
could be placed on the scale by considering its merits alone. A verbal 
scale required checking back to remember whereabouts on the scale previous 
alternatives had been placed. 
This last is an in te res t ing point. Numerical scales may be used to 
consider each alternative in isolation because the 0-10 concept remains 
f ixed in one's mind in some sort of 'absolute' sense. The verbal scale is 
less f ixed , and requires constant re - i te ra t ion as the a l t e r n a t i v e s are 
evaluated. So long as the number of alternatives does not grow too large, 
verbal assessment could ensure a useful built-in reiteration mechanism. 
The Department of Computing 
A lecturer in the Department kindly assisted in this investigation. 
Again, we began the analysis by discussing the problem and drawing up a 
tree of objectives. This l ist of objectives involves a large amount of 
interaction between different objectives, in the sense that improving any 
single objective will also cause improvement in many of the others. 
For example, the Department is expanding, w i t h a new l e c t u r e r jus t 
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Objectives of Department of Computing 
Main Objective: 
Improve morale w i t h i n Department. 
Sub-Objectives: 
1 Improve undergraduate teaching. 
2 Improve status of Department from eyes of other 
departments. 
Goals: 
la O f f e r more d i s c i p l i n e s w i t h i n Department by having more 
s p e c i a l i s t s on s t a f f t o provide more v a r i e d courses. 
lb Recognise computing as a l a b o r a t o r y subject and supply 
machines and appropriate s t a f f . 
l c Remove r e s t r i c t i o n s on undergraduate computing time and 
avoid i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h Unit's services. 
Id Improve o r g a n i s a t i o n and communication. 
2a Improve i n t e r f a c e and communication w i t h Applied Physics 
on J o i n t Honours course. 
2b D i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y between Unit and Department. 
Table 9.10 
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appointed, and the f i r s t group of 3rd year students about to join the joint 
Honours course in Computing and Electronics. The informal system of 
in-house communication which was previously effective is becoming less so 
now, as outside Depar tments become i n v o l v e d . A more e f f e c t i v e 
communications system would be desirable, but this must be achieved, as 
far as possible, without disrupting the existing relaxed atmosphere. 
In this case, the overriding objective appeared to be to improve the morale 
of the Department, and the respondent was happy to evaluate alternatives 
on this a t t r ibute alone, without undergoing any fur ther formal analysis. 
One part of the morale is the status of the Department, and already the 
Unit and Department are as one in the eyes of many members of other 
university departments. Thus, the alternatives which are l ike ly to be 
suggested under the problem to be investigated here may be considered with 
respect to their effect on the link between Unit and Department. 
As a f i r s t approximation, two alternatives and the present situation may be 
rated as follows: 
A l Sever completely the link between Unit 
and Department, making the Department 
equal in every respect with all other 
Departments. Very good 
A2 The present position Poor 
A3 The Department and Unit completely 
integrated with teaching done jointly 
by Departmental and Unit staff. Very Poor 
This may seem an over-simplification and I apologise if I do the respondent 
an injustice. However, these statements of alternatives are simple, and 
require fur ther development, wi th respect to how undergraduate teaching 
may be improved. For example, the other main sore po in t w i t h the 
Department is that i t lacks a dedicated machine, properly maintained by 
own technicians. If any of the alternatives involved improvements to or 
deteriorations of the present arrangement, then this would be important in 
determining the success of any strategy. So far , this aspect does not 
appear to have been taken into account in this prel iminary, f i r s t cycle 
evaluation of the alternatives. 
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There are few conclusions which can be drawn from this study, except that 
we observe how a preference ordering may be made using one a t t r ibute 
only. However, I must emphasise that this was not fixed, and that the 
respondent did express a strong willingness to re-consider the problem more 
fully as i t developed in the future. 
THE WORK AT "JOZEF STEFAN" INSTITUT 
I have already mentioned (Chapter 7) the work of Rajkovic and Bohanic at 
the "Jozef Stefan" Institute, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, in developing a computer 
program to help in the construction of £ , and I shall now describe it 
more thoroughly. 
Thei r p rogram, DMP, supports a dialogue between the computer and 
decision-maker, so as to: 
1) define a decision space, 
2) obtain insight and 'utility' construction, § , 
3) evaluate alternatives. 
The emphasis of the program, though, is on the second point. Typically, 
they use 3 to 5 performance variables and about 30 n - tup les . Two 
examples are contained in this chapter's appendix. 
They encourage the decision-maker to provide percentage weights for each 
performance variable, to express their relative importance. In practice 
they f ind this useful as a way of fo r c ing 1 people to think about al l the 
performance variables at once, so as to distribute the percentage weights 
amongst them. 
The group is carrying out a project to compare the results of a fuzzy 
approach with those of a more t r ad i t iona l approach, namely tha t of 
Dujmovic . The problem is on the selection of a database management 
system. A tree of the performance variables has been constructed, end 
one branch of this is being investigated under the two approaches. See 
Figure 9.2 for a skeleton of this tree. Note that there are never more 
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They found that , using the fuzzy approach, i t was not diff icul t to identify 
the partial $ , represented by each branch of the tree. The process of 
aggregation and evaluation was simple and clear. They found that in some 
cases the f u l l £ tables were large, and so general, descriptive rules 
summarising the information would be useful. In comparison, Dujmovic's 
method requires the decision-maker to specify precisely a logical operator 
which aggregates the informat ion . This task ws d i f f i c u l t to perform 
precisely enough, and also prevented backtracking through the analysis, to 
identify the sources of particular results. 
The fol lowing table shows the results obtained by both methods f o r 3 
database management systems. 
Fuzzy Method Dujmovic Method 
(0 - 100) 
DBMS1 very good 70.88 
DBMS2 good 61.51 
DBMS3 very good 68.47 
During the analysis, the Dujmovic method forced them "to cheat" in binary 
situations, where the performance variables required Yes-No answers. The 
values of 0 and 1 were having too great an influence because of the 
continuous logic involved. Mgr. Rajkovic also comments that the f i r s t and 
third are equal under the fuzzy method, which is a more realistic conclusion 
than 68.47 vs 70.88. "Results precise on two decimal figures are stupid." 
To test th is apparent equality is genuine, the fuzzy approach allowed 
backtracking through £ , but the D u j m o v i c method loses a l l such 
information and so this cannot be done. 
Their program is being used to compare the fuzzy and classical approaches 
in a very pertinent test of the methods. Of the examples in the appendix, 
one concerns a group of school teachers who were evaluating computer 
hardware for secondary schools, and in the other, an individual explored his 
decision space prior to purchasing a camera. 
From this work we may conclude that fuzzy information may produce the 
same decision as informat ion which has been prec i se ly measured and 
aggregated. The information is presented in such a way as wi l l allow 
identification of the sources of particular answers. Also, the dialogue is 
reported by users to bo enjoyable and useful. 
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THE DERBYSHIRE COUNTY L I B R A R Y P R O J E C T S 
For a period extending over about none months, I was involved in a project 
wi th some of the staff from Derbyshire County Library. Using the BASYC 
methodology, we investigated the problem of how a branch l ibrary, Long 
Eaton, could be made more a t t ract ive to users. After the departure of 
the Durham team, a further project was set up by the s taf f themselves to 
find the best layout of stock and public service areas at Long Eaton library. 
Some members of the original team were also involved in the second project. 
The fol lowing comments are extracted f r o m a report by K . H . Mantel l , 
Assistant County Librarian, who was involved in both projects. This report 
was presented at a meeting of people involved in other l ibrary projects 
using the BASYC approach and the derived Verbal Assessment techniques. 
"BASYC, Benefi t Assessment for System Change, is of course 
about effecting change, and if I had only two more words wi th 
which to describe i t I would say that i t was about Participation 
and about Measurement. Of both we had fu l l experience in the 
original Durham project. 
"We f u l l y took the point that if change is to be e f fec t ive i t 
should be planned wi th the members of the s ta f f concerned or 
wi th their representatives. We thought that the prescription in 
original BASYC for measuring s taf f sat isfact ion was over-fussy 
and indeed impossible to apply wi thou t the aid of outside 
consultants. And we saw too, experienced too, some of the 
problems of Par t i c ipa t ion : how to secure genuine informed 
articulate representation: how to form an in-group without also 
forming an out-group. That would be an aspect we would have 
in mind in any post-Durham projects. So, Participation. 
"Now Measurement. On this the great claim of BASYC was 
that it enabled you to quantify benefits without necessarily giving 
them monetary values. You determined what your goals were; 
you ranked them; you weighted them, percentage wise , you 
scored the e f f e c t of what you were going to do, you multiplied 
your weights by your scores and you go t you r u t i l i t y 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s . You had a to ta l benef i t . You also had a 
niggling doubt. Had you achieved a false precision? 
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" A f t e r our own project wi th Durham had ended we were very 
glad to hear of a completely alternative method of scoring, using 
verbal assessment rather than numbers. That was something we 
would want to try." 
and on the second Long Eaton project: 
"A l i s t was compiled of service components wi th associated 
benefits, and the second meeting produced a ranking order of 
user goals and s taf f goals. And subsequent meetings tested by 
Verbal Assessment, using Worksheet B5, alternative strategies for 
the layout of Long Eaton library. The Worksheet was found to 
be helpful in ensuring systematic consideration of the e f f e c t of 
each strategy on all the important goals for each group, but in 
fact the team slipped into a quasi-numeric scoring - X, very Y, 
Y, very Y - rather than a purely verbal one. 
"The m e r i t of the whole process was seen to l ie in t h e 
preliminary discussion of objectives and in the detailed subsequent 
discussion of alternative strategies which did generate ideas about 
the layout at Long Eaton which the local managers freely admit 
would not otherwise have been produced. So, perhaps here 
Participation was more important than Measurement." 
The Worksheet B5, to which he refers, is a simple worksheet developed by 
D r . John Hawgood to assist the design team in their assessment of 
alternatives with respect to many objectives. 
Throughout the original Long Eaton project, Mr. Mantell did not express, to 
me anyhow, any doubts about the val idi ty of the Weight, Score, Combine 
approach. However, he has said later that doubts did exist all along. 
The processes of assigning weights and scores meant that a f igure was 
always required. He said that such a decision aid would only be used to 
reinforce a more intuitive decision. If the answers did not look r ight , then 
i t would not make one change one's mind, but instead there was a tendency 
to work backwards adjusting the figures until the answer came out right. 
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The meri t of the approach lay in the structure which it imposed upon the 
discussions - determining groups and objectives and careful ly describing the 
alternatives. The team was forced to think and look more deeply. The 
rei terat ion of the process was very i m p o r t a n t , because ideas were 
continually developing. 
OTHER L I B R A R Y P R O J E C T S 
The idea of verbal assessment has been used within a full-scale investigation 
of the American Library Association Planning Process. Durham Universi ty 
under took an examination of this Process, wi th librarians f rom Public 
Libraries at Sheffield and Islington, under the sponsorship of the Br i t i sh 
L i b r a r y Research and Development Department. The results of this 
investigation are in an unpublished report written by L t -Col . W . E . M . Morris , 
who acted as the analyst in both cases. The studies at Sheffield and 
Islington were carried out separately, in paral lel . A joint meeting was 
held at the conclusion of the project. The analysis in both cases began by 
appointing a design team of staff members to carry out the analysis. 
The Islington team produced a list of 16 Interest Groups, and identified 30 
goals which could be relevant to them. They found i t a d i f f i c u l t task to 
define the relative importance of the goals to the Interest Groups, involving 
much discussion and heart searching. These are the problems usually 
encountered in such role-playing activities. User surveys were carried out 
to reduce this uncertainty, and a number of verbal measures of importance 
were changed before the completion of the second cycle. 
The design team devised three separate strategies which were measured 
using the previously mentioned Worksheet B5. The design team's task was 
complicated by having to combine the opinions of all sixteen I n t e r e s t 
Groups, to yield an overall opinion on the strategy's projected performance. 
However, they were able to decide which groups f e l l into the fo l lowing 
classes: 
(1) S t ra tegy A p r e f e r r e d over Strategy B, both being 
better than Strategy 0. 
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(2) L i t t l e p re fe rence i f any for either Strategy over 
Strategy 0. 
(3) Strategy 0 preferred over both alternatives. 
The second cycle was simplified by reducing the number of groups to 10, 
and using 24 goals instead of 30. A third strategy was devised, and again 
this was compared with the status quo, Strategy 0, using Worksheet B5. 
The Sheff ield team had a similar pattern of behaviour - many groups and 
goals f i r s t t ime around, dissatisfaction wi th role-playing and a survey 
undertaken. This team also benefited from a high degree of involvement 
by local Councillors and community r ep resen ta t ives . The tab le of 
importances for interest groups and goals which they produced is in the 
appendix to this chapter. 
F r o m t h i s s tudy, we see some of the problems and successes of 
participation in decision-making. The recognition of uncertainty by the 
design team in their estimates of importance is very healthy. The fact 
that the analysis could be p e r f o r m e d w i t h o u t the use of n u m e r i c a l 
measurements of importance or degree of f u l f i l m e n t of the objectives is 
encouraging. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The investigations described in this chapter have demonstrated, I believe, 
the f e a s i b i l i t y of such an approach. The t r a d i t i o n a l methods of 
mul t i - a t t r ibu te decision analysis required the input of a large amount of 
information, yet the decision-makers themselves say that the output of such 
techniques would not be used to change their minds away from an intuitive 
decisions, but only to reinforce what they already know. The important 
part of decision-making is in the analysis of the problem, identifying the 
relevant features and the structured discussions wi th in a p a r t i c i p a t i v e 
process. 
Specifically on the fuzzy approach, we have demonstrated the asymmetry of 
weights, the use of verbal measurements, the subjective aggregation of 
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vague information and the learning process involved. There is a tendency 
for verbal assessments to be used as an ordinal measure only, but this 
seems to provide enough information. There is a demand for an automated 
technique, but its design must be influenced by the way in which people 
want to use i t , and not by the particular favoured notions of the designer. 
The analysis seems to have been enjoyable for the participants, and the 




pp.243-248 Notes prepared by ICI Secretaries. 
p.249 Form to test the undergraduates' opinion on the library 
service. 
pp.250-255 Printout from DMP program at "Jozef Stefan" Institut. 
Results of Library Project 
- 243 -
Scale 
These objectives were weighted as follows: Extremely Important 
Very, very important 
Very important 
Quite important 
Weighting of Objectives 
Job Satisfaction 
Working Relationships 
Very important to maintain 
Important not to decrease 
Secretary's Competence 
Very important to maintain 
Extremely important not to decrease, 
(without an acceptable level good working 
relationship cannot exist) 
Work without Supervision 
Fairly important to maintain 
Very important not to decrease 
Promotion Opportunities 
Important to improve 
Important not to decrease 
Job Satisfaction Objectives and Related Factors 
Good Working Relationships Require Trust 
VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN T a k i n B °Ver< j * r t - ° f •• • manager's job 




word processing 2 
typing 4 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT 
NOT TO DECREASE 
IMPORTANT TO INCREASE 
Ab i l i t y to Work without Supervision 
FAIRLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN 
VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
Good Promotion Opportunities 
Maintenance of s k i l l s Very important 
Responsibility 
Trust 
IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
Necessary S k i l l s 
Good Environment 





Committee A agreed that the Secretarial Group had the following job 









Job Satisfaction Objectives 
Ranking 
1 Most 
Good working relationships 1 
* Varied and challenging work 2 
V Responsibility 2 
\ Work without supervision 3 
Promotion opportunities 4 
High level use of s k i l l 5 
Develop new s k i l l s 5 
Help manager by taking over certain parts 
of his job 5 
Secretary provides high quality service for 




Manager can trust secretary's competence 6 




J r Access to word processing machines 
•J \ More word processing machines 
•/ No increase i n centralized control 
(e.g. organics) 
>/ /More knowledge of what w.p. machines can 
( do i n future 
• ^ W.P. machine with capacity for: 
a) Registry 
b) Electronic mail 
c) Producing diagrams 
d) Mathematical calculations 
•J Better accommodation 
«/ / Better planning by authors 
V \ Better presentation by authors 











Weighting of Objectives 
Efficiency 
Access to w.p. machines 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
No increase i n centralized control 
VERY, VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN 
. EXTREMELY IMPORTANT CONTROL DOES NOT INCREASE 
Accommodation 
VERY IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE - B ,. _ _ ' 
•• • "Possible c o n f l i c t area 
VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
Knowledge of word processing capabilities i n general 
(understanding of these) 
(can't be recognized without knowledge) 
_ - QUITE IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE 
IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
Knowledge of capability of wordplex and other machines 
IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE 
IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
Author's planning and presentation of work and knowledge of w.p. 
IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE <r~» 
* POSSIBLE CONFLICT AREA 
VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO DECREASE 
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Committee A's Perceptions of Managers' Objectives 
Job Satisfaction 
JSj—jp Maintain Increase 
To do job to best of his a b i l i t y ' / 
Responsibility for making management decisions • 
Good working relationships with colleagues J 
Promotion opportunities -J 
Varied and challenging work J 
Develop new s k i l l s and knowledge • 
To persuade and influence other people J 
Get sense of achievement J 




Ease of correction with word processing «/ 
Less time required, to check work / 
Fast service / 
'Confidence i n secretary's competence • 
Veil presented reports • 
*» 
Manager able to delegate Job to secretary 
to give himself more time J 
Manager can get information from secretary • 
To have good secretarial service / 
Faster appropriate information to and from 
other groups / 
(by word processor, computer, or telephone) 
Verbal, not written communication to secretary. J 
For typing or word processor and from 
secretary to manager 
? Visual tele conferencing 
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Committee A*s Perceptions of Top Management 
Objectives 
As for managers plus: 
Acquiring necessary resources from ICI 
Running an e f f i c i e n t organization 
Ensuring good relationships between Fulshaw Hall 
and rest of ICI 
Providing job satisfaction for a l l s t a f f 
Making effective policies and setting standards 
Ensuring two way communication between Fulshaw 
Hall s t a f f and ICI top management 
TOP MANAGEMENTS LIST OF THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES 





SCOPE - ACCROSS BOUNDARIES/IMPACT 
INNOVATION 
CORPORATE 
LONG TERM/MISSION/ON GOING/DEVELOPMENT 
SUCCESS 
CAREER PROSPECTS FOR STAFF 
FULSHAW HALL EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY FOR ITS OWN USE 
PRODUCTIVITY AND WORK ENRICHMENT 
FACILITATE LEARNING OF DIFFERENT GROUPS 
EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
WHAT AS WELL AS HOW 
CREATE RESEARCH TYPE ENVIRONMENT 
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OTHER MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
AS DEFINED BY MANAGERS 
TO ENSURE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY 
TO DEVELOP THE CONCEPT OF THE OFFICE OF THE FUTURE 
TO ENSURE THAT TECHNOLOGY IS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCEPT NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS 
TO MATCH RESOURCES TO NEEDS 
TO DEVELOP STRATEGIES TO TAKE THE COMPANY INTO THE FUTURE 
TO PRODUCE AN IMPROVED SECRETARIAL SERVICE 
DEFINITION OF *IMPROVED SECRETARIAL SERVICE* 
TO PROVIDE SCOPE FOR SECRETARIES TO BECOME PART OF THE MANAGEMENT 
RESOURCE 
TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF TYPING - FEWER KEY DEPRESSIONS 
TO HELP DEPARTMENTS TO MANAGE THEIR TIME 
TO OPTIMISE THE USE OF THE BOSS, SECRETARY RESOURCE 
TO ENSURE THE SECRETARY FEELS VALUED 
TO ENABLE LESS TIME TO BE SPENT-DEALING WITH PAPER AND TYPING; 
LESS REDRAFTING 
THE DELEGATING OF TASKS TO THE SECRETARY 
TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY (WORK, ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL) 
TO INFLUENCE THE FUTURE 
TO HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES 
TO UNDERSTAND EMPHASIS AND PRIORITIES 
TO PROVIDE DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND THE TIME TO REALISE THESE. 
SECRETARIES 
TO ENSURE THE WORD PROCESSING PRODUCTIVITY OF:: 
MANAGERS 
- FREE PEOPLE TO IMPROVE THE SERVICE 
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Please I n d i c a t e which of the f o l l o w i n g statements i s most c o r r e c t . 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e I s extremely good. 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s very good. 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s good. 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e ±s f a i r l y good. 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s f a i r l y bad. 
j.he l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s bad. 
rho l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i c very bad, 
9,'he l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s extremely bad. 
i f you f e e l t h a t your t r u e o p i n i o n l i e s somewhere between a p a i r o f 
these statements, t r y the next stage. 
Choose the p a i r o f statements you agree w i t h most: 
The l l b r . r r y s e r v i c e i s 
The l i b r a r y s e r v i c e i s 
Just as we had used a range of 'goodness* t o describe the l i b r a r y 
s e r v i c e , we w i l l use a fsirailfii* range t o describe the t r u t h .of tho 
statements yen. h.-iva chosen. For example,the r a r i j e could be: 
cxtre»fc3.y t r u e very t r u e t r u e f a i r l y t r u e 
Try t o p i c k a ' t r u t h value' t o describe your feeDinge about the 
ti ' u t h o f your chosen statements* 
D E C I S I O N M A K I N G P R O C E S S O l - J l ' L - 7 9 
O p e r a t i n g f i l e : D : E X P E R . D M P / O L D 
U T I L I T Y = COMPUTER HARDWARE S E L E C T I O N FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS - E X P E R T S 
U T I L I T Y K N O W L E D G E C O N S T R U C T I O N 
G r o u p n a m e : E X P E R T S 
F i l e : D : E X P E R . D M U / O L D 
D E C I S I O N S P A C E L I S T 
P S = ( v g o o d f g o o d i a c c > p o o r ) 257. 
C A L = ( v g o o d i g o o d » a c c i p o o r ) 25'/. 
CML= ( g o o d » a c c » p o o r » n o n e ) 15'/. 
A D M I N I S T = ( g o o d » a c c i p o o n n o n e ) 10"/. 
M A I N T = ( n o n e i m i n i a c c i d e m a n d ) 05'/. 
L 0 C A T = ( v c o n v i c o n v i I c o n v ) 10'/. 
P R 1 C E = ( l o w , m e d » h i g h ) 10V. 
U T I L I T Y = ( e x l v g o o d i g o o d i r g o o d i a c c i c o n d a c c m o t a c c ) 
3 2 c o m b i n a t i o n s e n t e r e d . 
L I S T ( A L L ) 
PS CAL CML A D M I N I S T MAINT L O C A T P R I C E 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v low 
U T I L I T Y 
e i 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v med 
v g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v h i g h 
g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e c o n v low 
g o o d 
v i V •nr.ri nr.nn r* s\ n \.' 
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v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d none I c o n v h i g h 
a c c 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d min v c o n v low 
g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d m i n v c o n v med 
v g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d d e m a n d v c o n v h i g h . 
v g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d a c c n o n e v c o n v low 
v g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d g o o d a c c n o n e v c o n v med 
g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d a c c p o o r a c c c o n v med 
r g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d p o o r p o o r n o n e c o n v med 
v g o o d 
v g o o d v g o o d p o o r p o o r a c c v c o n v low 
r g o o d 
v g o o d g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v low 
g o o d 
v g o o d g o o d g o o d g o o d min v c o n v low 
g o o d 
v q o o d a c c a c c a c c d e m a n d v c o n v med 
g o o d 
v g o o d a c c a c c a c c d e m a n d v c o n v h i g h 
g o o d 
g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v low 
g o o d 
g o o d v g o o d g o o d g o o d m i n v c o n v low 
g o o d 
g o o d g o o d g o o d g o o d n o n e v c o n v low 
g o o d 
O O O d O a ? ri f>:>nrl .•; n n rl min w f* f \ n i* 
- 252 - g o o d 
g o o d g o o d g o o d a c c n o n e v c o n v low 
g o o d 
g o o d g o o d a c c a c c m i n c o n v med 
r g o o d 
g o o d a c c g o o d g o o d a c c v c o n v med 
g o o d 
q o o d a c c , a c c a c c a c c c o n v med 
a c c 
g o o d p o o r p o o r p o o r a c c I c o n v med 
c o n d a c c 
a c c g o o d a c c a c c a c c c o n v med 
a c c a c c a c c a c c a c c c o n v med 
a c c 
a c c 
a c c p o o r a c c p o o r a c c . c o n v med 
c o n d a c c 
a c c p o o r n o n e n o n e n o n e c o n v l o w 
c o n d a c c 
p o q r p o o r n o n e n o n e ' m in v c o n v low 
n o t a c c 
D E C I S I O N MAKING P R O C E S S 0 1 - J U L 
O p e r a t i n g f i l e : DsPHOTO.DMP / O L D 
U T I L I T Y = PHOTO CAMERA Q U A L I T Y 
U T I L I T Y KNOWLEDGE C O N S T R U C T I O N 
G r o u p n a m e : PHMARE 
F i l e : D :PHMAR.DMU/OLD 
D E C I S I O N S P A C E L I S T 
P R I C E = ( l O O i l O O 1 5 0 i l 5 0 2 0 0 i 2 0 0 2 5 0 . 2 5 0 ) 15"/. 
T Y P E * ( o u t i s a u t ) 15'/. 
F A C I L = ( m a n y i r i f e w i f e w i v f e w ) 30"/. 
P E R F = ( v g o o r i i f g o o d » f a i r » r p o o n p o o r ) 30*/. 
C 0 N V = ( v e r y » f a i r I y i c o n v > n o t v e r y i n o t ) 10"/ 
U T l L I T Y = ( e x c i g o o d » a c c e p t i p o o n n a c c e p t ) 
31 c o m b i n a t i o n s e n t e r e d . 
L I S T ( A L L ) 
P R I C E T Y P E F A C I L P E R F CONV 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
a u t 
a u t 
many v g o o d v e r y 
many v g o o d f a i r l y 
U T I L I T Y 
e x c 
cue 
1 0 0 a u t many f a i r v e r y 
g o o d 
1 0 0 a u t q f e w v g o o d f a i r l y 
g o o d 
1 0 0 a u t q f e w r p o o r v e r y 
a c c e p t 
a c c e p t 
1 0 0 s a n t many f g o o d v e r y 
1 0 0 s a u t f e w f a i r f a i r l y 
1 0 0 5 a u t v f ew f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 a u t many v g o o d v e r y 
1 0 0 150 a u t many f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 au t q f e w f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 a u t q f e w f a i r f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 a u t f e w v g o o d f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 a u t v f e w f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 0 0 1 5 0 s a u t many f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 5 0 2 0 0 a u t many v g o o d v e r y 
1 5 0 2 0 0 a u t v f ew f g o o d f a i r l y 
1 5 0 2 0 0 au t v f e w p o o r no t 
1 5 0 2 0 0 s a u t many v g o o d v e r y 
1 5 0 2 0 0 s a u t v f e w v g o o d v e r y 
1 5 0 2 0 0 5 a u t v f e w f g o o d v e r y 
200 250 a u t i a n v r -;.vir crr.v 
e x c 
p o o r 
a c c e p t 
e x c 
g o o d 
g o o d 
a c c e p t 
g o o d 
p o o r 
g o o d 
e x c 
p o o r 
n a c c e p t 
ex c 
g o o d 
p o o r 
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p o o r 
2 0 0 2 5 0 a u t many p o o r n o t v e r y 
n a c c e p t 
2 0 0 2 5 0 a u t f ew r p o o r n o t 
n a c c e p t 
?50 a u t many v g o o d v e r y 
e x c 
»50 s a u t q few r p o o r f a i r l y 
n a c c e p t 
2 5 0 s a u t q f e w p o o r c o n v 
n a c c e p t 
2 5 0 s a u t f e w f a i r v e r y 
n a c c e p t 
?50 s a u t f e w r p o o r v e r y 
n a c c e p t 
?50 s a u t v f ew r p o o r v e r y 




In writing this thesis, my purpose has been to reconsider the multi-attribute 
decision-making problem. I have argued that the existing methods for 
tackling this problem are unsatisfactory when extended to problems with a 
strong human factor. The reasons for this are many, but boil down to the 
belief that the traditional mathematical methods may not be used to model 
human reasoning. These require that the decision-maker should obey some 
axioms of 'rationality' and should express his feelings about the value of 
alternatives numerically. In practice this is inadequate. 
A suitable tool for dealing with the real problems of multi-attribute 
decision-making was sought, and fuzzy set theory and fuzzy reasoning 
seemed suitable. This tool was appraised and methods suggested for how 
it might be applied in practice. The previous attempts to apply fuzzy set 
theory to multi-attribute decision-making were considered, and deemed ad 
hoc. 
A new approach to the problem was suggested, together with a practical 
recipe for its use. Worked examples and real trials have demonstrated 
that such an approach has potential as a personal or management tool. 
Such an approach relies upon the concept of participative decision-making. 
Despite the extra effort involved, participative decision-making is gaining 
credence as a constructive and useful way to design and implement systems. 
The present climate of worker participation, educated users and shop-floor 
involvement in decision-making ensures that autocrat ic management 
practices are becoming unacceptable. At the same time, there is much to 
be gained in achieving successful implementation if the users of a system 
are involved in its design. The end-product of a decision, i.e. an 
implemented choice, has received less attention than it should, but it is 
hoped that participative decision-making will help to achieve greater success 
here. 
In the participative decision-making process, the analyst takes a back seat, 
relinquishing much of the status and control which he once enjoyed. The 
decision aid should be free of his value system, even if this is only in the 
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way in which information is aggregated. The choice of the method of 
processing information must be open to the decision-makers, so that truly 
participative decision-making will consider the meta-levels of the problems 
as well. The analyst must become an educator, in the classical sense. 
The analyst's status is derived, in part, from the decision-making technique 
which he advocates. If this technique is complex and highly mathematical, 
say, then the analyst, who understands it, will retain control. Participative 
decision-making demands techniques which are easy to understand and apply. 
Because of the large amount of information processing involved in 
decision-making, the decision-maker needs a structure upon which to base 
his ideas. Multi-attribute utility theory did, in fact, provide such a 
structure, although the language involved was difficult for users to trust and 
understand. A technique based upon the use of verbal statements and a 
means of choosing the way to combine information seems best. 
Fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic provided the mathematical foundation upon 
which to build such a theory. In complex or human systems, there is an 
exchange between precision and significance, and it was this realisation 
which fostered the conception and development of fuzzy set theory, with its 
pragmatic attitude towards problem solving. Despite continuing objections, 
fuzzy set theory enjoys an expanding sphere of interest. Perhaps its chief 
contribution has been in making subjectivity respectable, and in removing 
the spurious need to express subjective opinions numerically. 'Rationality' 
had been defined as obedience to axioms whose only purpose had been to 
extend the realm of objectivity to include subjective phenomena as well. 
FURTHER WORK 
Looking towards the future, it would seem that fuzzy set theory might play 
a role in the development of the next generation of management tools. 
The work of people such as Machin (1977), Radford (1975), Howard (1975) 
and Boxer (1978) show new approaches based on the need for communication 
within an organisation, and an expression of the opinions of the people 
involved. We might speculate that this represents a movement towards the 
top of Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of human needs, i.e. to fulfil the need for 
growth and self-actualisation of the individual. Rather than obey 
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prescribed decision-making behaviour, the decision-maker must play the 
meta-game and understand better his own motives. This is a demanding 
task, and does not permit the decision-maker to relinquish the chore of 
decision-making to an automated technique. Rather, the burden of the 
analysis is with the decision-maker himself, so that the decision-maker is a 
vital part of the decision-making process. 
These ideas must determine the way in which mult i -attr ibute 
decision-making tools will develop. If the process is to become 
computer-assisted (as those mentioned above already are), then there are 
some guidelines which it ought to follow. Most importantly, such a 
program is intended to educate the user by gaining, not knowledge, but 
insight into his own decision-making behaviour. His information-processing 
capacity may be expanded, because a greater amount of information is 
readily available. Such a program is intended to train and not necessarily 
to replace the decision-maker, although he should have the option to hand 
over responsibility to the program, once satisfied with the results. 
This requires that the program to assist multi-attribute decision-making 
should be flexible. Such a program may be put to many uses, both 
personal and commercial, and it should be able to cope with all such cases. 
Traditional decision-making tools such as multi-attribute utility theory and 
mathematical expectation should be available to the decision-maker when he 
wishes to apply them over any range of the decision space. Such methods 
are examples of information aggregation processes, and if their axioms of 
rationality appeal to the decision-maker, then he should be able to use them 
as he wishes. 
The program should also be flexible enough to accommodate the highly 
reiterative nature of such an enquiry. The decision-maker should be able 
to move freely to and from previous steps, adding and deleting attributes, 
vocabularies, alternatives and preference statements. The process of 
exploration should result in the insightful generation or adoption of heuristic 
rules of problem-solving, and a handy means of updating a list of heuristics 
should also be available. 
Such a program should enable the investigator to look at both the problem 
and the meta-problem. The analysis of the problem should follow the lines 
outlined in Chapter 8, i.e. definition of object ives, recognition of 
uncertainty and assessment of status quo. The meta-problem stages involve 
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the definition of an ideal solution, rank ordering the objectives and 
considering the alternatives. In these stages, the computer acts as an 
information handling device, and cannot contribute directly to stages such as 
analysis of variance, devising new alternatives and the statement of 
heuristics, which require imagination and insight. The division of labour 
between man and machine must be recognised, and we should avoid the 
pitfalls of giving the machine more of the task than necessary. 
The process of finding the preference ordering of alternatives and- the rules 
which are associated with choice are particularly the concern of such a 
program, however. It is assumed that the decision-maker can state the 
satisfaction he obtains from the ideal solution, as well as from the status 
quo and perhaps an intolerable solution. He can devise alternatives and 
describe their outcomes, and state a 'utility' value which they also 
represent. The decision-maker may explore his decision space in one of 
two ways - either he generates the description of an alternative himself and 
assesses its value to him, or the computer generates a description by 
changing a previous description slightly and suggests it for the 
decision-maker to evaluate or compare with the computer's assessment 
derived from previous information it already has available. This second 
method provides no description of the policy whereby a part icular 
alternative as described may be achieved. Both methods may be checked 
by presenting all the aalternatives to which the decision-maker has given 
the same 'utility' value, and checking that they are indeed equally preferable. 
The eventual output of such a program should be a table of preference 
statements, a list of heuristics, an educated decision-maker and a decision. 
A simpler, less flexible version of such a learning program is being 
developed and tried out in practice at the Jozef Stefan Institut, but it is 
the author's intention to develop a more sophisticated version. This work 
has already begun. 
The development of such a program must go hand-in-hand with applications 
of this approach. The program must suit the way in which people desire 
to use such a tool, and so a program written without testing the ideas 
behind it is less likely to be genuinely useful. It must be emphasised that 
practical trials are very important, and the next stage in the development 
of the ideas of this thesis must involve both rigorous practical tests and 
computer assistance. 
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